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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho) 
Corporation; TIMBERLINE DEVELOPMENT) 
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability ) 
Company, 
Case No. CV-2009-554*C 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-vs-
VALLEY COUNTY, A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) Supreme Court No. 38830-2011 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------------) 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley. 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge 
Presiding 
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Jed Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villegas ISB# 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 West Main 
P. O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
Vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
AHCtt1t; N. t51\mIJUHY, \Jl..tR" 
BY. Cio-;;;~ 
CaseNa InslNo __ --
A~4J..M_--P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idabo. 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV -2009-S54-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATT WOLFF 
MATT WOLFF, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
t. That I am an aduJt over the age of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of 
Boise, Ada County. Idaho, and that 1 have personaJ knowledge of the facts set forth in this 
Affidavit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATT WOLFf· 1 
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2. I am a member of and a manager of RedWolff Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company (referred to hereafter as "RedWolff Ventures"). Henry Rudolph, also a 
member and manager of RedWolff Ventures, signed an application to Valley County for a 
conditional use permit ("CUP") on behalf of RedWolff Ventures to construct the Whistler's 
Cove Subdivision located in Valley County. RedWolff Ventures' application was approved by 
the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission on March 8,2007 and CUP No. 07-04 was 
issued to RedWolffVentures, effective March 20,2007. A true and correct copy of the CUP is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
3. Condition No.1 J of the CUP states that RedWolff Ventures shall enter into a 
Development Agreement with Valley County. Exhibit A, Conditions of Approval, of the Staff 
Report of Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission, dated March 8, 2007, identifies as 
Condition No.5 that RedWoltT Ventures "[mJust enter into a Road Development Agreement 
with the Board of County Commissioners." A true and correct copy of toe March 8,2007, Staff 
Report is attached this Affidavit as Exhibit B. The Staff Report's Attachment D is a letter from 
Valley County's engineer, Jeffery Schroeder, dated February 28, 2007, which states, in relevant 
part: "4. CU.P. 07-04 Whistler's Cove Subdivision: ... Vaney County will require a Road 
Development Agreement (RDA) for this project." 
4. In fulfilling the conditions of the CUP and in order to obtain approval of the final 
plat for Whistler's Cove Subdivision, RedWoltT Ventures was required to enter into a Road 
Development Agreement with Valley County and pay the fee caJculated by Valley County 
Engineer for the Wagon Wheel 2007 Capital Improvement Area where Whistler's Cove 
Subdivision is located. 
AFFIDA VIT OF MATT WOLFF - 2 
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5. RedWoltT Ventures did not otTer to pay to mitigate for any impacts on county 
roadways attributable to traffic generated by Whistler's Cove Subdivision. Rather Valley 
County required RedWoltTVentures to enter into the Road Development Agreement pursuant to 
the conditions placed on its CUP. 
6. At no time in my meetings and interactions with any Valley County representative 
with regard to RedWolff Ventures' CUP was I told or advised that the Road Development 
Agreement and payment of the fee was voluntary, or that RedWolff Ventures had an option not 
to enter into the Road Development Agreement. At no time in my meetings Or interactions with 
Valley County representatives with regard to RedWolffVentures' CUP was I told or advised that 
the fee paid under the Road Development Agreement was negotiable or that RedWoltTVentures 
could elect not to pay a fee. At no time in my meetings or interactions with Valley County 
representatives with regard to RedWolffVentures' CUP was I told or advised that the contents of 
the Road Development Agreement were negotiable or that ) could strike certain parts or 
provisions of the Road Development Agreement. Red Wolff Ventures was not given the option 
of proceeding with the development of Whistler's Cove without improvements to the roadways. 
7. Since Valley County imposed the Road Development Agreement and the 
associated fee as a condition to receive a final plat. I believed that Valley County had legal 
authority to do so. Had J been advised by Valley County that the fee under the Road 
Development Agreement was negotiable or that RedWoltfVentures had an option not to pay the 
fee, RedWolffVentures would not have paid the fee. 
8. With my consent, Henry Rudolph signed the Road Development Agreement on 
behalf of RedWolff Ventures on September 17. 2007. A true and correct copy of the Road 
Development Agreement is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C. RedWoltfVentures paid the 
AFFlDA VIT OF MATT WOLFF· 3 
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fee required by Valley County on October 29, 2007 in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Six and no/l00 Dollars ($44,256.00). 
9. RedWolff Ventures did not voluntarily enter into the Road Development 
Agreement with Valley County or voluntarily pay the fee under the agreement. RedWolff 
Ventures did so only because Valley County required it as a condition to approval of the final 
plat and as a condition for scheduling a hearing before the County Commissioners to approve 
final plat for RedWolffVentures' project. 
~~ 
SUBSCRIBED and S WORN to before me this .;:LIs+-day of ~ 20] O. 
MARY C. HOLT 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ).. day of IVff/.tlt./ur , 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to: by fax transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by persona~ly delivering to or 
leaving with a person in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, 10 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise. ID 83701-2720 
TeJephone: (208) 388-1 200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
AFFIDA VTT OF MA TT WOLFF· 5 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ '] Hand Delivery 
r i U.S. Mail 
[ J Fax 
f ] Overnight Delivery 
[x1 Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
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. 
Plannina and Zoning Commission 
VAJ.J.E( COUNTY 
IDAHO 
P.O. Sox 13SOI219 Hortt\ Main ~, Idaho 83611-l3SO 
Approved by _~~!!!"£~~1l:J~~ __ 
CON DI T JON AL V S'E PI: RMIT 
NO. 07-04 
Whittler', Co-ve Sab4Msion 
Issued to: Henry Rudolpb 
Red Wolf Ventutes, LLC 
56 Meadow Lane, Highway 21 
Boise, ID 83716 
!>hone: 208.382.7114 
FAX: 208.382.1119 
Property Location: The site is located on Lots 6 II.. 7. M&E Wagon Wheel Subdivision No. 7 
and portions of Sec. 34. T. 16N. R. JE. a.M., Valley County,1daho. 
There have been no appeals of the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission's decision of 
Marcb 8, 2007, The Commission's decision stands and you ~ heJeby issued Conditional Use 
Pennit No. 07-04 with Conditions for establishing a 26 lot single famjly residence as described in 
the application, staff report. and minutes. 
The effective date of this permit is March 20,2007. The use mLlSt be estabHshed according to the 
phasing plan or a permit extension in compliance with the Valley County Land Use and 
Development Ordinance will be required. 
Conditions of Approval: 
t . The application, the staff repon. and the provisions of the Land Use and Development 
Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations are aU made a part of this permit as if written in full 
herein. 
2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shall require an additional 
Conditional Us~ Permit. 
Conditional Use Permit 
Page 1 
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3. The final plat shall be recorded within one year of the date of approval or this permit sba]] be 
null and void. 
4. The issuance of this permit and these conditions will not relieve the applicant from 
complying with applicable County. S1a1e. or Federal laws or regulations or be consuued as 
pcrmislrion to operate in vioilllion of any statute or regulations. Violation of tbese law"~ 
regulations or nales may be grounds for revocation of the Conditional Use Permit or grounds 
for suspension of [he Conditional Use Permit. 
S. A final site-grading pJan with a stonnwater management plan showing BMPs should be 
reviewed and approved by the Valley County Engineer prior to construction of the road. 
6. The CeRs shall address wood burning devices and lighting requirements. 
1. Utilities shall be placed to each tot and the road constructed prior to final plat reeordation or 
shall be financially guaranteed. 
8. A wetland delineation/detemination shan be submitted to the Planning and wning office 
prior to distwbanee of the land. 
9. A letter of approval from the Donnelly Rural Fire District is required. 
10. A will serve letter is required from the North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District 
prior to plat recordation. 
11. A Development Agreement shall be approved by tbe Board of County Commissioners. 
12. No building permits shall ~ issued until sewer and fue protection are in place. 
'3. A note shall be placed on the face of the plat that states. "There must be safe separation of 
two feet between the foundation and groundwater. Also. if fiJI is required. the fill must be 
imported." 
14. High groundwater eJevation muu be sbown for each Jot on the fmal plat. 
END CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
Conditional Use Pennit 
Page 2 
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Cynda Hm-iek. AlCP 
VALLty COUNTY 
ID~HO 
PODoll3S0 
~19}lor1h Main Strcd 
C~.ldaho aJ611·13~ 
Plannin& .t. ZORina AdministralDr 
f lood Pia;" CoorOirwor 
Phone: 208.312.11 IS 
F.x: !0i.312.7119 
HEA.RING DATE: 
TO; 
STAPF: 
APPLICANTIOWNER: 
SURVEYOR: 
LOCA TIONISIZE: 
REQUEST: 
ST AFP REPORT 
Conditional Use Pennit Application No, 07-04 
Whistler's Cove Subdivision, Preliminary Plat 
March 8,2007 
Planning and Zoning Commission 
Cynda Herrick, AICP 
Hul')' Rudolph 
Red Wolf Ventures. LLC 
56 Meadow Lane, Highway 21 
Boise,lD 83716 
Bob Fodrea 
Rennison Fodrea. Iii<:. 
PO Box 188 
Cascade,lD 83611 
E·Mail: chemck@Co.vallcy.id.us 
Web: "'_,tQ,vlllcy.jd,\!! 
Located in Sec, 34, T. 16N, R. 3E, B.M .• VaUey County. Idaho . 
The property j s 12 acres. 
EXISTING LAND USE: 
26-Lot Single-Family Residential Subdivision. 
Singtc-Family Residential Subdivision. 
BACkGROUND: 
The applicant is Henry RudoJph. He is requesting preliminary plat approval to re-establish a. 26-
lot single-family subdivision, on 12 acres. The lots would be served by individual wells and 
North Lake Recreational Water and Sewer District. Access would be from Jacks Lane. The site is 
located on Lots 6 and 1, Blo<:k 2, ofM&E Wagon Wheel Subdivision No.1. 
Whistler's Cove Subdivision, preliminary plat, was previously submitted on January 27, 2005. 
The Planning and ZOning Commission denied the application on March 10,2005. due to density 
and wetland concerns. An appeal of the PJanning and Zoning Commission's decision went before 
the Board of County Commissioners on May 2, 2005. The Board overtumed the Planning and 
Zoning Commissjon's decision. A Conditional Use Pennit was issued. effective May 3. 2005, 
Staff Report 
C.U.P.07*04 
Page 1 of 11 
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expiring on May 3, 2006. The applicant was notified after the permit had expired. 
FINDINGS: 
1. Application was made to Planning and Zoning on January 22, 2007, 
2. Legal notice was posted in the Central Idaho Star News on February 15, and February 22, 
2007. Neighbors within 300 feet of tbe property line were notified by letter dated February 20. 
2007. Potentially affected agencif:5 were notified by letter dated February 5, 2007. The site was 
posted February 28. 2007. 
3, Agency comment reeeived: 
Bureau of Reclamation responded by tetter received February 27. 2007. They requested the 
following: 
• Include infonnation regarding encroachments on the recorded plat. 
• Prepare a stormwatel' abatement pJan. 
• Construct a single-raU fence. on Reclamation lands, along the subdivision 
boundary. 
• Infonn residents that Reclamation lands are designated as conservation and open 
space areas. 
• No Rt:elamation lands shall be designated within the subdivision plat. 
Central District Health Department responded by fax received February 16.2007. They have nOl 
received an application for this development and have no comments at this time. 
Neighbor comment received: none. 
4. PhysicaJ characteristics of the site: Agricultural. 
S. The surrounding land use and zoning lncludes: 
North: Single-Family Residential Subdivision. 
South: Agricultural (Bureau of Reclamation land). 
East: Agricultural (Bureau of Reclamation land). 
West: Single-Family Residential Subdivision. 
6. The Comprehensive Plan contains policy created and adopted by VaHey County. The Plan 
promotes residential uses to increase private property values. However. it also requires 
consideration of compatjbili1y with swroundingland uses. 
7. Land Use and Development Ordinance. This proposal is categorized under 2. Residential 
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Uses c. Subdivision for single-family residence 1n Table 1 ~A. 
The following se<::tions ofthe land Use and Development Ordinance apply to this application. 
3.03 STANDARDS 
The provisions of 1his section shaH apply to the various buildings and uses designated herein as 
Conditional Uses. 
3.Dl.01 LOT AREAS - GENERAL 
a. Minimum lot or parcel sizes are specified herein under the site and development standards for 
the specifiC use in sections 3.03.09 through 3.03.13. 
b. The minimum lot size and configuration for any use shall be at least sufficient to 
accommodate water supply facilities, sewage disposal facilities, replacement sewage disposal 
facilities, buildings. parking areas, streets or driveways, open areas, accessory structures, and 
setbacks in accordance with provisions herein. All lots shall have a reasonable buiJding site 
and access to that site. 
c. AU lots or parcels for Conditional Uses shall have direct frontage along a public or private 
road with minimum frontage distance as specified in the site or development standards for the 
specific use. 
3.03.02 SETBACKS - GEN~RAL 
a. The setbacks for aJ I structures exceeding three feet in height are specified herein under the 
site and development standards for the specific use. 
b. All residential buildings shaU be setback at least thirty (30) feet from high water lines. All 
other buildings shall be setback at least one-hundred (100) feet from hlgh water lines. 
c. Front yards shaU be determined by the structure establishing the principal use On the property 
and the location of the access street or road. 
d. No other struc1ure may enc.roach on the yards determined for the structure establishing 
principal use. 
e. All building setbacks shall be messlll'ed horizontally, on a perpendicular to the property line, 
to the nearest comer or face of the building including eaves, projections, or overhangs. 
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3.03.03 BUILDINGS - GENERAL 
a. AU buildings or structures to be set on a pennanent foundation and exceeding ] 20 square feet 
in roof area are subject to the provisions. of "County Building Code ONinance" 1-76, 2-77. 4-
88. and 99-2. or any subsequent updates or adoptions. Compliance with the provisions of 
said ordinance shall be a condition of approval of the Conditional Use Permit. 
b. Building permits are required and may be obtained from the Valley County Building 
Department after the Conditional Use Pennit is issued. The Building Department win assist 
the zoning department by imposing pertinent conditions of approval on the building penni1. 
c. Building height, shape. floor area, construction material, and location on the property may be 
regulated herein under the site and development standards for the specific Use as well as by 
provisions of the "Building Code". 
3.03.04 SITE IMPROVEMENTS - GENERAL 
a. Grading 
Grading to prepare a site for a conditional use or grading. vegetable removal, construction or 
other activity that has any impact on the subject land or on adjoining properties is a conditional 
use. A Conditional Use Pennit is required prior to the start of such an activity. 
Grading for bona-fide agricullUl'8.1 activities, timber harvest, and similar permitted uses herein are 
exempt from this section. 
Grading within flood·prone areas is regulated by provisions of Section 4.02 herein and the Flood 
Damage Prevention Ordinance No. 3-90. A pennit, ifrequired, shall be a part of the Conditional 
Use Pennit. 
Grading or disturbance of wetlands is subject to approvaI of the U.S. Corps of Engineers under 
the Federal Clean Water Act. The federal penn it. if required, shall be part of the Conditional Use 
Pennit. 
The Conditional Use Permit Application shall include a site-grading plan, or preliminary site-
grading plan for subdivisions, clearly showing the existing site topography and the proposed final 
grades with elevations or contour lines and specifications for materials and their placement as 
necessary to complete the work. The plan shall demonstrate compliance with best management 
practices for surface water management for pennanent management and the methods that wilJ be 
used during construction to control or prevent the erosion, mass movement, siltation, 
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sedimentatioll, and blowing of dirt and debris caused by grading, excavation. open cuts, side 
slopes, and other site preparation and development. The plan shall be subject to review of the 
County Engineer and the Soil Conservation District. The information received from the County 
Engineer, the Soil Conservation District, and other agencies regardins the site-grading plan shall 
be considered by the Planning and Zoning Commission andlor the Board of County 
Commissioners in preparing the Cooditions of Approval or Reasons for Denial of the 
applications. 
For subdivisions, preliminary site grading plans and storm water management plans must be 
presented for review and approval by the Commission as part of the conditional use permit 
application for subdivisions. However, prier to construction of infrastructure, excavation, or 
recordation of the final plat. the final plans must be approved by the Valley County Engineer. 
All land surfaces not used for roads, buildings, and parking shall be covered either by natural 
vegetation. other natural and undisturbed open space, or landscaping. 
Prior to issuance of building pennits. The administrator must receive a certification from the 
developer's engineer verifying that the storm water managemen1 plan has been implemented 
according to approved plans. 
b. Roads and Driveways. 
I. Roads for pub]jc dedication and maintenance shall be designed and constructed in 
accordance with the "Subdivision Ordinance" and in accordance with "Construction 
Specifications and Standards for Roads and Streets in Valley County. Idaho" . 
2. Residential Developments, Civic or Community Service Uses, and Commercial Uses 
shaH have at least two acces1 roads or driveways to a public stree' wherever practicable. 
3. Private roads shan meet the provisions of the Valley County Subdivision Ordinance and 
any policies adopted by the Board of County Commissioners. 
4. Cattle guards shall not be installed in public roads within residential developments. 
5. Access to Highway 55 shall be limited al all locations and may be prohibited where other 
access is a'Vailable. An access pennit from the Idaho Transportation Department may be 
required. 
c. Parking and Off Street Loading Facilities. (See LUDO for specifics.) 
d. Landscaping.. (See LVnO for specifies.) 
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e. Fencing: 
3. If livestock are allowed in a residential development then fencing shall be installed to keep 
Jivestock out' of public street rights-of-way. Cattle guards shall not be installed in public 
roads within residential developments. 
S. Fence construction and materials shall be in accordance with commonly accepted good 
practice to produce a neat appearing durable fence. The location, height, and materials 
used for constructing a fence shall be 8J)J'fOved by the Commission and specified in the 
conditional use permit. Fences required for any conditional use shan be maintained in 
good repair. 
6. Where a Conditional Use adjoins an Agricultural Use where animal grazing is known to 
occur for more than 30 consecutive days per year, the permittee shall cause a fence to be 
constructed so as to prevent the animals from entering the use area. The pennittee shall 
provide for the maintenance of said fence through covenants, association documents, 
agreement(s) with the adjoining owner(s). or other form acceptable to the Commission 
prior to approval of the permit so that there is reasonable assurance that the fence will be 
maintained in functional condition so long as the conflicting uses continue. 
7. Sight-obscuring fences. hedges, walls, Jattice-work, or screens shall not be constructed m 
such a manner that vision necessary for safe operation of motor vehicles or bicycles on or 
entering public roadways is obstructed. 
f. Utilities: 
1. All Jots or parcels for, or within Conditional Uses, shan be provided, or shall have direct 
access to, utility services including telephone, electrical power, water supply, and sewage 
disposal. 
2. Central water supply and sewage systems serving three (3) or more separate users shall 
meet the requirements of design, operation, and maintenance for central water and sewage 
systemS in the "Subdivision Ordmance". 
3. Probability of water supply, as referred to in (1) above, can be shown by weUlogs in 
general area or by a determination of a professional engineer, hydrologist, or soil 
scientist. 
4. Ifindividual septic systems are proposed to show compliance with sewage disposal 
requirements in (I) above, sanitary restrictions must be lifted on every )ot prior to 
recordation unless it is designated as a lot where a building pennit will never be issued 
for a residential unit, such as pasture lot, common area, open space, or a no build lot. 
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5. Easements or rights-of-way shall be set aside or dedicated for the constnJCtion and 
maintenance of utilities in accordance with (he provisions oftbe "Subdivision 
Ordinance" . 
6. A Utility Plan showing the schedule of construction or installation of proposed utilities 
shall be a part nfllie Conditional Use Pennit. 
3.03.05 IMPACT REPORT 
3.03.06 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS· GENERAL 
a. Noise. 
1 .stockpiling, andJor hauling ohald materials from site approved by the County for said 
purposes that are located outside the North Fork of the Payette River Drainage of the 
County. 
2. The noise emanating from any residential, recreational, or commercial airstrip or airport 
will be considered in the conditional use pennit process. The FAA will be consulted. 
b. Lighting. 
Purpose - These regulations are intended to establish standards tliat insure minimal light 
pollution. reduce glare, increase energy conservation, and maintain the quality of Valley County's 
physical and aesthetic character. 
Applicability - These standards shall apply to al1 outdoor lighting including. but not limited to, 
search. spot, or floodlights for: 
I. buildings and structures 
2. recreational areas 
3. parking Jot lighting 
4. landscape lighting 
5. signage 
6. other outdoor lighting 
Standards: 
1. All exterior lighting shall be designed, located and lamped in order to prevent: 
• Over lighting or excessive lighting; 
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• Energy waste; 
• Glare; 
• Light trespass; 
• Skyglow. 
2. All non-es.sehtial exterior commercial and residential lighting is encouraged to be turned 
off after business hours and/or when hot in use, Lights on a timer are encouraged. 
Sensor activated lights are encouraged to replace existing lighting that is desired for 
security purposes. 
4. All other outdoor lighting shall meet the following standards: 
a. The height of any ljght fixtUJe or illumination source shall not exceed twenty (20) 
feet. 
b. AJllighting or illumination units or sources shall be hooded or shielded in a 
downward direction so they do not produce glare or cause light trespass on any 
adjacent lot Or real property as depicted in Fi gures 1 and 2 (located at the back of the 
chapter). 
c. Lights or illumination units shall not direct light, either directly or through a 
reflecting device. upon any adjacent lot or real property. Lighting should not 
Hluminate the sky or reflect off adjacent water bodies or produce glare or cause light 
trespass on any adjacent lot or real property. 
5. A II outdoor lights used for parking areas, wa~kways, and similar uses mounted on poles 
eight reet or greater in height shall be directed downward. The light source shall be 
shielded so that it will not produce glare or cause light trespass on any adjacent lot or real 
property. 
7. The installation of mercury vapor lamps is hereby prohibited. 
8. Flashing or intermittent lights. lights of changing degree of intensity, or moving lights 
shall not be permitted. This section shan not be construed so as to prohjbit the flashing 
porch light signal used only while emergency services are responding to a call for 
assistance at the property or holiday lights. 
9. Industrial and elderior lighting shall not be used in such a manner that produces glare on 
public highways and neighboring property. Arc welding, Acetylene Torch-Cutting, or 
similar processes shaH be perfonned so as not to be seen from any point beyond the 
property line. Exceptions will be made for necessary repairs to equipment. 
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10. Sensor activated lights, provided: 
a. 1t is located in such a manner as to prevent glare and Hghting onto properties of others 
or into a public right.of.way; 
b. ]t is set to only go on when activated and to go offwjthin five minutes after activation 
has ceased; 
c. It shall not be triggered by activity off the property. 
II. Lighting of radio, communication and navigation towers along with power Jines and 
power poles; provided the owner or occupant demonstrates that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) regulations can omy be met through the use of lighting. 
12. All applications for a conditional use pennit shall include an outdoor lighting plan for the 
entire site. which indicates how the above standards are to be met. Tbe approved permit 
shall be a part of the conditional use permit andlor the building pennit. 
d. Emissions. 
The emission of obnoxious odors of any kind shall not be pennitted, nor the emission of any 
toxic or corrosive fumes or gases. 
Dust created by an industrial, commercial, or recreational operation shall not be exhausted or 
wasted into the air. All operations shall be subject to the standards in Appendix C - Fugitive 
Dust. State air quality permits, when required, may be a condition of approval of the 
condjtional use pennil or may be required to be a part of the Conditional Use Permit at the 
discretion of the Commission. 
Wood burning devices shall be limited to one per site. Wood burning devices shaH be 
certified for low emjssions in accordance with EPA standards. 
e. Dust. 
Dust and other types of air pollution borne by the wind from such sources as storage areas 
and roads, shall be minimized by appropriate landscaping, paving. oiling, watering on a 
scheduled basis, or other acceptable means. 
Dust created by any approved operation shaH not be exhausted or wasted into the air. The 
standards in Appendix C - Fugitive Dust along with State air quality permits, when required. 
may be a condition of approvaJ of the conditional use permit or may be required to be a part 
of the Conditional Use Permit at the discretion oftbe Commission. 
f. Open Storage. 
Staff Report 
C.U.P.07·04 
Page 9 ofn 
425 
g. Fire Protection. 
Provisions must be made to implement pre-tire activities that may help improve the 
survivability of people and homes in areas prone to wildfire. Activities may include 
vegetation management around the home, use offire resistant building materials, appTopriate 
subdivision design, removal of fuel, providing a water source, and other measW'es, 
Recommendations of the applicable ftre district wi)) be considered, 
h. Community Housing. 
All residential developments, PUDs, and Subdivisions shall provide on-site Community 
Housing units at the ratio of not less than one unit per each ten total pennitted dwelling units 
or platted lots. AU Community Housing W1i.ts must conform to the regulations set out in 
Appendix 0 of this ordinance. 
Subject to the approval of the Commission, which shall consider the recommendation of the 
V ARHA. and only according to the procedW'es set out in Appendix D hereto, these Wlits may 
be provided in alternate locations andlor fees may be paid '"in-lieu" of provision of these 
units. 
Developments shall provide Community Housing according to the following fonnula: 
Density per Gross Acre 
Less than 1 Unit 
1.00- 1.24 
1.25 - 1.49 
1.50 - 1.74 
1.75 - 1.99 
2 Units or More 
CommWlity HOusing 
10% 
11% 
12% 
13% 
14% 
15% 
There shall be a family deferral for land owners who give a portion of their land to immedlate 
family members, up to a maximum of5 lots per land owner. Lots gifted to family members 
shall be restricted for resale for at least S years. [f any lot is sold to an unrelated party prior to 
5 years from date of recordation the family member holding title to said lot shall, at the date 
of such sale. comply with Commtmity Housing requirements,calculated as of the date of the 
original subdivision. Lots gifted to family members shall be recorded with a deed restriction 
desl:.ribing this process. 
Other pennitted and conditional uses, including commercial and industrial uses, win be 
required to include Community Housing should the Commission detennine thal1he use 
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creates a demand for such housing which should be mitigated. In such instances and subject 
to the approval of the Commission, which shall consider the recommendation of the 
V ARHA, and only according to the procedures set out in Appendix D. hereto, these units 
may be provided in alternate locations and/or fees may be paid "m*lieu" of provision of these 
units. 
All Community Housing shaU be priced (on the average, according to the procedures set out 
in Appendix D) to serve households with incomes not exceeding 800/0 of the median income 
for Valley County. 
3.03.07 BONDS AND FEE 
Dependent on the impact report and the compatibility rating as wen as the applicant proposed site 
improvements and structure to be used or constructed, the Administrator may recommend bonds; 
a Development Agreement; reimbursement fees or impact fee ofthe applicant. The Board shall 
have the option of exclusively dealing with the issues of bonds. reimbursement fees, and/or 
application fees, in the case of developments, which are deemed by the Board to be large enough 
in scale to have significant impact on County services and infrastructure. In such case, p\ll'suant 
to the direction of the Board, the Commission shall defer such matters to the Board 
The Commission or Administrator shall have discretion as an inherent condition of the permit to 
impose and collect fees from the applicant for the cost of monitoring and enforcement of 
standards. 
3.03 .• ' RESIDENTIAL USES 
Residential uses requiring a Conditional Use pennit shall meet the foHowing site or development 
standards. 
Subdivisions of land shall also comply with the standards of the "Subdivision Regulations for 
Valley County. Idaho" adopted April 29. i970 and as revised hereafter, 
Developments accommodating mobile homes, motor homes or recreational vehicles shall also 
comply with the standards of the "Minimum Standards and Criteria for ApprovaJ of 
Development and Operation of Mobile Home Subdivisions and Parks, Travel Trailer 
Courts and Parks" adopted May 12, )911 and as revised hereafter. 
Planned Unit Developments, condominiums, and multi·family residential developments sha)) be 
platted in accordance with the regulations of this chapter, the "Subdivision Ordinance", or as may 
be approved in accordance with Chapter g as a planned unit development prior to the sale or 
transfer oftitle to any lot, parcel, or unit. 
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a. Minimum Lot Area. 
!. The equivalent minimwn lot area shall be unlimited herein except for provisions of 
Section 2.03.01, Section 3,03.01 b. t the "Subdivision Ordinance''. the "Mobile Home 
Standards", Table In-A herein, paragraph e. of this section. and paragraph 2 herein. 
2. New subdivisions must be compatible with existing or proposed surrounding land uses 
(See Appendix A). 
New subdivisions for single-family residences and multi-family residences shan provide 
the following minimum lot sizes: 
• An average lot size of two acres where individual sewage disposal and individual 
wil1er supply systems are proposed e)l(cept participants in the Community Housing 
program may have an average lot size of 1.6 Bcres; 
• 20,000 square feet where a central water supply system and individual sewage 
disposal systems are proposed; 
• 12,000 square feet where a central sewage collection and disposal system and 
individual wells are proposed; 
• 8.000 square feet where both central systems are proposed. 
These minimum Jot sizes may not be used to exceed the density limitation of paragraph e. 
of 1his section for any development plans. 
Lot sizes wi1hjn new Planned Unit Developments may vary from these minimum becau~ 
of reduced setbacks or other consideration in accordance witb the proVisions of Chapter 
8. In subdivisions where the amount of Community Housing provided exceeds the 
requirements of Section .3.0.3.06, require"d Jot sizes may be reduced (provided that the 
conditions of aU other sections of this ordinance, and state and federal requirements, are 
met) by an amount equivalent to offset the number oflots in excess of those required 
under Section 3.03.06. 
3. Frontage on a public or private road shall not be less than thirty (.30) feet for each lot or 
parcel. The lot width at the front building setback line shall not be less than ninety (90) 
feet. A P. U .D .• Condominium, or other cluster development may contain lots without 
frontage on a road and widths less than ninety (90) feet in accordance with the approved 
development plan or plat. 
h. Minimum Setbacks. 
The minimum building setbacks shall be thirty (30) feet from front. rear, and side street 
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property lines and fifteen (I S) feet from all side property lines. Setbacks for mobile 
homes in Subdivisions or Parks shall be in accordance with the "Mobile Home 
Standards". A P. u.n., Condominium or other cluster development may include zero lot 
line development and other reduced setbacks in accordance with the approved 
deveiopmenl pJan or pial. 
c. Maximwn Building Height and Floor Area. 
1. Building heighls, except or may be modified by a P.U.D., shall not exceed thirty· five (35) 
feet above the lower of existing or finished gmde. 
2. The building size or floor area. except as may be modified by a P.U.D. shall not exceed 
the limitations of Section 3.03.01 and 3.03.03. 
3. No structure OT combination of&tructures, except as may be modified by a P.U.D., may 
cover more than forty (40%) percent of the lot or parcel. 
d. Site Improvement. 
I. Two ofT-street parking spaces shall be provided for each dweJling unit. These spaces may 
be included in driveways, carports, or garages. 
2. All utility lines, including service lines, that are to be )()Cated within the limits ofthe 
improved roadway in new residential developments must be installed prior to placing the 
leveling coarse material. 
e. Density. 
The density of any residential development or use requiring a conditional use pennit shaH 
not exceed 2.5 dwelling units per acre except for planned unit developments. 
Developments which provide Community Housing at the rate set out in Section 3.03.06.h 
may increase density from 2.5 dwelling units per acre to 3 dwelling units per acre. 
Density shall be computed by dividing the total nwnber of dweJling units proposed by tbe 
total acreage of land within the boundaries of the development. The area of existing road 
rights·of-way on the perimeter oflhe development and public lands may not be included 
in the density computation. 
In subdivisions where the amount of Community Housing provided exceeds the 
requiremenlS of Section 3.03.06, density may be increased (provided that the conditions 
of all other sections of this ordinance, and state and federal requirements., are met) by an 
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amount equivalent to offset the number oftots in excess of those required under Section 
3.03.06.h. 
8. Subdiv .. ioD Regulado.lI: 
Section 315. Lots 
1. The lot size, width, depth, shape and orientation, and the minimum building setback lines, 
shall be appropriate for the location of the subdivision and for the type of development and use 
contemplated. Every lot shall abut upon II street. Comer lots for residential use shall bave extra 
width to pennit appropriate building setbaclts from and orientation to both streets. 
~ (The Commission should review this list to determine any additional necessary 
infcnnation needed.) 
7. The subdivider, upon demand by the Commission. shaH provide the Commission with the 
following infonnation. or sucb portion thereof as the Commission deems necessary. 
(a) data setting forth the highest known water tables for the proposed subdivision and for 
the property lying down-grade and coatiguous to subject subdivision. 
(b) the strata formation of the proposed subdivision for a depth of sixteen (16) feet. 
(c) a percolation test for each acre within said proposed subdivision 
(d) the known weH logs of well! located in surrounding contiguous property. 
(e) the location cfall existing or proposed irrigation ditches, streams, drainage ditches, or 
known underground water courses. 
(1) a statement of policy to be included in the recorded subdivision covenants, jf animals 
are pennitted. regulating and restricting the area against use by animaJs for a radius of 50 
feet from any well site. 
(g) the minimum size of the lot in all instances shaU be adequate to provide for the 
installation of two sewage disposal areas commensurate with sewage disposal demands in 
addition to providing adequate space for typical structures to be erected thereon. 
8. If, upon consideration of such information, the Commission finds that by reason of the factual 
situation and circumstances concerning the subdivision in ques1ion. the health. safety and welfare 
of the inhabitants of the subdivision and the aquifers and streams in question would not suffer 
from pollution. the Commlssion, upon review of such infonnaticn, may approve minimum lot 
sizes for areas to be served as fo11ows: 
(a) public water and public sewage disposal service - 8,000 sq.ft. per lot. 
(b) semi-public water and sewage disposal services -12,000 sq.ft. per lot. 
(c) individual well and individuaJ sub-surface sewage disposal service - 20,000 sq.ft. per 
lot. 
Section 330. Easements 
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1. There shall be provided easements for the utilities upon and across lots, or centered on the 
side lot lines, of a width of a minimum of 12 feet (except fOT entrance service) as and where 
considered necessary by the Commission. There shall be provided an easement 20 feet wide 
centered on the Tear lot line of each Jot for utilities upon and across said lot and which may be 
opened as an alley as set fOM hereinafter. Such easement shall be opened and used as an alley 
upon the determination and finding of the Commission. that the same is required by the public 
convenience and heanh. 
SUMMARY: 
Compatibility Rating; Stall's compatibility rating is a +38. 
StaR' RecommeDdatioD: 
Staff believes the application is consistent with the Valley County Comprehensive Plan, complies 
with the Subdivision Regulations. and substantially complies with the Valley County Land Use 
and Development Ordinance. 
The following item, however, needs to be addressed: 
• I do recommend that you contact Michael David at 315-3711 concerning compliance with 
your participation in the community housing program. 
• How much of the infrastructure is already located? 
Staff recommends approval of the subdivision upon a favorable response 10 the above item. 
ATTACHMENTS: 
Attachment A: 
Attachment B: 
Attachment C: 
Attachment D: 
Conditions of Approval 
Compatibility Rating 
Map of Surrounding Area 
Agency Responses 
CODdidoDB of Approval- Attaebmeut A 
I. The application. the staff report. and the provisions of the Land Use and Development 
Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations are all made a part of this permit as if written in full 
herein. 
2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shall require an additional 
Conditional Use Permit. 
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3. The final plat shan be recorded within one year or this pennit shaH be null and void. 
4. The issuance of this pennit and these conditions wiU not reHeve the applicant from 
complying with applicable County. State, or Federal laws or regulations or be construed as 
permission to operate in violation of any statute or regulations, Violation of these laws, 
regulations or rules may be grounds for revocation of the Conditional Use Pennit or grounds 
for suspension of the Conditional Use Pennit. 
5. Must enter into a Road Development Agreement with the Board of County Commissioners. 
6. Must comply with the requirements of the Donnelly Rural Fire District. A Jetter of approval 
is required. 
7. Must participate in the Housing Authority. 
8. All proposed improvements shall be constructed or financially guaranteed, including but not 
limited to: power. roads, phone, and common areas. 
9. The CCRs shall address wood burning devices, bear proof garbage containers, lighting 
requirements, and Bureau of Reclamation lands designated as conservation and open space 
areas. 
10. The Valley County Engineer shall approve the site grading/storm water management plan 
ptior \0 construction or excavation. 
il. A wetland delineation/determination shall be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office 
prior to disturbance of the land. . 
12. Must construct a singlewraiJ fence, on Bureau of Reclamation lands, along the subdivision 
boundary. 
13. Final plat must include, "[n accordance with Jdaho Code Section 42-1 J 02, no person or entity 
shall cause or permit any encroachments onto Reclamation lands, including public or private 
roads. utilities, fences, gates, pipelines, structure, or other construction or placement of 
objects. without the written pennission of Reclamation". 
L4. No Reclamation lands shall be designated within the subdivision plat. 
1 S. A wi1l serve letter is required from the North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District 
prior to plat recordation. 
Staff Report 
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16. No building pennits shall be issued until sewer and fire protection are in place. 
17. A note shall be placed on the face of the plat that states, "There must be safe separation of 
two feet between tbe foundation and groundwater. Also, if fill is required. the fill must be 
imported. " 
18. High groundwater elevation must be shown for each lot on the final plat. 
END OF STAFF REPORT 
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JeIrrQf Sc:htOtder 
t.1.T. 
Febru8ry 28. 2007 
Cynda Harick, AlCP PI..m.e -loaiDa AdmiDimtor 
P.O. Box 1350 
c. ... .ad.. ID 83611 
P.O. b 671· CWAdt.ldMo ~l 
the fbllawiDlarc commet", perWuina to the lecm.lilted 011 the M:.dl 1*. 2007 Valley 
County P&.mIq and Zollift8 Commiaion Apada: 
N ........... : 
I. VAC 07'()1 A.l'ortitm ojUJM T,..a ROIIII 
ItJlCOlllrntDCtina the AptIticaJt consider iIdusion of amai9ICrA udHty a. 
private !Old rillbU-of-.., tbtoUBb the va&:ated DOrthclrly portloo ofR.eao Vista 
Driw 0Jr2_ ftD&I plIL Addit:iodaIlY. the n.t curve ndiuI DCICIda to be 
cona&r\Jd8d ~ 'With * 1owK, mutherly poItiaI:\ ofae aIDe. 
2. PUD 06-01 BfI/frIIo lIDs", ""'" Y..4C 07-01 A. Pt1Jrfkm o;IOId Slate Ht~ 
Pre!imiDaIy aiel: ..... plmt haw beta suhmiuod 10 VaUcy County for 
mriew lad ba¥llt been IIPPfOWCl 
Bt:sI Mwegt:meot PrIicticcs (BMP9S) ........ bccu ~ OIl tile subadW 
p.n -. 'I1tfa pmjeec ...ru requite ~ wiCft the VaUey COUIIty 
Stoauw*", Bell Mwwe' ,d't Pmcticea M.uaL TOIDPOIC)' EmsiDD CoDtIol 
Meu&Uel m1 BMP'. sbaIl be m place 1&.1 times 'ltInNah out ooastnM:tion 
_my rcquirecI penDIIIIC:IRt aoROD 00IID'0l ........... be iastaIJed. per tho 
JDIIPI8I. 
. The AppliClm will be tecluRd to Ibow saai1Iry ICWCI' and WIter MlI"Vice 
toc:a1ioDs 0Jl the tbI ck:sian for CODJInIdioD widtin My VIIIJey ~ riaht-
of-way ............. oftbis ~mutcomply with the Iddo 
S1IndadJ for Pubic WOIb  (lSPWC). 
1 
86tLtet8a~ ee:et L99~/19/te 
434 
.+:>. 
w 
Vl 
('1'1 
CIJ 
~ 
I 
~ 
~ 
CD (7\ 
... ,.. 
N 
~ 
III 
CD 
N 
i 
IQ; 
... 
,.. 
Z 
N 
'" ;S; 
~ 
N 
II' I' Ii ([t Ii Ir;fa~i il il (l~ tJI!w It tii 
itl Jill It f If I~ II ~ ;fif)" II ~i tii ;1 t., il. ! ~~r'tlf Ii tll ii iltlir fl ·1! 
I gat fI. i II f. I ,". .. 1 ft· f I: B_1 h i!<r • f 
.- II fl ttl. r (if! ~ t~Hr ~j IIi II 1·1;:~i ~ i 
t Ia' ! ~'I l It~QI 1 it" Itll. 
I r rJ ~ 1il ! ~ ... ~~l It"i 
I f~ fit Ii 
n f 3 I ~ l ~I. ~ ... tf . t ~l 
It '< § 8 .. 8 . I II g If ~-'of 
Iury infi'utnIotuIe imbUatfOD or.-~ withlD v.., CCNDty 
~r-'MI)' IDUSt haYe _ approved. traftIc coaIrOI plao in IICCOI'Ciance wi'Ib 
the Manual OD Uaifonn TndIic Com:n.ll Devices (MUTCD). Due to * 
l0c:ati0D and ICOpC of ... ptopOICd PUn. a. compr .... ve ~l plm 
IhouIcl be 18bm1tted ad iDdude rmew(l) from lIlY IIffeded GitJ(s) (i.e. 
Idabo State PIIIrOl. Dclaaclly R.uraI File DUdriet C!tC.). 
The ApplicIDl wiU be required to pn:Mdc • two yar ...,aatee 00.., wadi: 
compbtted for puhIic .-vices or within. public rtabHf-way. 
It COIIIIIUOtiDD ovoIutIons Nm8iD .. tile time of fiDaI pili. the AI1Pliwnt ...til 
be mraiNd to provide • ....,. boad in die amonat of 110% of toIal rwnatntna 
C6a1rUaIioa COIbJ. 11JiI 00IIIIIUCIiGD C08C etIt:ImIde wiD IIIMId prior IlJIIIIOVIl 
&om the vaOcy County EatPneer aadlor Valley COtBItf Road SupcdDle.ateDt. 
J. CUP 01-02 Our FWd IbIda SubtltvUltJIt 
P1te1Unin.ry .. ..-. plAIDS have bees Abmitted to Valley Comuy aad have 
bcca appwed. 
Bat Manaaemc-t Practicet (BMI'ts) ..... .., bean aboWIl aa die ~ 
plaD let. nia project will NqUire compIbuace wkb die VIIIIey County 
StomrwItet Bat ~ Prae1U:a Manual. Temporary &osioo Conrtol 
Me.uun:.1Dd BMP·. abalt be in pWce It aU timet tJJroqb out ClOIlSCrUCtloa 
and 8Jf1 required petJD8DCnt aoRca CODtJoI meuun:a .... be iastaO.ed per ., 
.".,UaI 
Vcricalp.- in .... prcliminaty _ ... __ to be milled with. N8pDCt to 
it1taIcdiOJ(s) II per" Valley COUld Minimum StInduds for R-.d Detdp. 
.ad Ca.astructian (VCSRDC). Addldoaally. ~ erades IDUIt be 
deslped wi1bia. die tblJowiDa pInIDdcr. O.j% < G < 10% 
TypieaI.-dleCdon(l) Deed to be pnMd.od. ia the te'riaed pi_ ..... 
VCSJU)C. 
00Jd Fork RoId iI idealifJecl lIS • miDDr collcecur RIId wbm '*loins .10' 
npt.ot-way (35" adt lide ofCCl1ferlb:wl). ThiI cIcwIopmeat wiU DeOd to 
dedieatc IIoIfditi.oa.J. riaht-of-WILJ aJoaa Gold Pea __ to aaoomrMt1atc .3S· 
riaJd..ot .. way ftom CCIIIk:Idilie. 1'biI rigbt-of..-ay decliad:i0D 'Will DeOd 10 be 
~on'" reviIoct pI-." pior to final pilla ippOVal. 
ApplicIDl must ~ all public ritJhta-of-'MI)' withiD 1M1ep1 bolmd.ri. 
of1bl propoted cIcvelopmcat. 
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Valley CowIty will ~ a Ro.d DewIopDeat Aereeaeat (RnA) for Ibi. 
project. 
T ........ ...,. cui ...... mu.t be nJdoei .... with mini",..,. mdU of 4" .. 
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to tbe ".-ioDed. 
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aIf ........ ou tbe~,...1CI to.lade ~ C\Irft 
caJcuIadou. 
Dc Appli.cM1 wiD be roquind to proYide tile de-iD "*' .,i.meat with Gold 
FOlk Raid oa 1M ~.,. __ 
A private toed decllnlioll DGte IDUIC be bIcIudecl prior to fmII pblt IpIlIOvll. 
If CODIItructioo. ~ rem.in lit the time or fiDal plat. tbe Applicaut wiD 
bo JeqUired to pnwlde. sunty boad ill the ~ of t 10% of .... remaiN", 
coaBtIl~.'tian colli. Tbia CODIInJdion oa&t .,.n.". wiD tilled prior appmval 
from 1M V.uc, Coua£y En..., .adlor Valky Coualy Road Supe.rirttcod.c 
i. CUP 0741 JJ1dn1.'J Caw SrJHIJyUi"" 
PleIimjrwy" amdiDa pIMI wc:re nMewaI, ad sut.equatC'.O",mmu 
Iddnuod per die .pprovallcua'daMd 1 November 2005 II ~
by .I>ouB ~ P.E.. Paramarix. 
vaUey ~ will nqaal!e. R'* ~ ~ (Rl>A) for 1biI 
ptoject. 
JKb Loop (CcMmty RaId) will be idcdi6ed •• _dad 1oaIItw:.d wtJich 
requires .10' ri&hHf-way (3S· elida side of~)' nil ckvetopmcDt 
will DCIOd 10 dediQlle the n:quirtd 70' of ~.way 1« pubHt 'IIIe ... 
1 .... Loop. 1'be Applicant wUl-*'lO ..".,. dDI required riabt-ot'-'MI)' OD. 
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aodIor Va!lcy Cauaty a-s Supet_ • ..seaa DIUtlICCqlt tbI  
ftWl for;public 1IIC prior to &aal ""'lIFPOwi. 
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Valley Couaty woukl request 1bat.,. cbaqa 10 the.pproved piau be 
~ tbrreYNwllpplOVll. 
Prior to 6mt plat lPJIilWaI, VaDey CoUld)' will required that puhllc road 
CODItI'bcIiGD (Jacb Loop) be cati.ficd by cbI: DevelO(JCl'·. En .... 
If COIaItrudion cvoIUIiou rarIIIiJl at the time of ... plat. the AppJl .. wiD 
be 1't1!qUifed to provide aanty bond ill Oae 8IbOlmt of 1 10% oftoCll ,.",.iDinl 
~CMItI. 11da eoDltl'Oction COIl estiJute will ... prior apptoYal 
80m the VIDeyCoua., BItaia«w mtJIot Valley Couaty RGId S~ 
Upon ~ ofdle pubJic n:.I (Jacb Loop). the .AppIiamt will be 
nquimllO IUII-- the aforUleUlioaad for a period of two ,.... 
Applicant.tIIt praervc all pahlic npu-cf-way wifhiD the lcpl bomJdaries 
of the ]'l'O:POIed cIeveIopmeaL 
The AppIicaat will 1Ie ntqUhed to aubmi1cb1: appovod"'" pIcu f« my 
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n::fereaced itant. 
~L?a­J~ 
VaUcy Couaty RA*I J)epa1mIat 
Co: 00rd0D CNieksbank. Valley County Road ~ 
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. Whistlers Cove Subdivision 
ROAD DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
3277S"..5 
THIS AGREEMENT is made dlis 17 ~ day of Sep -M19 b". , 2007, 
by and between Red Wolff Ventures. LLC whose address is 1804 Rairmee Drive, Boise. 
Idaho, 83112, the Developer of that certain Project in Valley County, fdaho, known as 
Whistlers Cove Sulxiivision. and Valley County. a political subdivision of the State of 
Idaho. {hereinafter referred to as "VaUey County"}. 
RECITALS 
Developer has submitted a subdivision application to Valley Count) il..')r approval of a 24 
lot residential development known as Whistlers Cove Subdivision. 
Through the development review of this application, VaHey County identified certain 
unmitigated impacts on public services and infrastructure reasonably attributable to the 
Project. 
Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by 
contributing its proportionate fair share (If the cost of the needed improvements idemiflCd 
in this Agreement and lis1ed on the anached Exhibit A. 
Valley County and the Devdoperdesir~ to memorialize the temlS of their agreement 
regarding the Developer's participation in the funding of certain of tbe aforesaid 
improvements. 
AGREEMENT 
Thel'efore. it is agreed as follows: 
I. Capital Improvement Program: A listing and cost estimate of the Donnelly to 
Tamarack Area 2004 Roadway Capita' Improvement Program, incorporafing 
construction and right-of-way needs for the project area (see map. Exhibil B) is 
attached as Exhibit A. 
2. ProponionfJle share: Developer agrees to a proportionate shal"e of the road 
improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by Whistlers Cove Subdivision 
as established by Valley County. Currently this amount has been calculated by 
the Valley County Engineer to be $461 per average daily vehicle trip generoted by 
the Project. Refer [0 Exhibit A for details of the Donnelly to Tamarack Area 2004 
Capital Improvement Program Cost Estimate. Road impact mjtigation may be 
provided hy Developer either through the c·ontriblltl011 of money or capital offsets 
such as right-of-way or in-kind COI,stl'llction. Such an oftset to the road 
improvements is addressed in paragOlPh 3 of this Agreement. 
Whistlers Cove Subdivision Road Development Agreement Page 10f4 
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3. Capital contribution: Developer agrees to pay a sum equal to $1,844 per Jot (an 
averoge of 4 trips per single family residential lot times $461 per [rip). The 
Developer's propOItionate share of the road improvements identified in Exhibit A 
fOl' rhe 24 Jots shown 01) the Final Plat is $44,256. 
The Developer agrees to pay VaHey County their propoltionate share of roadway 
COSl.'i tor a total casb pa.)'mem of$44,256 dl.le at the time of Final Plat approvaL 
4. The contributions made by Developer to Valley County pursuant to the terms of 
this Agreement shall be segregated by Valley County and earmarked and applied 
only to the project COsts of the road improvement projects specified in Exhibit A 
or to su.:h other projects 8S are lnutullfly agreeable to the parties. 
S. The sale by Developer Df part or all of tllC Project prior to the plaUing lhereof 
shall not trigger any payment or c.ontributicn responsibility. However, in such 
case, the purchaser OfSllCh property. and the successors and assigns thereof. shall 
be bound by dle terms ofihis Agreement in the s!'Ime respecr as De\'e!oper, 
regarding the· property pun:hased. 
6. Recorda/ian: It i~ intended that Valley County will rttotd this Agreement. The 
incent of the recordation will be to document the official aspect of the contractual 
obligati.on set tofU' in d.\\s Agreemei)t. Ihis Agreen"len\ win not in :loy way 
establish a lien or other interests in favor of Valley County as to any real property 
owned by the Developer at the lime of recording, or any real propeny that may be 
acquired by the Developer on any date aftet' the recording of this Agreement. 
Whistlers Cove Subdivision Road Developmerll Agreement 
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Henry Rudolph, Red Wolff Ventures, LLC Manager 
By: ')j;AMSp- <: e~ 
V ALLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: 
B.Y;....--l."c::e==-"'~~_~=~~I.,--~""':=:O' ______ Date: I J( " 0 - 0;7 
CommissionerJChatrman Gerald Winkle 
Commissioner F. W. Eld 
Commissioner Gordon L. Cruickshank 
ATTEST: 
Date: 1#,7 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
) 58. 
COUNTY OF VALLEY ) 
On this ' J-tb. day of ~)~ 2007. before me, Pt:br-och L.. ~ 
the undersigned, a Notaryp blic in and for sajd State. personally appeared 
l:lmr:>j c.. ;z..;do I ph and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
Tn witness whereof. J have unto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year 
~first above written. ( , h"'AI,.! ." ~ \OA .. !J-, -
My Commission Expires: f i5-Q.)- r~._ 
DEBROAH L. NEMETH l' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
••••• b ¥. 0 (k~' 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF VALLEY ) 
On [his .f? day of ~-..L-- 2007, before me . ..s;;~~u.......L~~::::!:::~ 
the: undersigned, a Notary Public i~apd fOJ sL\iQ _~tate. personally ap red 
& .£_ l-'Vu. ,)<.a....L.",L an~'ieCfgeato me that they executed tb~ sam' . 
rn witness whereof [have unto set my band and aftixed my official seal the dar' and year 
abovt: writte 
My Commission Expires: _--,-,II,--'_-_r!.!!.)..._-~()_t' _ _ 
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~tjlO/2010 1Q:48 PAX 
l(09/10 1l:34 20B-388-1300 
IN 1'lll! DISTRiCT COURt OF 'rUB FOUR."LlilUDIClAL DIS'1'R.IC1' Of 
ntH Sl'A.tE Oli 1.DAJiO. iN ANt) FOR nm COUNTY OF v ALLEY 
@OOO2/001& 
BUCKSKIN P.R.C)P1.~RT.:r.BS. INC .. an!Jdaho 
Corgoratiou. aIl4 TIMBEIU.TNB. 
OEVBLOPMl!NT. LI.C, an 141M lJmitcd 
LiabUi1;y CQ~. ORQBR. GMNT/NQ' V ALUyeouNTY'. 
'Mo~1.or. :tQ r.NI.A.Rtt PI\C;l\: ' 
LIMI'tA'rIONJ 
V A.tl .. EY CG)tJ.N'Mf~ a ,poli~1 ,:IubdiyiJ,ion 
ot'l'J:w State'of Tda\c." 
'nils MATTER. having c()mc bef'"re ~o C:O'W:f upon Van:"y C~' 3 Mo{io~ tt? En~c 
Prge ~in!i:tallOJl', olJd havlar ,found IJ'Kd CIW3e tb~!b~j 
IT TS'lf£R£BY CADER.FiO ilutt V~I.Iey (',(lumy"'mution t\'t t:lllargc:'paac linu'hnlorw,i$ 
ORA.NT.P.D 8Ild Valley CCJWlt),:r .. Reply Brief in Kuppon. ofM,udunfor Su..mn~ClI'1 JlIdQMC.t\t.1\ 
1:'101 dccced ·tw\,'1lty-tWO palJCl6 ill.l~th. 
TlATflO this _t!.. .. day ofNavem.bcr. 2{)J O. 
. ~---
.~ 
C- CHA. ... It. MCLAUOUt..1N' 
})j8~el c.ourt Judge 
Rett i'led TilDe No'y, 9,' 12:31PM 
=-==----.. 
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1.1/10/2010 10: 48 FAX 
CL)tQXtS CER'1'P.l(;AT.t: OF Sf:R. VI(!E 
.f bf)reby ~crtHy ~lIt QIl tbc -1l.....dtty ~~:rN()VClmbel'. 20.1'0. ft 1l\lC lWhom:c:c pop.y of the 
foregoing WUllUWG. Upon k &UOtMDI 'ndlvid'llu.1(.} by lhe ll'lH118 \ndfcawd: 
Jtd Manwaring 
VictotVUl~ 
E"l&Plt KeaftC LU' 
14M W.ect Main 
P,O. B<nt,959 
lloiae.lD ·8l?Ol-M19 
Jrnanwarillg@eval)lWnc.com 
nille~tr@''iAllIIbgnc,corn . 
.Ma.;Ithew e, WnUams 
V al\ey C~~\\I:f p.xq.'ICtllt'i~ll Attorney 
1'.0. 80x .1350 
CJI$CuQIt, 'lD 136 J I 
Tel~phone!G208)382,7120 
. l'acsiinlJc: (208) 38Z-7.114 
,,,,wlitia;os(f~():,,a1'cy ,td ;u& 
CbrbtQplJe.r 'H. .~yer~ 1$"& tl446l 
MAllin.C. Hend¥ic~ L'SBojj5871S 
GIV'I'J,ilS PtJRSlJ:!i" .1.1.1' . 
601 w. 8.uanock. St.' 
p .0,. I~()I( -2720· 
llt)iae,. Idaho 1l1m·2.?2t} 
1.'i'tJopbonO: lOtl·lUI' J·200· 
'Fac..""Ilmlle; .2QS..i)8S. UOO 
o~i~oyer@givtm'PUtJltY.CQl1\ 
rllcll@ti\'\Wl,'UlUtsJ~.Y .I:OJD 
Received lime Nov. 9. 12:31PM 
Received Time N()v.l0. il:43AM 
13.S. 1-4ail. l'051.6gu ~a.ld 
F.xprcs.~ ~f.ail 
.J:1and O=livc:ry 
l:aoaimik:. 
B-Mall 
ARCHlE N. BANBURY 
CLERK 
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Matthew C. Williams, ISB #6271 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade,lD 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
mwilliams@co.valleyjd.us 
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Umited 
LiabHity Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VALLEY COUN1Y. a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2009-554 
VALLEY COUN1Y~S REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
V ALLEV COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEl" IN SUPPORT OJ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
10915--2_100628C21 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is Defendant Valley County's ("County") reply brief in support of Valley County's 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 14, 2010. It follows Valley County's Opening 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opening Brief'), and replies to Plaintiffs • 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response Brief'). 
In Idaho. certain impact fees are illegal taxes under Idaho '5 Constitution unless imposed 
pursuant to an ordinance compliant with the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIF A"'), 
Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Valley County did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, 
because it believed in good faith that none was required. Recent lawsuits involving other 
municipalities have successfully challenged impact fees. Accordingly, to be on the safe side, the 
County is now exploring enactment of a new IDIF A-compliant ordinance. But there is no need 
to detennine whether the Conditional Use Pennit ("CUP") or the preliminary Development 
Agreement, proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, final Capital Contribution Agreement, 
and/or Road Development Agreement (collectively "Agreements") at issue here imposed iUegal 
taxes. The question presented in the pending motion is whether Plaintiffs proposed and/or 
entered into the Agreements without objection. accepted the CUP without complaint, avoided 
opportWlities to raise the issue administratively, and waited too long to chaIlenge. I 
This case has nothing to do with due process. Plaintiffs had plenty of process. Indeed. 
part of the County's defense is that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the remedies available to them. 
Plaintiffs' so-called due process claim is based on the contention that the County should have 
enacted an IDIF A -compliant impact fee ordinance and that, if it bad done so, they would have 
been given even more process. But counties are not required to enact ordinances under IDIFA. 
1 In this brief, we use the tenn P1aintiffs to refer to the eurrent Plaintiffs and/or the original 
developers. 
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Thus, the question is, given that Vaney County decided not to enact an ordinance under IDIFA at 
the time, was it unlawful for it to issue a CUP requiring an Agreement? That is purely a state 
constitutional law question which. if answered in the affirmative, would give rise to an 
unconstitutional per se regulatory taking under the state and federal constitutions. But there is no 
need to reach the merits of this claim if the defenses in the pending motion prevail. 
Plaintiffs' devote most of their Response Brief to their effort to show that the County had 
a policy of requiring road impact fees and that there was no room for negotiation. Some of their 
statements inaccurately reflect the record. See footnote 14 at page 21. But this debate is not 
material to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. It is undoubted1y true that, as a general 
statement, the County expected developers to help improve the roads near their developments. 
The County held this expectation in good faith. believing, correctly or incorrectly, that they had 
the power to provide for such improvements without adopting a special ordinance under IDIF A. 
Most developers welcomed having a funding mechanism available to improve local roads and 
operated under the same assumption that this was proper. 
Even if the Court were to assume as true all the facts as stated by Plaintiffs in their 
Response Brief, the defenses to this litigation posed by the pending motion remain valid. The 
material facts are not in dispute, and the motion should be granted as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE ALLEGED 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint includes two claims for relief. In their first claim for reJief, 
Plaintiffs purport to seek declaratory judgment that the County's alleged practice of requiring 
developers to pay for a proportion of road improvement costs attributable to the development is 
illegal under unspecified state law and unidentified state and federal constitutional provisions. 
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Complaint at 4-5. In the second daim for relief, Plaintiffs allege that the County's collection of 
funds pursuant to the Agreements was a taking under the state and federal constitutions for 
which they are entitled to compensation in the fonn of a refund. ld. at 5. Nowhere in P1aintiffs' 
Complaint do they identify the specific Constitutional provisions upon which their daims are 
based nor do they reference any source for their causes of action. 
In its Opening Brief, the County pointed out that claims that are premised on alleged 
vioJations of the U.S. Constitution must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs disagree, 
claiming that they can bring suit alleging federal takings and procedural due process claims 
directly under the federal constitution independent of § 1983. Response Brief at 15-16. (Actions 
broUght directly under the constitution are referred to as Bivens claims, after Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents o/Fed. Bureau a/Narcotics; 403 U.S. 388,389 (1971).) Thismatters 
because ifno Bivens claim is available and § 1983 is Plaintiffs' only access to these federal 
claims, Plaintiffs have problems: (i) they have failed to plead § 1983 and have affirmatively 
disavowed it and (2) a § 1983 claim in this case is barred by various procedura\ hurdles. 
Plaintiffs fail even to address the settled Ninth Circuit precedent on this point in Azul-
Pacifico. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (91h Cir. 1992). the authorities relied on 
in Azul-Pacifico. or subsequent cases such as Golden Gate Hotel Ass 'n 1!. City and County of San 
Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482 (91h Cir. 1994). (TIle "cause of action" issue is a question of federal 
Jaw, so federal cases are controlling.) Instead. Plaintiffs rely primarily on First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987), 
and the reference to that case in a footnote in BHA Investments, inc. v. City oj Boise, 141 Idaho 
168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). Although First English contains some remarkably broad language 
regarding takings claims, it does not address the particuJar question of whether claims alleging 
VALLEY COUNTY'S KEPL Y BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
10915-2_1006261_21 
Page 3 
451 
violations of the U.S. Constitution may he brought independent of § 1983. The opinion does not 
even mention § 1983, and the dissent mentions it only in another context. Nor do the parties' 
briefs. Nor does the case on remand, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church o/Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 258 CaL Rptr, 893 (1989). 
Given that § 1983 was not discussed, it is fair to say tbat First English is not On point. In 
any event, the commentators have recognized that First English is not definitive. "In the wake of 
Monell and the provision of a remedy under § 1983 there is a split in authority as to whether a 
right of action based on the Fourteenth Amendment provides a claim for relief sufficient to 
invoke the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts," Kenneth B. Blcy, Use 0/ the Civil 
Rights Acts 10 Recover Damages in Land Use Cases, ALI-ABA, § lU(S) (2001) (available on 
Westlaw at SF64 AU-ABA 435) (citing Monell v. Dep', o/Social Se~ices, 436 U.S. 658 
(\978». The cases and commentary, however, overwhelmingly support the rule established in 
the Ninth Circuit by Azul-Pacifico and other cases. For exampJe: 
Although § t 983 provides express authorization for the 
assertion of federal constitutional claims against state actors, the 
Supreme Court has endorsed the view, expressed in several circuit 
court decisions, that limitations which exist under § 1983 may not 
be avoided by assertions of Bivens-type claims against state and 
local defendants. [Footnote citing Jell v. Dal/as Independent 
School Disl., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989).] Thus, the availability of 
the § 1983 remedy precludes reliance upon the Bivens doctrine. 
Whether § 1983 preempts an alternative constitutional or statutory 
claim depends upon congressional intent. 
.. , As discussed below, it is settled that § 1983 operates to 
preempt alternative Bivens-type claims asserted directly under the 
federal Constitution. 
The federal courts have consistently adhered to the principle that 
§ 1983 preempts Bivens-type remedies against those who acted 
under co)or of state law. [Footnote citing Azul-Pacifico among 
others.] 
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Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims and Dejenses, § 1.05 (2010) (available on 
Westlaw as SNETLCD s 1.05).2 The authority on this point, none of which is addressed by 
Pla.intitf~ is overwhelming.) An of these cited authorities are post-First English. In any event, 
Azul-Pacifico is crystal clear and directly on point. 
Plaintiffs cite Davis v. Passman. 442 U.S. 228 (1979), for the proposition that due 
process claims may be brought directly l.Dlder the U.S. Constitution and that § t983 is not the 
only means of raising these matters. Plaintiffs misrepresent the holding in this case. Davis 
2 Cases from other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion as Azul-PacifICo include the 
following: Smith Y. Dep'tofPublic Health, 410 N.W 2d 749,787 (Mich. 1987) t'Thus, both Chappell 
and Bush signal a retrenchment from the broad remedial scope evident in the Court's earlier Bivens, 
Davis, and Carlson opinions. Both Chappell and Bush suggest greater caution and increased willingness 
on the part of the Court to defer to Congress on the question whether to create damages remedies for 
violations ofthe federal constitution."); Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 
909, 921 (Conn. 1993) ("In its current configuration, the Bivens line of United States Supreme Court 
cases thus appears to require a would be Bivens pLamti.ff tc establish that he Or she would ~ack any remedy 
for alleged constitutional injuries if a damages remedy were not created, It is no longer sufficient under 
federal law to alJege that the available statutory or administrative mechanisms do not afford as complete a 
remedy as a Bivens action would provide."); Wax 'n Works v. City of St. Paul, 213 F.3d 10]6,1019 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff asserted claim directly under Fourteenth Amendment; court treated it as WIder § 1983 
and denied relief on exhaustion/ripeness grounds); Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir, 1987), 
vacated on other grounds & remanded, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) (when § 1983 action is precluded by statute 
of Jimitations, plaintiff may not bring separate action directly under the Constitution). A case that adopts 
Plaintiffs' view of First English, albeit in dictum. is Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service Dist. No.1, 
220 F.3d 298 (4'" Cir. 2000). Even this case, however, recognizes that this is a departure from the Azul-
Pacifico line of precedent: "Other courts, however, have held, in apparent conflict with First English, 
that a violation of the Takings Clause can only be redressed through a claim under § 1983." Lawyer at 
303 n.4. 
3 Another hornbook on § 1983 notes a variety of federal cases reaching the same conclusion, 
concluding, "The Ninth Circuit asserted that Fourteenth Amendment actions for damages against state 
defendants are precluded by the availability of § 1983." Sheldon Nahnlod, Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983. § 6:59 (2010) (available on Westlaw at ClVLmLIT 
§ 6:59). Another law professor concludes: "Under Bivens, the courts are to refrain from a Bivens-type 
action for damages only when Congress has created an alternative remedy. Originally, the Court withhe1d 
a Bivens damages remedy, because unnecessary, only when the remedy provided by Congress was 
equally effective. Since Bivens, however, the Court bas retreated from that principle and now refuses a 
damages action whenever Congress has made available some relief even if not equal to the damages 
remedy." Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, 
Federalism and the Courts, 59 Missouri L. Rev. 499, 551 (1994) (footnote cites David C. Nutter, Note, 
Two Approaches to Detennine Whether an Implied Cause of Action under the Constitution is Necessary: 
The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 683 (1985». 
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involved a suit by a congressional staffer alleging discrimination protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. The Court specifically noted that she could not bring her suit under § 1983, 
because, as in Bivens, no state actor was involved. Davis,442 U.S. at 239 n.16. Thus, Davis and 
Bivens are consistent in recognizing a direct cause of action for constitutional deprivation under 
facts where no other cause of action is available. Neither is inconsistent with Azul-Pacifico and 
other authorities holding that § 1983 displaces direct constitutional challenges when § 1983 is 
available. 
As the above-referenced authorities make clear, § 1983 is the only cause of action 
available to Plaintiffs for their federal claims. Given that Plaintiffs have afftrmatively, 
definitively, and repeatedly stated. that they are not pursuing any § 1983 claims, they have no 
cause of action for their federal claims. For this reason alone, the federal claims should be 
dismissed.. If Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed under § 1983, their c1aims fail for the reasons 
discussed below. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE ACTIONS IS NOT 
IUPE. 
As noted in Valley County's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 13, the County's future approach to fees for road impacts is evolving. 
Given this, Plaintiffs are in no position to claim that they are entitled to a declaration or 
injunction regarding whether the County can legally require a contract that includes payment 
toward off-site improvements as a condition of approval. Plaintiffs' supposition that the County 
will not change course in the future is, at bes~ hypotheticaL Indeed, the very quotation provided. 
by Plaintiffs (Response Brief at 37. quoting Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767. 773, 133 P .3d 
1232, 1238 (2006» works in the opposite direction. Allowing events to unfold will demonstrate 
whether or not the County and Plaintiffs are able to reach an accommodation as to new plats. 
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Given that many of the defenses the County has raised to this action would not apply to future 
actions, it seems a pretty good bet that the County win wotk out an accommodation. In swn, 
claims based on future actions of the County (regarding the remaining phases or any so-called 
"policy" of the County) are not ripe and are improper subjects for a declaratory judgment. 4 
III. THIS LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiffs concede that § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute oflimitations. 
Response Brief at 17. We have shown above that all claims alleging violation of constitutional 
rights must be brought under § 1983. Accordingly, they are subject to the two~year statute. End 
of story as to the federal cJaims.5 
If the Court does not dismiss them for other reasons, Plaintiffs' state law claims (takings 
and anything else) are subject to the state's catch-all four-year statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs 
concede this point as well (ex.cept for their side argument with respect to the five-year statute 
applicable to contract claims, which we discuss below). Thus, as to state constitutional claims, 
the only question is when the clock starts. lfthe statute began to run before December 1, 2005, 
the state constitutional dairns are barred. 
Plaintiffs contend the statute did not begin to run until they wrote a check on December 
15,2005, thus beating the statute by a few days. For starters, this ignores the fact that they had 
already conveyed right-of-way under the Capital Contribution Agreement on or before final plat 
4 See, e.g., Davidson v. Wright. 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812,816 (2006) ("Idaho has 
adopted the constitutionaUy based. federatjusticiability standard. (Citation omitted.] Idaho courts are 
authorized under I.C. § 10-1201 to render declaratory judgments under certain circumstances, but even 
actions filed pursuant to that statute must present an actual or justiciable controversy in order to satisfy 
federal constitutional justiciability requirements."). 
5 If this Court were to detennine that Plaintiffs could bring their federal constitutional claims 
independent of § 1983. they, too, would be subject to Idaho's catch-all four-year statute of limitations 
under Idaho Code § 5-224. Accordingly, both federal and state claims would be barred for the reason.~ 
discussed below. 
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approval on October 25,2004.6 lt also ignores the law. It is well-settled that the claims run from 
.. the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes 
apparent," that is, when the plaintiff"was fully aware of the extent to which [the government] 
interfered with his full use and enjoyment ofthe property." McCuskey 11. Canyon County 
Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996), Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential 
facts on July 14, 2004, the day they received the CUP and they signed the final Capital 
Contribution Agreement setting out the contribution requirements in ful1 detail. And Plaintiffs 
knew on September 26, 2005, the day they signed the Road Development Agreement governing 
phase II. Indeed, the clock started running even earlier. It ran at least from April 1, 2004, the 
day that Plaintiffs submitted their proposed Development Agreement and Capital Contribution 
Agreement. The Plaintiffs have admitted that the deve]opers included the proposed mitigation 
agreements because they believed such mitigation was required. Pachner Aff., W 4-8. Even if 
the precise tenns or the total amounts changed. it does not matter because the statute runs even 
though plaintiff does not know "the full extent of his damages." McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 217, 
912 P.2d at 104. Indeed. in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982), the 
Court said the statute ran on the date of a meeting between the parties at which time there was 
"recognition of the severity of the problem." 
In the face of this, P1aintiffs cling to the fact one of the pa~ents (for Phase lJ) occurred 
after December 1, 2005. The cases they cite do not help them push the clock back this far. In 
Harris v. State. ex reI. Kemp,horne, 147 Idaho 401, 405,210 P Jd 86,90 (2009). the Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations on inverse condemnation ran from the day the 
6 The minutes of the approval at page 2 recite as foHows: "'accept the dedication of public right-
of-way along Norwood Road and West Roseberry Road; ... agree that the Development Agreement that 
is [in] place covers off-site road improvement costs for this phase; .... " Herrick Aff., Exh. 15. 
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plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a nrinerallease with the state, not the time they made 
payments to the state under the lease. Even if the Phase II payment had been the first 
conveyance under the Agreements, the date the check was written is not the issue. The statute 
was triggered. at a minimum, on the date of the Capital Contribution Agreement and the Road 
Development Agreement. Accordingly, the lawsuit came too Jate. 
Plaintiffs creatively try to avoid application of the four-year limitations period by arguing 
that their claims arise out of the Agreements they entered into with the County, making the five-
year statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 5-216 applicable. "Plaintiffs' have requested in their 
Complaint declaratory relief declaring that the Road Development Agreement executed on 
September 26,2004 [sic], is void ab initio" and should be rescinded. Response Brief at 19. The 
allegations in Plaintiffs' own Complaint belie this assertion. There is nothing in PlaintiffS' 
Complaint that can fairly be interpreted as a breach of contract claim or any request that the 
Agreements be declared void. 
Even if Plaintiffs were pennitted to amend their Complaint (more than six months after 
the deadline) it would be futile. If a contract is deemed illegal, the remedy is not rescission-the 
Court would simp1y refuse to enforce the contract and leave the parties as it finds them. Trees v. 
Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). Here, the parties have both performed their 
respective obligations under the Agreements so there is nothing left to enforce. Rescission is an 
equitable remedy that relieves the parties of their duties and obligations under the contract, and 
returns the parties to their pre-contract positions. Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 
957 (1971). But rescission is not a proper remedy where it would be impossible for the parties to 
return to their pre-contract positions. GME, Inc. v. Carter. 120 Idaho 5]7, 520, 817 P.2d 183, 
185 (1991). That is the situation here. The right-of-way dedicated and the money paid by 
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P1aintiffs have already been put to use. Plaintiffs have already received approval of their final 
plat and the completion of improvements near their development. Herrick Aff., '" 31-35. There 
is no breach of contract claim or theory that would pennit Plaintiffs to obtain both the benefit of 
their bargain with the County (improved roads serving their development) and a refund. In any 
event, it is apparent that this is a case about alleged constitutional violations. not contractual 
violations. This ruse fails. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS FAlL THE TWO SPECIAL "RIPENESS" REQUIREMENTS OF 
W ILLJAMSON COUNTY. 
A. Williamson County Test 1: Tbe "fmal decision" requirelDent applies 
because this is a regulatory taking, not a pbysical taking. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (l985) establishes two special "'ripeness" tests applicable to 
all federal regulatory takings claims. Response Brief at 33. The first is the "final decision" 
requirement. This means that Plaintiffs must use reasonably availabLe opportunities to raise their 
concerns at the administrative level. Plaintiffs undisputedly did not do so. 
Plaintiffs continue to misunderstand the finality requirement in Williamson County. They 
say, "Valley County basically asks this Court to find Plaintiffs should be precluded from 
maintaining this action because it did not object during the public hearings .... " Response Brief 
at 26. That is the least of their failures. The finality requirement in Williamson County is not 
limited to raising an issue at the hearing. For instance, in Williamson County, the Court faulted 
the developer for failing to initiate a new variance proceeding. Plaintiffs had ample 
opportunities to object or otherwise bring their concerns with the Agreements to the COWlty'S 
attention. 7 Williamson County requires that they employ at least one of them. 
7 Plaintiffs could have filed a petition with the County to reopen and amend the CUP. Although 
there is no express provision in the ordinance for such an amendment, the County, having issued the CUP 
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In any event, PlaintiflS' principal defense is that Wmiamson County does not apply to 
them at all because this is a physical taking, not a regulatory taking. Response Briefat 33-34. 
The difference between physical takings and regulatory takings is well-established black-
letter law. In a physical taking, the government forcibly appropriates the person's property. 
There is no quid pro quo and the property owner cannot say, "No thanks." Exactions are 
different. They occur when the plaintiff wants something from the government (e.g .• a pennit) 
and the government seeks to exact something from the plaintiff (e.g. , an easement). When the 
government goes too far, that is a taking. The identifying factor in an exaction is that the 
government takes the property by leveraging its regulatory authority, not by fiat. The regulated 
person could avoid the exaction by decJining the permit. For this reason, exactions are treated as 
a subspecies of regulatory takings, even when the exaction involves land or money.s Because 
pursuant to LLUP A, has inherent authority to entertain a petition by the pennit holder to change the 
permit based on changed conditions or new infonnation. In addition, there are specific remedial 
provisions in the ordinance that could have been employed. First, they could have submitted an 
application for fmal plat approval without making the conveyances contemplated under the Agreements. 
Subdivision Regulations § 250. In that proceeding, Plaintiffs could have presented their position that 
payment oftheir share of road costs is an unlawful exaction. Second, Plaintiffs could have filed an 
application for a new CUP with different conditions to replace the existing ClJP. LUDO, Chapter 3. 
Third, they could have initiated .an investigation Wlder Chapter 12 ofLUDO. This chapter allows any 
person to initiate a proceeding to investigate noncompliance with a CUP. Although these are typically 
employed by third parties andIor County staff, it could just as easily have been employed by Plaintiffs 
through notification to the County that they were unable to reach agreement oc an Agreement, a violation 
of the CUP. Plaintiffs then could have presented their defense that the requirement is unconstitutional. 
Alternatively, they could have simply informed the County that they would not sign the Agreements, and 
waited for the County to initiate an investigation Wlder Chapter 12. 
8 "'The government affects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the 
physical occupation of his or her land." 26 Am. Jur. 2d. Eminent Domain § 10 (2004) (emphasis 
supplied). Exactions in land use cases are discussed under the section on regulatory takings. Id. § 16. 
This black letter rule derives from many cases, notably Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc" 544 U.S. 528, 546-
47 (2005) (citing Nol/an v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825. 831-32 (1987) and Dolan v. 
City olTigard, 512 U.S. 374.384 (l994)). In one case, the Ninth Circuit struggled with this more than 
necessary, we think, but came down the same way: "(The] claims arising out of the exaction of the offers 
to dedicate can plausibly be characterized as either regulatory or physical takings. .,. We think it most 
plausible to eharacterit.e [the] claims as aUeged regulatory ratber than physical takings." Daniel v. 
County olSanta Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002), cerro denied, 537 U.S. 973. 
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this case involves an alleged regulatory taking, the physical takings exception to Williamson 
County does not apply. 
B. WIUiamson County Test 2: The requirement to employ state iDvene 
condemnation procedures applies. 
Plaintiffs concede that Williamson County requires takings litigants to employ state 
inverse condemnation proceedings before going to federal court. Response Brief at 33. They 
say this does not apply because they have in fact brought an inverse condemnation claim as part 
of this lawsuit. But the fact that Plaintiffs are pursuing a state inverse condemnation action now 
(albeit one subject to fatal flaws), does not solve their problem Wlder Williamson County with 
respect to their federal claims. Williamson County requires that Plaintiffs fully litigate their state 
law claims first, and lose, before bringing a § ] 983 action. Bringing the federal and state claims 
in the same lawsuit does not satisfy Williamson County. 
Plaintiffs also argue that this second test does not apply to their procedural due process 
claims. The problem is they have no independent due process claim; it is a meaningless 
restatement of the takings claim in an effort to avoid Willia1n3on County.9 Nor does it matter 
what reJiefthey seek. Plaintiffs' attempt to end-run Williamson County is also similar to the end-
run tried unsuccessfully in Daniel, 288 F.3d at 384-85. The plaintiffs in Daniel argued they were 
not subject to Wiiliamson County because they were seeking injWlctive and declaratory relief, 
not damages. The Daniel court recognized an exception to the requirement to employ state 
inverse condemnation proceedings (where the plaintiff is making a facial chaJJenge to a 
9 Note also that Plaintiffs quote Williamson County out of context. The statement that "the 
remedy for a regulation that gO(l$ too far, under the due process tbeory is not 4just compensation' but 
invalidation of the regu.lation," Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197, was not the Court expressing its 
view. but the Court reciting the county's argument-which it found unnecessary to reach. "We need not 
pass on tbe merits of petitioners' arguments, for even if viewed as a question of due process, respondent's 
claim is premature." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199. 
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municipaJ ordinance). but found it not applicable there. Nor is it applicable here. Neither Daniel 
nor our case involves a challenge to an ordinance, much less a facial challenge. 1o Where an 
action is alleged to be a regulatory taking. the remedy is not to stop the exaction, but to make the 
government pay for it. Declaratory and injunctive relief is inappropriate, Daniel, 288 F .3d at 
385. 
In swn, Plaintiffs' attempt to sidestep Williamson County by characterizing this as a due 
process case or a case seeking injunctive and declaratory relief falls flat. This is a takings case at 
its core. The Court should do as the district court did in Daniel, 288 F.3d at 380, and throw out 
the federal claims under Williamson County. Iu to the state 'aw inverse condemnation claim, it 
fails under the statute oflimitations and tor all the other reasons discussed. elsewhere. 
v. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL THE "EXHAUSTION" AND "VOLUNTARY~TESTS 
EST ABUSHED UNDER IDAHO CASE LAW. 
A. Plaintiffs failed to exhaust. 
Plaintiffs had ample opportunities. both formal and informal, for bringing their concerns 
to the County's attention. In addition to potential avenues at the administrative level, II they 
failed to seek judicial review under LLUPA, another exhaustion requirement. The law of 
exhaustion requires that they employ at least one of them. As the Court said in KMST, 
"[Plaintiff] simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially calculated.. Having done so, it 
cannot now claim that the amount of the impact fees constituted an unconstitutional taking of its 
property." KMST, u..C v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56,62 (2003). 
10 Plaintiffs claim that they are facially challenging Sections I and J of Chapter 8 of LUDQ, but as 
explained above, this is both fiction and futile. Rather, Plaintiffs are challenging the CUP and its 
application through the Agreements. 
11 See footnote 7 at page II listing administrative actions that could have been taken. 
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Plaintiffs defend their failure saying that exhaustion is not required here. KMST and 
other cases recognize two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (I) where the interests of 
justice so require and (2) challenges to actions "outside the agency's authority." These and other 
al1eged exceptions are discussed below. None apply here. Plaintiffs should have exhausted, and 
they did not. 
1. Exhaustion exception 1: Plaintiffs cannot meet the "interests 
of justice" exception. 
In light of the current challenge and other litigation, the County has initiated a thorough 
review of its road mitigation process and, as previously noted, is considering new IDIF A-based 
ordinances. Had Plaintiffs timely challenged the County during the course of the 
CUP/development agreement process, who knows what might have happened? Instead, 
Plaintiffs waited for years, raising the issue after the money was spent and it is too late to reverse 
course. No public policy is served by encouraging such delinquent behavior. 
There is no countervailing consideration. Plaintiffs have not offered a shred of evidence 
that the County acted in bad faith in the pennitting process. 
In American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. ] v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862,872,154 P.3d 433,443 
(2007), the Court explained why exhaustion matters: 
"Important policy considerations underlie the requirement for 
exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the 
opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial 
intervention, deferring to the administrative processes established 
by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of 
comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body." 
White v. Bannock County Comm 'rs, l391daho 396, 401-02, 80 
P.3d 332,337-38 (2003). 
This statement is a good summary of why the ·'interests of justice" exception does not 
work here. 
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2. Exhaustion exception 2: The "outside the agency!s authority" 
eXceptioD does Dot apply. 
Valley County explained in its Opening Brief at 22 n.15 that the "outside the agency's 
authority" exception applies only to facial challenges. Plaintiffs dismiss our analysis of White v. 
Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003) as a manipulation, 
Response Brief at 23, but fail to explain why. They cite only one case, American Falls. This 
case suggests that there may be some instances in which the exception could apply to an as 
applied cha1lenge, but our case is not one of them. 
The American Falls Court began by recognizing the exhaustion principle. "Additionally, 
a district court cannot properly engage in an 'as applied' constitutional analysis until a complete 
factual record has been developed:' American Faiis, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. "In this 
case, the district court recognized that parties must choose between either a facial or <as applied' 
constitutional challenge and that an 'as applied' analysis is inappropriate before administrative 
proceedings have been fully completed." ld. 143 Idaho at 871, 154 P .3d at 442.12 
The Court then recognized the two standard exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. 
American Falls, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. However, the Court proceeded to sharply 
narrow the circumstances in which the first exception might apply to an as applied challenge. 
The Court explained that deciding whether an agency acted outside its authority sometimes calls 
for a "circuitous analysis." ld. If the agency's action was entirely beyond the scope of its 
authority, no circuitous analysis is required. In such cases exhaustion is excused, apparently in 
both facial and applied challenges. But where the nature of the action falls within the agency's 
12 See AmericQn Falls, 1431dabo at 870-72, 154 P.3dat 44)-43. fora good discussion of the 
difference between facial and as-applied challenges under Idaho law. 
V ALLEV COUNtY'S REPLV BRIEF IN SUPpORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARV JUDGMENT 
10915-2_1006261_21 
Page 15 
463 
broad authorization, exhaustion will be excused only for facial challenges. The Court concluded, 
143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443: 
Thus, the exception for when an agency exceeds its authority does 
not apply unless the eM [Conjunctive Management] Rules are 
facially unconstitutional. Therefore, this Court's review wiH be in 
tenns of the CM Rules' constitutionality on their face and not in 
tenus of the Rules' ·'threatened application" or '''as applied." 
This is a more nuanced statement of the simpler rule articulated by the County in its 
Opening Brief, but the end result is the same, Indeed. American Falls reinforces the County's 
main point. If an agency acts in a manner entirely outside its regulatory authority (for instance, 
if the County had no planning and zoning power), then the agency's action could be challenged 
without exhaustion. But where the governmental entity has regulatory authority to act on the 
subject matter and the only question is whether it has exercised that authority properly in a 
particular "as applied" action, then exhaustion is required. 
Plaintiffs, in a transparent attempt to sidestep the exhaustion requirement (and the statute 
oflimitations), assert that their claims include a facial challenge to Sections I and J of Appendix 
C of LUDO. Response Brief at 24-25. Nowhere in Plaintiffs' Complaint is there any reference 
to any provision of LUDc nor is there any allegation that can fairly be interpreted as bringing a 
facial challenge to any County ordinance. The aJlegations in Plaintiffs' CompJaint are clearly 
directed at the condition included in the CUP that required a development agreement and the 
payment of money that was ultimately a part of the Agreements. Based upon the Plaintiffs' own 
allegations, their claims are an "as applied" challenge to the particular requirements that were 
placed upon their applications rather than a facial challenge to any County ordinance. 
Even if Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their Complaint (despite the fact that the 
deadline for amendments to pleadings expired more than six months ago) to assert a facial 
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challenge, such a claim would have no merit. Plaintiffs' sole argument in support of their 
purported facial chalJenge is that two provisions of LUDO illegally require the payment of 
impact fees. However, the provisions at issue do not mandate any payment of fees whatsoever. 
Section I of Appendix C of LUDO provides that, due to the unique nature of each PUD, the 
County requires the developer to work with the appropriate county entities and enter into a 
development agreement with the Board No particular content is specified. Similarly, Section I 
of Appendix .C of LUDO provides only that the P&Z ''may recommend" impact fees to the 
Board and that the Board "may implement" such fees as recommended or as deemed necessary. 
If a party asserts a facial challenge to a legislative act, it must prove that the act is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications. In other words, "the challenger must establish that no 
set of circumstances exists under which the [1aw] would be valid." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 
706, 7l2, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by a party to frame its claim as a 
facial challenge in Lochsa Falls. L.L. C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P .3d 963 (2009). The 
plaintiff in that case was required to construct a traffic signal as a condition of a construction 
pennit issued by the Idaho Transportation Department. The rules at issue provided that the 
department may require payment of costs associated with highway improvements in oonnection 
with the issuance of such a penni 1. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's action 
was an <4as applied" challenge. 
The same may be said of this lawsuit. Here, since the provisions do not specify any 
particular requirement or even that a fee will be charged at aU, they cannot be unconstitutional in 
every application and a facial challenge fails. In fact, the statute referenced in Section J is Idaho 
Code § 31-870 that authorizes counties to charge fees for services. (See footnote 15 at page 22.) 
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Obvious1y, Section J could be applied constitutionally so long as only service or user fees were 
required to be paid. 
3. Euclid A venue is inapposite. 
Plaintiffs offer a smokescreen by raising Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 
306, ]93 P.3d 853 (2008). Response Briefat 25. This case simply he1d that parties can no 
longer combine in the same lawsuit a civil complaint and a judicial review. 13 So be it. Both may 
still be pursued in separate lawsuits, if need be. But there would have been no need for separate 
lawsuits here. Plaintiffs could have obtained all the necessary reliefsimply by filing a timeJy 
judicial review of the CUP pursuant to LLUP A. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
(whose judicial review provisions are incorporated by LLUPA) allows permitting decisions to be 
set aside for violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). That 
is one way of undertaking an inverse condemnation. Indeed, it is probably the only proper way. 
If that would have occurred, there would be no need for this tardy collateral attack. 
4. Idaho Code § 67·6521 is inapposite.. 
P1aintiffs seek re1ief from exhaustion under Idaho Code § 67-652]. Response Brief at 
22·23. This is the same strategy that the plaintiff tried unsuccessfuJly in KMS'L 138 Idaho at 
580,583-84,67 P.3d at 59,62-63. As the Court ex.plained in KMST, the statute has no 
applicability here. 
By its tenns, that statute has no application to the impact fees 
imposed in this case. 1t only applies if the basis of the inverse 
condemnation claim is ''that a specific zoning action or permitting 
action restricting private property development is actual1y a 
regulatory action by local government deemed 'necessary to 
t3 The Euclid Avenue Court employed the tenn "administrative appeal" as a shorthand for 
''judicial review of an administrative action." The Court was not referring to administrative appeals 
within the agency (e.g., an appeal from planning and zoning to the county commission), which is a 
separate exhaustion issue. 
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compJete the development of the material resources of the state,' or 
necessary for other public uses." 
KMST. 138 Idaho at 580, 583-84, 67 P.3d at 59, 62'()3. (The quoted provision was changed 
slightly by the Legislature in 2010, but the change does not affect the Court's analysis.) The 
reference to whether the action is "necessary to complete the development of the material 
resources of the state" is a reference to whether or not an eminent domain action is undertaken 
for a legitimate public purpose--an issue made famous in the case of Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Plaintiffs' Complaint cannot be read to embrace such a claim. 
s. BHA 11 is inapposite. 
Plaintiffs cite BllA Investmenls, Inc. v. City of Boise (" BBA If'), 141 Idaho 168, 1 08 P. 3d 
315 (2004). This case involved a transfer fee cbarged by the City of Boise on liquor licenses. 
The Court ruled in a prior case, BRA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA l'), 138 Idaho 356, 
357-58, 63 P.3d 482, 483~84 (2004), that the City had no regulatory authority whatsoever with 
respect to the transfer ofliquor licenses. Only the State has such authority. Id. In a separate 
case involving different parties (which was consolidated in RHA 11), the district court dismissed 
plaintiffs' claim because they had not paid the fee under protest. In BHA II, the Supreme Court 
reversed that point, ruling that special rules requiring that taxes be paid under protest do not 
apply to "an action seeking recovery of unlawful fees." RBA II, 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 
323. This bas no applicability here. Valley County has not claimed that fees required under the 
development agreement are taxes. Nor has it relied on the line of authority addressed in RHA II 
requiring that taxes be paid Wlder protest as a prerequisite to challenge. Thus, the language 
quoted by Plaintiffs is inapposite. 
The BHA II Court then turned to the exhaustion requirement. The Cow1 discussed KMST 
noting that in that case exhaustion was required because ""had KMST pursued available 
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administrative remedies, its fee would have been reduced." The Court dlstinguished KMST: 
"'That case has no application to this one. The City has not cited any ordinance granting the city 
council the authority to waive the liquor license transfer fee unlawfully charged by the City." 
BHAll, 141 [dahoat 176-77, 108 P.3d at 323-24. 
Our case is like KMST, not BHA IJ. In BHA II, Boise had no discretion to eliminate or 
reduce the transfer fee. Valley County, in contrast, had ample authority to agree to any tenns it 
thought appropriate for the development agreement-including imposing no road mitigation fees 
at all. If Plaintiffs had timely raised the issue, Valley County might have backed off. It certainly 
had that discretion, bringing it within KMST's exhaustion requirement. 
Another distinguishing factor is that in BRA II, the City was imposing fees with no 
authority to regulate in the field (liquor transfers) at all and was instead intruding on authority 
expressly and unequivocally granted to the State. This reinforces the point we have made above 
with respect to KMSTandAmerican Falls that the exhaustion exception comes into play only 
when the governmental entity acts entirely outside the subject of is regulatory authority. 
6. Plaintiffs' alleged failure to perceive their rights at the time of 
the administrative proceedings does Dot excuse their failure to 
exhaust. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that they are excused from exhaustion because they assumed 
the County had the right to require mitigation. Response Brief at 26-27. The cases they cite are 
inapposite. The controlling cases on the subject of exhaustion clearly identify the exceptions to 
the exhaustion requirement. Failure to recognize one's own claim is not one of the exceptions. 
Although BHA II arose in a different context (the damage claim requirement applicabJe to 
cities), the case makes this point. "[Plaintiffs] argue that they timely filed their notice of claim 
because they could not reasonably have known until January 30, 2003, when we issued our 
opinion in BHA 1. That opinion did not create a cause of action where none previously existed." 
VALLEY COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPpORT OF MonON FOR SUMMAItY JUDGMENT 
10915-2_1006261_21 
Page 20 
468 
BHA II, 141 Idaho at 174, 108 P.3d at 321. Thus, those plaintiffs were not excused by the fact 
that Boise City believed and acted like it had authority to regulate liquor license transfers. 
Likewise, in Harris v. State. ex rei. Kemp/horne, 147 Idaho 401,403-05,210 P.3d &6, 88-90 
(2009), the Court fOl.md that plaintiffs were not excused from the statute of limitations by the fact 
that the State affirmatively misstated the law and demanded that plaintiffs enter into a mineral 
lease over minerals that, as it later became known, the State did not own. There is no basis for 
Plaintiffs' suggestion that exhaustion should be treated any differently. 
B. Plaintiffs' actions were voluntary. 
Plaintiffs contest whether their signing of the Agreements was voluntary. They contend 
that there were no meaningful negotiations, that the County had a policy of requiring al1 
developers to pay fees according to the County's schedule, and that Plaintiffs believed their 
failure to do so would result in delay or denial oftheir application. The County contests those 
facts. 14 But those facts are not material, and any disagreement over them does not bar summary 
judgment here. Even if everything that Plaintiffs say about the County's policy of seeking 
mitigation were true, these fact remain: Plaintiffs themselves included proposed mitigation 
agreements (including payments for off-site improvements) in their initial application, they did 
14 The County directs the Court's attention to testimony in the rerord by County representatives 
that establishes that the use of development agreements to help pay for road improvements was first 
suggested by developers and was enthusiastically supported by them when the real estate market in the 
County was booming. Cruikshank Depo., 154:9-155:24; Davis Depo .. 26:18-33:22,47:2548:18; Herrick 
Depo., 55: 18-59:8. (The deposition transcripts are exhibits A-D to the 4ffidavit o/Victor Villegas in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment.) Also, only one applicant objected to the inclusion of a payment for 
road improvements in a development agreement and the Board negotiated a reduced amount for that 
applicant, which contradicts Plaintiffs' position that the agreements were standard and non-negotiable. 
Eid Depo .• 34:13-36:13; Herrick Depo., 81 :17·82:10, 103: 12-107:1. Finally, no applicant ever refused to 
pay and demanded approval by the Board without a development agreement. COW1ty representatives 
testified that they did not know how such a demand would have been bandIed. Cruickshank Depo., 
143:5-146:12~ Eld Depo., 39:5-45:3. That the Plaintiffs have misrepresented these issues in the record is 
troubling but u1timately inconsequential because none of these disputed facts is materia! to the dispositive 
issues raised by the County's MotionjorSummary Judgment. 
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not protest or object to the condition in the CUP that required a mitigation agreement, they 
signed both Agreements. and they did not object to the conveyance of property or the payment of 
money required under the Agreements. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their actions from those of the developers in K}.;fST by 
claiming that they believed that LUOO mandated the Agreements,15 and that County officials 
told them that road impact mitigation would be required. Response Brief at 28. But that is no 
different from the situation in KMST. In that case, the developer agreed to the road dedication. 
He did so not because he was anxious to give something away, but because he was t()ld by an 
AeHD official that he would recommend it as a requirement. KMST, 138 Idaho at 579, 67 P.3d 
at 58. Thus, plaintiffs in KMST and here both believed they saw the writing on the wall; both 
decided that the easiest course was to give what they thOUght would be required at the end of the 
day. This is what the law means by ·'Voluntary." 
Plaintiffs meet that test as a matter of law. They included an express offer of mitigation 
contributions in their application and then agreed. to slightly modified terms in the Agreements. 
The terms of the Agreements are unambiguous. They are plainly entitled "AGREEMENTS" and 
provide that the developer "agrees" to participate in the cost of improving the roads near the 
proposed development. Regardless of what discussions mayor may not have taken place with 
County starf6 and regardless of the Plaintiffs' understandings and assumptions, ifit were not 
IS Plaintiffs point to section J ofLUOO (formerly Appendix C, now codified to Chapter 8) 
entitled "IMPACT FEES" as the basis for not timely chaUenging the road development fees. Response 
Brief at 3, 28, 32. The text of the provision, however. references only fees based on (clabo Code § 31. 
870, a statute authorizing counties to conect user fees for water, sewage, and the like. Even if reliance 
was appropriate to justify failure to challenge, which it is not, Plaintiffs should not have relied on this 
provision with respect to fees charged for off-site road construction. This provision, on its face, 
contemplated lawful user fees. 
16 To the extent that Plaintiffs contend their entering into the Agreements was involuntaly 
bet:ause of things they say were said by County staff, this argument is without merit Idaho case law and 
V ALLEY COVl'lTY's REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JuDGMENT 
10915-2_1006261_21 
Page 22 
470 
true that the developer was voluntarily agreeing to help pay for the improvement of the roads, 
then Plaintiffs simply should not have signed the Agreements without protest. 
Joseph Pachner represented the developers with respect to their application. In language 
embraced by the Plaintiffs, he testified in his affidavit that he included the payments for road 
improvements in order to ensure an efficient application process and avoid delays. Pachner AfJ.. 
~ 4,6, and 8. This is precisely the same reason that the developer in KMST included the 
dedication of the public street. 
The district court found "that as a general matter developers do not 
include conditions in development applications if they disagree 
with the conditions." The district court also found, "KMST 
representatives included the construction and dedication ofSird 
Street in the application because they were concerned that failing 
to do so would delay closing on the property and development of 
the property." KMST's property was not taken. It voluntarily 
decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to speed the 
approval of its development. Having done so, it cannot now claim 
that its property was "taken." 
KMST. 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. The inclusion of the mitigation measures in their 
application, combined with the lack of any objection and the execution of the Agreements, 
establishes conclusively that the payment was voluntary. No doubt the KMST developers did not 
really want to dedicate a road to the public. Nor does the County doubt that PLaintiffs did not 
really want to pay money to help improve the roads to their development. But in this context, 
"voluntary" does not connote desire-it simply means that the developer made a choice to agree 
instead of to object or protest.17 Having made this choice, the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by it. 
LUDD itself are clear that only the Board of County Commissioners bas authority to make a final 
decision on such matters. 
\7 This is apparently true of the other developers who signed affidavits that have been filed in 
this action. As with Plaintiffs, they may not have wanted to enter into the agreements, but they did so by 
their own choice. The fact that the developers (including Plaintiffs) may have thought that the County 
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VI. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PREVENT PLAINTIFFS FROM OBTAINING THE REMEDIES 
THEY SEEK HERE. 
Plaintiffs offer but one response to Valley County's equitable defenses: that the payment 
was not voluntary. But even if Plaintiffs believed that the COWlty was inflexible and that 
agreement to the road fees would ex.pedite approval. this does not change the fact that they 
signed two separate documents, without protest, which on their face say "Agreement," accepted 
the benefits of the Agreements, and waited for years before bringing this litigation. This is not 
the sort of behavior that equity encourages. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, payments made by Plaintiffs were voluntari1y made payments that benefited 
them by funding road construction on an ex.pedited basis. Even if those payments had been 
illegal taxes, it is too late to challenge them now. Plaintiffs were obligated to challenge them at 
the time. Doing so now violates the statute of limitations as well as well-settled ex.haustion and 
ripeness principles. FOT these and all of the other legal and equitable reasons discussed above. 
judgment should be entered dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
bad the authority to require a payment of fees is also irrelevant. LUOO was available to all as were the 
Idaho statutes that relate to these issues. 
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DATED this 10th day of November, 2010. 
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
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3 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
4 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
5 
6 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an idaho 
7 corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an Idaho limited 
8 
Case No. CV-2009-554-C 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
11:) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM DEC\S\ON RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES 
For Plaintiff: Victor Villegas of Evans Keane LLP 
For Defendants: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens 
Pursley 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. ("Buckskinft ) and Timberline 
Development, lLC ("Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in 
Valley County, Idaho called The Meadows at west Mountain (the "Meadows"). Valley 
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II 
County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition to approve the Plaintiffs' 
2 final ptat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plaintiffs filed this \awsuit seeking 
3 
4 
5 
a declaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of 
impact fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the 
Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the 
6 impact fees. Valley County has filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment 
7 
seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of limitations 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and paid the fees. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings. depositions. and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits. if any, show that there \s no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law," I.R.C.P.56(c}. When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial 
15 court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw ail 
16 reasonable factua\ inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowners 
17 Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343. 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot. 117 Idaho 963, 
793 P.2d 195 (1990), 
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531, 
887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who 
resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court 
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3 
4 
• 
the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. Sf. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,508.768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988). 
The resisting party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of 
facts which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those 
5 facts by deposition, affidavit, or othelWise. Id.; I.R.C.P 56(e). 
5 
7 
B 
9 
10 
11 
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Corbn"dge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85. 87, 
730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). In other words. there must be evidence on which a jury 
might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362, 
368 (1969). Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary 
12 judgment when the ptainUff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
13 of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at 
14 trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425. 426,816 P.2d 982. 983 (1991). 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
DISCUSSION 
Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs' allegations of violations of the federal 
constitution must be dismissed because the Pla,ntiffs' failed to bring th)s action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs respond that they have not sought relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, nor were they required to do so. The Plaintiffs argue that an action for 
inverse condemnation for violations of the Fifth Amendment can be brought 
independent of a § 1983 action. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
23 . Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
24 Amendment, Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provides: U[N]or shall private 
25 property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Article 1. § 14, of the 
26 
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Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: "Private property may be taken for public 
use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by 
law, shall be paid therefore." 
A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein. 
5 has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of 
6 law and the payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse 
7 
condemnation. McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987). The 
8 
property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 
777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). Here, the Plaintiffs have not made a claim pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, they were not required to do so because they have a valid 
claim pursuant to the State constitution. 
Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs failed to timely file this action within: (1) 
the four-year statute of limitations under I.C. § 5-224 for an inverse condemnation 
claim; (2) the two-year statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim; (3) the three-year statue 
of limitations for the taking of personal property; and (d) the six-month statute of 
limitations for claims against a county. The Plaintiffs respond that their inverse 
condemnation claim was timely filed because the statute of limitations began to run on 
December 15. 2005 when the Plaintiffs drew a cashier's check in the amount of 
$232,160.00 in orderto pay the impact fees for Phases 2 and 3 oHhe Meadows. 
Idaho Code § 5-224 contains the statute of limitations for an inverse 
condemnation claim. and states: "[a]n action for [inverse condemnation] must be 
commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued. ~ See C & 
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G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dis!. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143,75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003). 
The date when a cause of action accrues is a question of law to be determined by this 
Court where no disputed issues of material fact exist. Id. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. "The 
actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be 
5 fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to 
6 
7 
B 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." 
Tibbs v. Cit yo! Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979). 
The Complaint in this case was filed on December 1, 2009. The facts in this 
case are essentially undisputed. The Plaintiffs are making a legal argument that the 
Valley County's "taking" did not occur until the cashier's check was drawn in order to 
pay the impact fees on December 15. 2005. However, as Valley County points out, the 
"Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential facts on July 14,2004, the day they received the 
14 Conditional Use Permit and they signed the final Capital Contribution Agreement setting 
15 out the contribution requirements in full detaiL" At the very latest, drawing all 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, October 25, 2004 was the date when the 
statute of limitations began to run. This was the date when the dedication of right of 
way was accepted and it was at this point in time at which the impairment of such a 
degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property 
interest became apparent. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment because Plaintiffs are barred from recovering under their inverse 
condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224 because their Complaint was not filed within the 
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four-year statute of limitations.1 
Although the Court is granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the statute of limitations, the Court will address the remaining arguments 
submitted by the parties in order to provide a more complete record. As a general rule, 
a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge 
the validity 01 administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899,906,854 P.2d 242, 
249 (1993). However, there is an exception to that rule when the interests of justice so 
require and the agency acted outside of its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 
Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004). Valley County argues that summary 
judgment should be granted because the Plaintiffs could have objected or otherwise 
filed an appeal to the conditions of approval, but did not do so. The Plaintiffs respond 
that they had no duty to exhaust any administrative remedies because the Plaintiffs' 
claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion. It appears from the 
record that Valley County did not follow the provisions set forth in the Idaho 
16 Development Fee Act ("IDIFA") and Valley County concedes as much. More 
17 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
specifically, Valley County failed to follow the procedure for the imposition 01 
development impact fees set forth in I.C. § 67-8206. As such, the Plaintiffs were not 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies because the proper administrative 
procedures were not in place. 
Valley County also argues that the Plaintiffs should have raised their objections 
to the impact fees with the local govemment in a timely manner in order to set up their 
25 1 The Plaintiffs also argued that this action is subject 10 a five-year statute of limitations based on I.C. § 5-
216. However, this is not an action for breach of conlract. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the recQrd 
26 before the Court thaI the contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was ever breached. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. CASE NO. CV-2009-554-C • PAGE 6 
491 
II 
• • 
1 
claim that their payment was involuntary. In essence, Valley County is arguing that the 
2 Plaintiffs should be precluded from maintaining this action because they did not object 
3 during the public hearing on their previous approvals for Phases 1 through 3. The 
4 Plaintiffs respond that they were not required to object because there is no Idaho law 
5 requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest in order to later recover an 
6 illegal fee and the Plaintiffs had no reason to question Valley County's LUDO at the 
7 time of the public hearings on its CUP/PUD application. The Plaintiffs are correct. As 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Hi 
11 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
26 
the ldaho Supreme Court stated in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise. "[w]e have 
not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to impose at 
all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered." 141 Idaho 168, 
176, 108 P .3d 315. 323 (2004). Here, the Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact 
fees under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have 
the authority to impose the impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the 
procedures set forth in I.C. § 67-8206. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 1 day of January 2011. 
ICHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF TIlE FOURTH JODIClAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..~D FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
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of the State of Idaho. 
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Case No. CV~2009-554-C 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUl>GMENT 
PLaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLl'", move this Court, 
pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedme, for partial summary judgment 011 
Count One of Plaintiffs' Complaint. This motion is made and based upon this Court's 
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment entered on January 7, 
2011 wherein this Court held "Here, Plaintiffs had no obligation to payth.e impact fee fees under 
protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have the authority to impose 
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the impact fees as Vaney County bad not complied with the procedures set forth in I.C. § 67-
8206." This motion is also based on the Memorandum and Affidavits in support of PlaintiftS' 
opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sumnwy Judgment previously tiled with this Court. 
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By Kk~~ Victor vut;ga ~the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that all this lOth day of Januazy. 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing docttme1lt was served by first-elass mail. postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax 
transnlission to; by overnight delivery tOi or by personally delivering 10 or leaving with a person 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES. INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TL\fBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
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Case No. CV-2009-SS4-C 
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COMES NOW. Defendant, VaUeyCounty.byano through its. attQf'll8YS ofrecord,und 
hereby moyes this Court k) ~tcr judgment in favor of Valley ('ourJy ilDd dismiss this 8Ctl<lft in 
A ptopo~d judamen1 is a.ttaeht;:d hereoo 118· &hibit 1, 
GIVFNS PURSLEY.1LP, 
Atrom~ for Defendant 
V.\r..l.I~V C~J1'Ijn's MOTlOl'! &"OR. Drr.kY. Of iUDGMk~ 
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Received Time Jan. 13. 4:40PM 
Page. 2 
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1N THE L)1StRJC1' COURT OF "J'Jn~ FOUR.'nr JUl)lCJAL DrSTRICT OF 
THE STA. TE OF lDAHO • .TN AND POR THE COlJNTY OF VALLEY 
aUCKSKfN PR.()Pl~RTr.ES, lNC., tut fdaho 
CDl'pOraEion, and' TlMBERLINfi 
DHVELO.PMENT, LLC,lUl.ldabv Limited 
J.illbilit)' Company, 
Plainti"fls, 
V ALLEY COUNTY ~ ~ ]1<>lhical subdiVision 
of the State ofId;mo, 
Detendant. 
THIS MA TTJ:o:R luIving t:omc before the: Court ptJr,nlZlt to 'Vail,,,, C ouniy' s M"ficll/()'!' 
Entry ofJrldgm~n(. and this .court: hav.ing previCfusJy granted Vo.li~y COUnTY '3' Mt1Iiol'ljot 
Summtlr), Juilgme.>71 in -its Memorandum DeciskiD entered.un .january {, 2011; 
NOW. 1lfEREFORE1 IT IS H:ERE-BY ORDERED~ ADJUDGED, AND DEeRE}?;!): . . .,
l. ThatjUdgm~nt is entered. in faypr ofthe Defendant und against tht'! ,P:131nliffi;; and 
2. That aU of Plaintiffs' cbums agaiIlSt the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. 
D."\TED this , ......... , .... day of ~~ua.ry. 2Qll. 
MICHAEL R, MCLAUGHLIN 
Distric.1 C-Q'Urt Judge 
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BUCKSKIN P.ROPERTIES, INC.! an Idailo 
Ct)rporation, .and TlMBE.RLlNE 
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v. 
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of the State of ldar.o. 
Defendant 
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'V.~LLIY COL'Nt~ts RuPOHSK TO 
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COMES NOW, ~ant Villey County ecoumy"), by and thI,)ugb its und~ijJ1ed 
attorneys ofrcc:o-rd, and submits tbi3~to PlaiDtiU,' Morton../iJr PI~UarS1liJmUl-"" 
JS4dgmllt-l ("Plaintiffs' Motian")dated Januery 10, 2011. PlaintiftS seek Imtry ofpurtial 
summary ju4gment in. their favor on Count 1 of their ComplatJtt.Count t tleeks (ieQ'a,-.tory 
On Octob~ t 4.20 lO •. theCuunty tiled Val/ttY Cou.n(y '" .Malia_for Summary JudgmeKI 
("'Summary JudgmentMotJOll~I)~. whlch ~ughtjudgnullt agCinJt the PloUn'if.ts on aU CO.UAts on 
jw:isdi~dooa1.and Other grourtds. On Jenaazy 1. 20 J i, the C,'JUn entered Jts M~'" 
DecLfi!»l Re:~feruJant'3 MOlitmfo,.. Summary Judgmen! ("Decision;. granting!he County's 
motion in full .. Although the ('our! folmd jt un~saty to addr'es$ each of the defensesmised 
by the County to 'PwnUffii' suit, !;he e1fecl of the Decision wM to tWJy resolve this litiga.tion by 
dismissing fue suit i.n its entirety on statUte of' UmitatioIUI glt>ulllb. 
In'Ught of the Court ~ s. t:io.ding that P iaintitfs·· claims arc bmoQ by the statuto';..,! 
limitations. there is no basi$ tbr.pztting,any·reliefill Plaintiffi' faWI. Having m1$Sed r.neir 
filing deadline; Piainnffs are entitled. to nCi'.relie[ .m IUercate filil18: today. the COlmty is 
MOreover. Pl1DiltiftS· request is moot and unripe.. The County bas hriofCd tb:is o;l(t~ively 
arnl ,nffitrienUy befOre, and wiU not repeat it hete. suffice· it to. lay t:hat '& declaratory judgment 
with respca t\).fees alnady paid.1'bat ~r; nob-ru:ovenibie· 00 jari.8diction.a18l'0I.lDCb woUld be a 
.pointl.1S ~:untluthor!%ed judicii! t.XterciJe. [n'.&. WQ~ it.is moot. As tot' Clny fOC\S that miaht (\1 
miSbt nQt. be required.in the futllnl,; those isHlft are patently unripe. 
VALU" COUNTY" lU:&~TOMOnO:N FOR p.A.RTIAL SUMNAAV J1).~ 
1~15-2,_105&730 ... ~ 
~eceived T me Jan,13. 4:43 PM 
Pq 003 
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Finany. given th¢pc4turc Qfthi!J~ 11.'\ framed hy the Motioa f~r SummlU")' Judgment, a 
ruling l\n tbemerits,)fP~a1ntift$' elairns would bepttmllturo even ifmc cue'were.stiU alive.. 
Simply put, if the COWlty~ $ motion had been dcni.1d,. tho next· step woUld be to &;0 to trial at 
which poilU Tbere would have been.:furt:her fa<:tual devd.c;ipmeat and llpI argum.c;at.as 10 the 
klgsli'ty of tho fees in Cf'.1estion. 1 That nt:.y.e.r happened. Alld it ~not happen mow. gi v,an the 
COIoltt'sDec:isioa defen;niJU.Il8 that it i. without' j'Uti84idion to tvach the ~tI', It'!. o.thor wordl;, 
even if it were l'ipe and riot moot and not liu~ject,to diWIl"!£1t on at8t\Jt~ af"Hmitutions grounds, 
----.-.~ .. -.----
I Thts il' no a~ .n,.., Countyaddm.scld tho /lltqWllCIa& of il!lllUl:ll in i~ bru:f1Di~ 
In Id4bo ... ertain. fno..pilCf _ ~ illegal ~ under Idaho's 
(~l1ItilUdaQ I.II1teIt iii:JpoIIed. .pa"Ii.&&nt W Q~" coD1.P'~t. with abe. ldabu 
Dev;:lopmetJt f.l:tlpICtF-:e.AI:1 ('·IDtFA".tdlthoC~n,tl1 .. 32011'06?·82Hl., 
Va-Uoy CflIUiIt), did. Me ~t ati Il)IJ."A-~mplilmt ontizluGGe. ~1Uk: 11 bc·li~Y!:d, 
il\.g00d mtb tbahQ~'wu'ieq'llir.ed. ~ern t.wlIl;ilt mvoi\:lnf .' 
XJU.l.IiJcipalities ba'\'e ~cel5fut1y,~ impa.cl &es, ACCOIdWC1y. tC 'be. on 
610 11ft Ii~ the <"'owd:y i,,, MW'~~.ct\liBtment Ilf I'l MW mWA.eo~\i!lnt. 
O~I!. ~wi:lt9..M;1f1t~~ 
~Yr~,.gl:.dlc·mHmJDJIYPtYdoet¥hl ~moaow.d·~ 
:~~bwk>n·~. fWl~lCQl¥!i~A&1~!.. mg[~ 
C'f:~~.~~lJcgJ,OO;lx .. A&tH mse1rt:l.l.tm!!CJte.!'i! ~ 
ill~8!l..L~ .. 'fhcu;II01tfon ~ iQ 1be pedCtiIIe ~.' whethcrPWntitf£ 
pmpoS4d lItnVor etTtn jpto die ~ 'Nilho!lt o~1ioil,. ~ted ~ 
CUti witbo"" ~~ avo-ide" ~u 1(1 mac thtI:DIIe 
udJ;:a.iDiatrati\·eiy".wI waitM 100 linqJ to..:bat!eogc. 
'nu • .\lUella ~ tg do 'with dLMl 'PPJlCC'J. PlAiIlda·ha.d pkcty uf 
proccu. ~. part oflf;le. County's ric_e i, that PtaiDttffi failed j:(\ e1Cba\.~t 
Illo rem~ .~Je to the:m. "'aindftl' 1O-uUec1.dI.lepm_;.", ie lwed 
01\ the ~_,I.bac ibe County'dtould Ii8w ~ann:>IF li,.'C9mpli&nt 
~tfilct·o~ aad.1h.1,. j(it lI&d Cone .:10', tbey 'NQlll.d baw 'beell'li~ 
cvar'~~, a.uteo~ ~lIIX~ l~·II~or.dim1!.l;. under 
lDlfA·. Thut. the questWn ill, wven,tbatV'a1ley COuoty"docwtld. DOl to CQaCtlll1 
(\tdill~e lUlckr lOIF' A IWtbe t\1M, Will it mlawful (~r it to -. I CUP 
~iriDg ~ Alre~l? nat ~ JllW:ly a .fate- 'COnSOIll.tilXlll.iew qUCIfton 
wb1¢t,' i.f~ in .at1inn'-".e~ wu~r.t\ ... ri:lO tc .ua.U4C6W1U~ per 
J(! re.au1atm}'~ UDder the Ii~ rmd fedeiJl t'Ofll'd1utio.tu. ~l1J1i.~ 
JKoOCf to· rwh.ih~tI.oI.,fbh lijllW jt rIXl,.DJSI m .u&~~1PB II!K,wU\, 
,~~~ . 
VallfIJI' C~urlY'.r R"f'tv Rrlli(fbt Suppon (ifMolio"..for:S'IMI'lItlY)'Jt~othtas.1-2 (Nov. 10,2(10) (emphQi. 
~lio4). 
V ALUl-Y CutrNTV ~$ bSH»flll TO'M0110N POll PA.Iilt1A.l. ScrMMAIl'i JuOOMDIT 
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No,! can the Court reach tl;tc: iUepl tc..'<. iSllue (~n the basis of admiuion. The Court $tatC5 
on pup: 6 of its Decisioll that:, ~'n appears aom the recmd that Val1ey Coumy did· not fu}low the 
provi!iiom det forth in rIDIFA] and VaUey County ooncwes as much,'" However. Valley CQUnty 
W.IJS ~tul to notOl.)nce(1e that· anyoNts ac.:ttons w«c l1CtlUlUy in violation of rrUFA or any other· 
provision'of Idaho law;2 Instead. in itsbrlefiri& and at orrJ 1IIlgu~t,. ihe C-mmty acknowledged 
County eldvisod the CoiD1. 1hct it is·.exploringadO'pti.~n 0" 8. new ordil'lBnce with. these concertls in 
mind. This dez:uorurtretta that lbe·C.()UDty is not defiil'ltly thumbingits nOBC at these 
same· as a legal admission. Aca:.ltdingl,Y. the Court bus'no basi.s torendel' a n.r11."1g OD th.c leplity 
of the CO~ty'3 action in 1m maner. 
----... -.-~.-
2 TlIe Coumy f~tly ~ IDal it baa M,t ~ _on!i~o 1Mt comptlM 'Mta IDlP,\. Ylllt~ 
Coamtr '8:Srale»ItllIl.o/ Mtu.eriQl.F«1s iIf 5UPPUI1·DlMorfmf fo,. ~'u.lNH~'t)l JlJIignl~tt', " 61. 62. BIU IbM 40ce IlGt 
eqlW(110 an i!ldm.iJ$ion Ibfu i{5 i>lcms:I.mi and m. aOtiom viollr.ted lOlF A. Not..u f~ impollCd dIariz;g ihc W1.II:" 
ui' pldRi"l attd 7.ming~ IIA mrFA-eompH&ntm\i~ Whether tJl4 fcc. at iJ*'Ie ~ wvr.e ~'Y 'll'itNll 
!be COWUy'6 polke pO'WllJ':QTW'efC ilkpl tllX{)8' ill an :Is. !bat ba,·l1tI\'t\rbeen brielbd m this pro~. 0.11 ~ 
oth« ha;Jd, tho COWltY.1.t ac1t laoo."iIa the WIut. iQ~ttbt:ief. tht-CMLnty.$~ "Wba. utiot!s:1hJa .po_tills aDd··1he 
CoullCY migbctakct ill cbc:.ftir.ure 'regsrrling yet--tO-be ~tiat~ ii:Itore road dneklPl'DlCDlagr~ is pJmJily 
!!pICU~~ I~ tl\.= Covnty ii now uaal'l0inla ~ot~ t~ of it. policies ~ pemriuq of~w 
developmeau'lIIDd i$ npiorl&li '!be eHIl¢li2le::Je of It llInI IDf1 A..oom~nt orUmam:e. that woldct nuJO( by cI~ witb 
n..'iJ*t fA.) fUt\R di.welcpmen; ~rr:emelltL" Val/'i COIIi<I!Y !,s' Op,,"inrllrif:,/ ,,.. SUPPfJrt t1/Mo/I.OJl/OI'SUlIfm.llry 
Mgme1f1 &t2' (OC!. 14.lOU»)i 
VALLIV.C()(OOV'sltD.POIIiIlJ!· TO MonbN fOIl PAIlTrAl.·SUMMARY J.liOOMlNT. 
1celW_'OSSn.o .. 5 
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RESPECrF1Jl-LY St.J:SMIITED thi3 13 tis da,y of JL1WII)', 2011. 
VALLEY COUN"l'Y PROSECtJTIN'O A TTOR.NEY 
GIVENS PURSLEY uS' 
V ALUYCotiN'l'Y·.¥.R~1 TO Mmrol'( lI'D. ~ARTIIU.Slt~MA&V .rUDGME.~ 
1091 e-::u 059J.'<UJ 
Received T,me Jan."3. ~:43PM 
Pg 006 
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CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE 
I hereby ccti.fY thol 011 tbe i3~ day of January~ 20:11~ a true·and correct .co.py of the. 
tbregoingwas IICI'Ved upon the tbUowicg.individuaJ(s) bythe~eans indicated: 
1«1 Ma.'nwariag ~ U.S. MaH. postage ptet'4id 
VictorVilIegas q .&~iM!it 
.Evans K«m., I.-1.P [] Hand.De1..i~ 
14Q5 West Main D VaesUnile. 
P .(.) .. Box 959 [R- E-Mail. 
BoUie. to 83701-0959 
jmanwming@eva11skectc;com. 
V\illegas@cvansketme..oCOtll 
('Yl -~~~ •. ~.(,~. ~~ ---Chri,w:Pher H. Meya-·¥.:..!..··~ 
VA1.U:Y COC' ... N't'Y'tf R~HSi-1U Mcrrrollf roll PAMTlAL SIIMM.4Rl Jt1DGM.KNT 
10016-2.._11l59T.3G.;5 
~eceivd r me Jan. 13. 4:43PM 
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Jed Manwaring lSB #3040 
Victor VWegas ISB# 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 West Main 
P. O. Bo:x 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
e-maU: j maDtVarlng@evanskellne.com 
VviIlegos@evaDskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Case No .. __ --'JnstNo._"t""--
Filed A.M P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
i 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corperatieo, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOP'MENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of tbe State of Idaho. 
Defendant 
~aH No. CV-2009-SS4-C 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
Y ALLEY COUNTY'S MOnON' FOR 
ENTRY OF .JUDGMENT FILED 
.JAl'''UARY 13, :Z01l 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, subm.it tlJis 
Objection to VaHey County's Motion for Entry of Judgmellt Filed January 13, 2011. as follows: 
Although it appears that this Court may have beld that it granted ::he County's motion in 
full. it did not fully decide all the claims for reliefthat:Plaintiffs' have sought in their Complaint. 
When multiple claims for relief are presented in an acticn, an adjudication of less than all the 
claims does not terminate any of the remaining claimS. lmernational Business Machines Corp 
v. Lawhorn. 106 Idaho 194, 196, 677 P.2d 507, 509 (Ct. App. 1984). Such an adjudication is 
PLAll\R e c e i ve d -;; f~ e cJ an. j 4. J 4: 4 3 P~UNTY' s MOT[O~ FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED 
JA.i~VARi" 13, Z011 • 1 . 
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interlocutory, subject to revision at any time before entry of a judgment disposing of all 
remaining clall:ns. Id. Citing Baker v. Pendry, 98 Idaho 745, 572 P.2d 179 (1977), 
Here, Plaintiffs specifically asked Meier Count One of its Complaint" among other things. 
for a declaration that Valley County cannot circumvent the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act. 
Idaho Code § 67-8201 et seq. by forcing developers to pay impact fees monies under the guise of 
a Road Development Agreement. Plaintiffs also asked under its prayer for relief that this Court 
enter a declaration that Timberline Development LLC cannot be required to pay fees for the 
. 
proportionate share of road improvement costs a~butable to the remaining pbases of the 
Meadows at West Mountain (i.e. Phases 4 through 6) .. 
Final plat for Phase 4 through 6 of the Meadows at West Mountain bas not been granted 
artd the County. through i~ Road Superintendent Jerry Robinson. has told Plaintiffs' 
representatives that it must enter into a road developm~.J.t agreement and pay fees calculated 
under the 2007 Capital Improvements Program beforJ any final plat approval. See Aff~avit of 
Mike Mat/hot mi; 4-8. Affidavit of Larry Mangum 1Ml4-S; Affidavit of Joe Pachner W 13-16. 
Final plat is a necessary approval that is granted by the County Commissioners and, without that 
approval, final plat cannot be recorded. See Gordon Cruickshank Deposition pg. 27, L. 18 thru 
pg. 28, L. 17. 
I 
The County did not present any evidence on 'SUJTl['lary judgment refuting the facts set 
I 
forth in the Mailhot, Mangum and Pachner affidivil~. Simply put. unless this Court's 
Memor3Jldum Decision was also intended to grant partial summary judgment on Count One of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, there still remains a claim not fully adjudicated. Therefore, the County's 
proposed Motion for Entry of Judgment is either incoqect or i$ premature. Either way, Pla.intiffs 
object to Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgmtffit filed January 13,2011 and request oral 
argument. 
PLAIl\R e c e i vee Tim eCJ an. 14. 1 4: 43 PMJNTY'S MonON FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED 
JANUARY 13,2011 - 2 i 
5-1-1 
.. . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that this Court deny Valley County's 
Motion for Entry of Judgment. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By y~~~ 
Victor Vi1lega ,Of the FIrm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIfY that on this 14th day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimik (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTlONTO VALLEY COUNTY'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED 
JANUARY 13,2011 - 3 
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Jed Manwaring ISB #113040 
Vietor ViDegulSU 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 Weet MaiD 
P. O. Bos959 
CaseNo"' __ -..,Ilnst.fIlO. __ _ 
Filed A.M O? 14 
Boile, Idaho 83'701..0959 
TeJephouc: (lOS) 384-1800 
Faaimile: (208) 345-3514 
e-mai1: jmuwaring@muukeane.colD 
VviDegu@cv&Dlknne.com 
Attorneys lor Plaiatif& 
IN THE nrsTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. AD 
Idaho Corpol'1ltin, and nMBER.I..INE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Umited 
Liability Companyt 
Plaiatiff, 
YI. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a poDtiwnbdirisioD 
of the SAtc 01 Idaho. 
DefcndaDt. 
CaN No. CV-2009-554-C 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
'RECONSIDERATIONI 
AMENDMENT 
_J'r. 
Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and TImberline Development, LLC, by and throu.gh 
their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, move thls Honorable Cowt to reconsider and/or 
amend those portions of the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant)s Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated January 7, 2011 to the extent 1hey are deemed to grant summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant Valley County. 
Received Time-hn. n 1:30FM PLAfW. u·,., .... VUV1" ... 0 ... ~lwvl\c.,t/.l.c.MrrON/AMEND'MEJI."'· , 
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This Motion is further made and based upon the files and records in the above.entitled 
action, lOgetherwith Plaintiffs' Memorandum filed herewith. Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this 21st day of January. 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By, j/~~~ 
Victor VillegasJ(Jt11efiIm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTmCATE Of SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of January, 2011, a 1:nte and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to~ by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendric.kson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise. ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimi1e: (208) 388-1300 
[X} U.S. Mail 
[Xl Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[Xl Fax 
[ ,] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
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Jed Mauwariq ISH N3040 
Vidor VUlepllSBN 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 West Main 
P. O. Box 959 
Bolle, Idaho 83701·0959 
Telephone: (201) ]84..1100 
FaatmBe: (108) 345-3514 
e-maD! j ..... Dwlll'iDl@ena.k .... e.mm 
vviIIegU@evamkeaae.com 
Attora~ for P .... timI 
8Uhr,li~t=n, 
~y ~1-I-lW"~.:..:.. ___ Deput' 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICl OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. aD 
Idaho Cerpontion, ADd 11MBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, lID Id.aIM I.Jmlied 
Liability Company. 
PlahatHf, 
v •. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a politicalsabdMJioD 
of the State of Idaho. 
Defea.daat. 
Cue No. CV-1OO9..s54-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Oil 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR. 
RECONSIDERATION I 
AMENDMENT 
Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC, ("Plaintiffs), by 
and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, move this Honorable Court to 
reconsider andlor amend the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for 
Sununary Judgment dated January 7,2011, 
MEMORANDUM rN SUPPORT OF PLAIN11FFS' MOTION 
FORRIReceiveo TimenJan. 21.)1 1:30PM 
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I. lNTRODUCI10N 
Plaintiffs move this Court to reconsider and/or amend its entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant Valley County and against P1aintiffs. In its January 7, 2011 Mem.orandmn 
Decision Re: Defendant's ~otion for SummaI)' Judgment (the "Memorandum Decision")~ the 
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Valley County and agairu;t Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs' 
claim for inverse condemnation. The Court ruled that Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim 
accrued on October 24, 2005, when Valley County ac~d Plaintiffs' dedication of a right of 
way to under the Capital Contribution Agreement for Phase 1 of the Meadows at West MOW1.tain 
(the "Meadows''). (See Memorandum Decision, p. S.). As a result. the Court ruled that 
Plaintiffs' claims were not brought within the four-year statute of limitation for inverse 
condemnation. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs seek reconsideration andIor an 
amendment from this Court with regard to its Memorandum Decision. 
JL ARGUMENT 
A. Staudard for Motion for RecouJderation and/or AmeadmeD'L 
As threshold matter, Plaintiffs may seek reconsideration of this Court's ruling under 
Idaho Ru1e of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) or 59(e} depending on the nature of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. Under either rule, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration andlor 
amendment is timely and proper. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lJ(a}(2)(B)) governs motions for reconsideration of 
interlocutory orders. Rule 1 1 (a)(2}(B) provides a district court with authority to reconsider 
interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not been entered. A final judgment is one that 
disposes of the controversy or detennines the litigation on its merits. Evans State Bank 'V. 
Skeen,30 Idaho 703, 704. 167 P. 1165, 1166 (1917). A judgment or order that is incomplete, 
MEMORANDtJ).( iN SUP'PORT OF PLAIN!1FFS' MOTION 
FORlUReceivea Til'imJan. 21.)1 1:3C':>M 
01/21/2011 14:41 FAX 2083453514 EVANS KEA.'\'F: {J,P 141008/011 
while it may settle some of the rights of the parties, but leaves some issues remaining in the 
adjudica.tion of the parties' rights, is interlocutory. Id. When multiple claims for relief are 
presented in an action, an adjudication of less than all the claims does not terminate any of the 
remaining claims ilnd is interlocutory and subject to revision at any time prior to entry of a fmal 
jUdgment. Internationtll Bu.ri.ne$$ Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn 106 Idaho 194. 196, 677 P.2d 
501, 509 (Ct. App. 1984). 
On the other hand, Rule 59(e) allows a district court to modify or atnend a. final order if 
a motion is filed within fourteen (14) days of the order. RuJe 59(e) affords the Court an 
opportunity to correct errors of fact or law short of an appeal. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 
646 P.2d 1030,1034 (CtApp.1982) (quoting First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,570 P.2d 
276 (1977». Since Rule 59(e) motions are brought after final judgment, new evidence may not 
be presented. Id. 
In this case there is a dispute between the parties whether the Court's Memorandum 
Decision disposes of all of Plaintiffs' claims or only Plaintiffs' claims based on inverse 
condemnation. Since Plaintiffs brought more than one claim in this matter, it is PlailJtiifs' 
position that the Memorandum Decision is not a ftnal order, which is the position set forth in 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment. filed with this Court on 
January 14, 20] 1. Regardless, this motion is brought within fourteen (14) days of tbe Courfs 
Memorandum Decision and Plaintiffs do not attempt to introduce new evidence in relation. to this 
motion. Therefore, this motion is properly before the Court whether under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) as a 
motion for reconsideration or under Rule 59(e) as a motion to modify or amend. 
MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR RIR ec e i v ed T i mel]lJan, 21,)} ': 30PM 
OI/Zl/20l} It:41 FAX 20S3tS351( EVANS KE.~NE UP 
B. Plaintiffa l Cltdm tor bv.ne CoadelUatio. o. Pbues lad 3 of the 
Meadow. if TiJDeIy. 
~OQ7/011 
The Meadows is a multi-phase residential development. VitaUy important to the Coun's 
decision on Plaintiffs' inverse condelllllation claim is that each and every phase of a multi-phase 
development requiTeS a separate approval of final plat by the County Commissioners. See 67· 
6504 (the governing board only, not a planning and zoning commission, has full authority to 
"finally approve land subdivisions"). Valley County's Land Use Development Ordinance 
outlines the procus for obtaining PUD approvals, each ofwhieh is approved separately starting 
with Concept Approval and Ending with Final Plat approval. (See Affidavit of Joseph Pachner. 
Ex. A.). Nothing is more telling of this fact than the existence of two separate impact fee 
charges to Plaintiff" &ld twu ~o/:!.t¢ coatacwts that providd for the coHecting· of the: -illegal-
impact fee. Furthennore without that approvw. final plat cannot be recorded md a developer 
ca:n:oot go fotward with a development. (See Deposition of Gordon Cruickshank ("Cruickshank 
Depo."), p. 27, l. 18 -po 28, 1. 17., attached to the Affidavit of Victor S. Villegas in Suppon of 
PlaintiiPs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (Villegas Affidavit). Ex. A). 
Valley County did not collect its illegal impact fee for Phases 2 and 3 pursuant to the 
Capital Contribution Agreement for Phase 1. There was no relationship between the right ofwa.y 
tnnlsferred to Valley County pursuant to the Phase 1 Capital Contribution Agreement and the 
illegal impact fees paid pursuant to the Road Development Agreement for Phases 2 and 3. 
Simply put. the fees demanded by Valley County are a separate impact fee assessment This 
assessment is i!I. $epsrate taking with its own statute of limitations accrual analysis. Each 
application for final plat stands on its own merits. In order to proceed with final plat for Phases 2 
and 3 of the Meadows, Pllintiffs were required to obtain separate approvals independent of 
Phase 1. Valley County also required Plaintiffs to enter into an entirely separate contract. the 
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Road Development Agreement, and to pay illegal impact fees under the Road Development 
Agreement for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows. 
Finally. impact fees are only collected after it is determined that an impact will actually 
occur. Plaintiffs had no obligation to proceed with Phases 2 and 3 after completing Phase 1. 
Had Plaintiffs elected not to proceed with. subsequent phases, there could be no impact and, 
therefore, no illegal fee charged. Since Plaintiffs had DO obligation to continue on with Phases 2 
and 3 of the Meadows and bad no obligation to pay any impact fee until they sought final plat 
approval, no taking could ha.ve occurred until the illegal impact fee aerualJy was paid on 
December IS, 2005. This is clear under established Idaho law on inverse condemnation. 
Plaintiffs could not have brought their inverse condemnation claim seeking the plI.yment of just 
.' 
compensation for Phases 2 and 3 at the time Valley County accepted the dedica.tion of right of 
way for Phase 1. A party cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has 
actually been a takins of property. KMST, LLe v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 
56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jejfe,.son County, 131 Idaho 771, 53 PJd 828 (2002». Until 
Plaintiffs actually paid the money, there was no taking. Had Plaintiffs flIed a laW1Uit for inverse 
condemnation at the time 1hey signed !he Road Development Agreement, but before they 
actually paid the illegal impact fee under the Road Development Agreement, their taking claim 
would not have been ripe. Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reconsider or amend its ntlina 
with regard to Plaintiffs' claim for invenic condemnation for the illegal impact fee taken by 
Valley County for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows. 
The same holds true for Phases 4 through 6 of the Meadows. Plaintiffs have not yet paid 
the impact fee tequired by Valley County or sought approval for final plat for Phases 4 through 
6. It is undisputed. however, that the payment of the illegal impact fee remains a condition of 
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final plat approval. In fact, Valley County. through its Road Superintendent Jerry Robinson. has 
iniormed Plaintiffs' representatives that Plaintiffs must enter into a road development agreement 
and pay fees calculated Ullder the 2007 Capital Improvements Program before fmal plat for 
Phases 4 through 6 can be approved.. (See Affidavit of Mike Mailhot", 4-8; Affidavit of Larry 
Mangum. ft 4·5; and Affidavit of Joseph Pachner, "13-16.). Under the Court's current ruling, 
if Plaintiffs desire final plat approval for Phases 4 through 6 of the Meadows, they have no 
choice but to pay the illegal impact fee without any hope of recourse :fur inverse condemnation 
because the accrual date on the claim relates back: to Phasc ]. This is not the law in Idaho. 
Establi shed Idaho law requires that a talcing actually occur before a property owner can maintain 
an action for inverse condemnation. 
C. TIle Five (5) Year Stato.tc ufLimitatiou in Idaho Code SedioD 5-%1' Based 
aD • WriUeD Contract Apply PJaintillil' Declar:am.,. .Judgment Claim •• 
One of Plaintiffs' claims in Count 1 of its Complaint is for a declaratory judgment from 
this Court that Valley COlmty' s Road Development Agreements requiring payment of impact 
fees are illegal contracts and void because Valley County uses the agreements to circumvent 
Idaho law on impact fees. Set Complaint, ft 18, 21; Prayer for Relief, .. B. The Road 
Development Agreement is a written contract. The applicable statute of limitations states: 
Within five (5) years: 
An action u.pon any contract, obligation or liability fOWlded upon an instrument in 
writing. 
The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in the name 
or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor interposed as a 
defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state although such 
limitations may have become fully operative as a defense prior to the adoption of 
this amendment. 
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I.C. § 5-216. The Court indicated, however, in footnote 1 of its Memorandum. Decision that the 
five year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-216 is inapplicable to this action 
because there has been no claim for breach of contract and there is no evidence in the record of a 
breach of contract. 
Plaintiffs. agree with the COUrt that they have not claimed a breach of contract in this 
matter. The statute of limitations. however, is not limited to ai:tions for II breach of contract. 
Section .5-216 states that: "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing" must be brouiht within five (5) years. There is no limitation 0"(' restriction 
in the statute that the limitations period applies only to an action "upon any con1:r8.d' for breach 
of contract. The limitations period applies to any action founded upon an instrument in writing. 
In this ease plaintiffs have sought a declaratory judgment with regard to the validity and 
enforceability of written contracts, the Road Development Agreements, A claim of breach is not 
necessary in order for the five (5) year limitations period to apply. Plaintiff's respectfully ask this 
Court to reconsider andJor clarify or modify its judgment to the extent the January 7, 2011 
Memorandum Decision may dispose of legitimate clairm upon a. written contract. Since 
Plaintiffs' declaratory jUdgment claims .have been brought within the five (5) year limitations 
period for claims on a written instrument, those claims should not be dismissed simply because 
the claims do not involve a claim for breach of contract. 
m. CONCLUSIOl! 
For the foregoing reasons, PJaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reconsider and/or 
amend its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judament dated 
January 7,2011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is Defendant Valley County's (,'County") response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration/Amendment (,;Reconsideration Motion'") and Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion/or Reconsideration/Amendment ("Reconsideration Memorandum") both 
dated January 21, 2011. 
In addition to the Reconsideration Motion., Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and 
Timberline Development, LLC ("'Plaintiffs") have filed a Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
and Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion/or Entry 0/ Judgmentfiled January}3, 
2011. They re-trace much of same ground again in their Motion /0 Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Fees and Plaintiffi' Memorandum in Opposition (0 Valley County's Memorandum o/Costs and 
Statement in Support 
All of Plaintiffs' post-<iecision filings share a common theme. They seek to reo-hash the 
same issues that they have briefed, argued, and lost. all the while driving up attorney fees and 
wasting the Court's time. This is old ground. Plaintiffs' continued churning of this case should 
be taken into account in consideration of the County's pending Memorandwn of Costs. 
In their Reconsideration Motion, Plaintiffs press two basic points. First, they contend 
that the Court should have engaged in a separate statute of limitations analysis for each of the 
three phases of the development. Second, they repeat the arguments they have made before with 
respect to the state's five~year statute oflimitations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAL~TIFFSt MOTION IS PROPERLY PRESENTED UNDER RULE 11(A)(2)(8). 
At the outset of their Reconsideration Memorandum, Plaintiffs go through contortions to 
justity why their motion is proper under either Idaho R. Civ. P. II(a)(2)(B) or 59(e). Their 
argument is both wrong and unnecessary. 
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Plaintiffs have every right to file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 11 (a}(2)(B), but 
not for the reasons they say. The rule authorizes motions with respect to "interlocutory orders." 
The Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Decision") dated January 7.2011 is an interlocutory order for the simple reason that it was 
issued before entry of judgment. See. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. 
App.2006). Plaintiffs' contention that it is interlocutory because the Court failed to adjudicate 
all ofPlaintiffi' claims is wrong. The Court did adjudicate them all; it threw them all out 
because the Plaintiffs violated the statute of limitations. But that does not make it a final 
judgment. It is an order, not a judgment. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(a). 
As for Plaintiffs' reference to Rule 59( e), that ruJe al lows for amendment of a judgment, 
and, as oftoday, there is no judgment to amend. Consequently, Rule 59(e) has no applicability 
here. 
II. THE FOUR· YEAR STATUTE OF LlI\UTA TIONS RAN ON ALL PHASES OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT AS SOON AS PLAINTIFFS BECAME A WARE THAT A FEE WOULD BE 
IMPOSED. 
The Meadows has been developed in phases.' Plaintiffs insist that the Court is required 
to separately address the statute of limitations for each phase, and that the statute has run only on 
Phase 1. This is wrong, and the reason is simple. Plaintiffs knew on or before October 25, 2004 
that they would have to pay a fee on all phases. 
As the Court recognized in its Decision Memorandum, it makes no difference when a 
particular fee is quantified or when it is actuaIJy paid. The clock begins running when "the full 
I Phase 1 was subject to the Capital Contribution Agreement of July 26. 2004. Phases 2 
and 3 were subject to the Road Development Agreement of September 26, 2005. The parties 
have not yet entered into a development agreement regarding Phases 4-6. Phases 1-3 have gone 
to fina1 plat. Phases 4-6 have not. 
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extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent." McCuskey 
v. Canyon County Comm 'rs ("McCuskey 11'), 128 Idaho 213,217,912 P.2d ]00, 104 (1996). 
The Idaho Supreme Court's reference to "full extent" in McCuskey II does not mean that 
the damages must be quantified, just that the plaintiff be aware ofthe impending loss. McCuskey 
II was a temporary taking case. The Court rejected McCuskey's argument that the taking did not 
occur until it could be quantified. "Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount 
of damages cannot bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of action is determined." 
McCliskey II, 128 Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105. 
The law on this is consistent and settled. In another case decided the same year, the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained that the statute begins to run "when the impainnent was of such 
a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's property interest became 
apparent:' Wadsworth v. Idaho Department o/Transportation. 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d I, 
5 (1996). In Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333,1338 (1982), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the statute ran on the date of a meeting between parties at which time there was 
"recognition of the severity of the problem." In another case, the Court has explained, 'The 
actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detennination, is to be fixed at the 
point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial 
interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 
Idaho 667, 671, 603 P .2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (inverse condemnation based on airport expansion). 
In yet another case, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the statute ofIimitations on inverse 
condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with 
the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease. ·'We affinn the district 
court's detennination that the full extent ofthe Hacrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the 
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property became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the 
impainnent constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed 
an agreement promising to pay roya1ties and rents on the sand and graveL Therefore, the 
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by l.e. § 5-224." 
Harris)/. State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401. 405,210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009). 
In light of these precedents, tne County is at a loss to understand why Plaintiffs continue 
to harp on this. It became apparent to Plaintiffs at some time in 2004 (more than four years 
before the Complaint was filed on December 1,2009) that the County intended to charge a road 
improvement fee on all phases. 
How was this apparent? In many ways? First, on March 29,2004, Plaintiffs themselves 
included a Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement in their application filed with the Planning 
and Zoning Commission.3 The paragraph on "Road Improvements" says "Developer agrees to 
pay a road impact fee as established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the 
Valley County Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit. ... " This 
was reflected as well in the [mpact Report also attached to the Application. Exhibit A to 
Appendix C and Appendix D to Exhibit 2 to Affidavit 0/ Cynda Herrrick in Support 0/ Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Oct. 14,2010). Thus, by their very own statements, Plaintiffs knew 
about the road fees even before they filed their Application. 
2 The items listed below are a subset ofthe events documenting that Plaintiffs were aware 
from the outset that a road improvement fee would be imposed on aU phases of their 
development. Others are discussed in Valley County's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated October 14, 2010. 
3 The Application is dated "March 2004" on the footer. The cover letter is dated March 
24,2004. The "Acceptance" by Jack Charters is dated March 29, 2004. Mr. Charters also 
signed the Application on March 29, 2004. The Application was actually filed on April ], 2004. 
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Second, Plaintiffs entered into a Capital Contribution Agreement for Phase] on July 26, 
2004. Exhibit I to Affidavit of Cynda Herrrick in Support of Motion for Summary Jluigment 
(Oct. 14, 2010). This Agreement set out the formula that would be applied on a per unit basis 
($1,844). From this, Plaintiffs easily could detennine what the fee was likely to be on 
subsequent phases, 
Third, On October 25, 2004, Plaintiffs actually conveyed the property (via fInal plat 
approval) to the County, as required for Phase 1. Exhibit 15 to Affidavit ofCynda Herrrick in 
Support of Motionfor Summary Judgment (Oct. 14, 20 I 0). This was the date that the Court 
determined started the limitations elock "[a]t the very latest." Memorandum Decision at 5. 
Fourth, on September 26, 2005, Plaintiffs entered into a Road Development Agreement 
for Phases 2 and 3.4 In this agreement, they agreed to pay cash of$232,160, based on $1,844 per 
single family lot and $1,383 per apartment unit. Again, it was easy for Plaintiffs to look down 
the road to Phases 4-6. Each of these four events occurred more than four years before the 
Complaint was filed on December 1,2009. Accordingly. the Court was correct in dismissing the 
entire Complaint. 
It is thus inescapable: [f Plaintiffs knew they had a takings problem with Phases 1,2, and 
3 (the fees for which were quantified more than four years before the Complaint was filed), they 
must also have known that they bad a problem with Phases 4-6. It is irrelevant, for purposes of 
the statute of 1imitations, that the actual payment for Phases 2 and 3 was made later, or that the 
quantity of the fee for Phases 4-6 has not yet been determined. It is equally irrelevant that 
4 On its face, this agreement refers only to Phase 2. That is because Phase 2 was later 
renamed Phases 2 and 3, but this reference was not updated to reflect this, See Minutes of 
September 23, 2005, reproduced in Exhibit 18 to Affidavit ofCynda Henrick in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct. 14,20 I 0) ("Has been a confusion because of changing 
Phase 11's name [which] is now called Phase II and Phase III.") 
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Plaintiffs conceivably might decide not to proceed with subsequent phases; they still have a 
cause of action as soon as it is apparent that their right to develop is unlawfully restricted. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' contention that a takings claim as to Phases 2-6 would not accrue until a 
payment was made is simply and profoundly wrong.s The Court acted correctly in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' entire case. 
As the County repeatedly has pointed out, it is now considering what to do going 
forward. in light of this and other litigation chal1enging development fees.6 AU options are on 
the table. Accordingly, the County contends that the litigation vis-Ii-vis Phases 4-6 is not ripe. 
But if it is ripe, it became ripe in early 2004 when the County began applying its road 
improvement fee fonnula. Accordingly, the statute has run in any event. 
III. THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE. 
Plaintiffs contend that Count 1 of their Complaint sounds in contract. making it subject to 
the state's statute of limitations fur contract actions. This statute sets a five-year deadline for 
"[a]n action based uPOn any contrach obHgation or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing." Idaho Code § 5-216 (emphasis supplied). 
Before going further. it may be enough to point out that Plaintiffs have mischaracterized 
Count I. In fact, nothing in Count 1 (or any other count) sounds in contract. For starters, Count 
I is entitled "Declaratory Relief - Violation of State Law WId State and Federal Constitutions." 
5 Ignoring all the case law, Plaintiffs continue to make assertions like this: "Until 
Plaintiffs actually paid the money, there was no taking." Reconsideration Memorandum at 5. 
6 "Indeed, the County 1S now undergoing a complete review of its policies regarding 
pennitting of new developments and is exploring the enactment of a new IDIF A-compliant 
ordinance that would moot any claims with respect to future development agreements." Valley 
County's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 25 (Oct. 14, 20 to). See 
also, Valley County 's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment,,, 62 and 63 (Oct. 14.2010); Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support o/Motionfor 
Summary Judgment, ,,37 and 38 (Oct. 14,2010). 
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Paragraph 18 complains about the County's "practice" ofimposing fees on developers. 
Paragraph 19 complains that the County has not complied with IDIF A and that money collected 
"amounts to an unauthorized tax:' Paragraph 20 also complains that monies collected 
"constitute an unauthorized tax." Paragraph 21 complains that because ofthese violations, the 
County cannot force "developers to pay monies under the guise of a Road Development 
Agreement and/or Capital Contribution Agreement." In other words, the County's actions are 
illegal in spite of the contracts, not because of the contracts. Moreover, none of the prayers for 
relief involve either breach or invalidation of the agreements. 
In sum, ignoring the words of their own Complaint, Plaintiffs now contend that Count I 
seeks declaratory relief that the development agreements "are illegal and void." Reconsideration 
Memorandum at 6. This is simply not so. Plaintiffs' contract theory is plainly an afterthought-
an effort to re-cast the Complaint in a way that was never intended. 
The Court properly rejected such semantic gamesmanship. The Court rightly looked to 
the nature of this case-which is plainly a takings case. "In detennining the nature ofthe actions 
for limitations purposes, it is the substance or gravamen of the action, rather than the fann of the 
pleading, that controls. In other words, in determining which statute oflimitations governs an 
action, the court looks to the reality and essence of the action, and not to its name." 51 Am. Jur 
2dApplication o/Statutes o/Limitation § 91 (2000).7 
7 Another example of the need to look past the plaintiff's characterization of the case to 
its true basis is found in City oj McCall v. BUX/Oll, 146 Idaho 656, 20 I P Jd 629 (2009). In that 
case, the City sued its attorneys for malpractice. It also included a claim for unjust enrichment, 
seeking return of the money paid to its attorneys. This Court dismissed that latter claim. stating, 
"AJthough styled as a claim of unjust enriehment., Count Six is clearly premised upon legaJ 
malpractice:' Buxton, 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld that 
portion of the District Court's decision. 
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The Court was also correct in declining to apply the five~year statute because "this is not 
an action for breach of contract." Memorandum Decision at 6 n.1. Plaintiffs concede that they 
have not plead breach of contract, but insist the statute is not limited to breach of contract. 
Reconsideration Memorandum at 7. Yet they point the Court to not a single case supporting this 
conclusion. What case law is out there does not support their position. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals provided this definitive swnmary in 2008: 
Pursuant to I.C. § 5·216, an action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be filed 
within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues 
ypon breach for limitations purposes. 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis supplied), 
This is consistent with the black letter law on the subject: 
The statute oflimitations begins to run in civil actions on 
contracts from the time the right of action accrues. This is usuaUy 
the time the agreement is breached, rather than the time the actual 
damages are sustained as a consequence of the breagh. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 160 (2000) (emphasis supplied). 
Plaintiffs' position is further demolished by the fact that they are alleging there was no 
valid contract In Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 318, 160 P.3d 754, 757 (2007), the Court 
found that contract statute of limitations was inapplicable because the contract at issue was void 
ab initio. In other words, if Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that there was no valid contract, this 
is not an action "upon a contract.'" Instead, this is an action based on alleged constitutional and 
statutory violations, and is therefore subject to the four~year statute. 
Plaintiffs seem to believe that if a case's facts involve a contract, it is a suit ''Upon a 
contract," This is not the case. For example. the case of Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., l25 Idaho 
429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994). involved a single transaction (a court reporter's failure to 
prepare an accurate transcript) and various claims based on that event section 1983, fraud, 
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negligence, tortuous interference, and breach of contract. The Court carefully applied a different 
statute of limitations to each claim, applying the contract statute of limitations only to the claim 
for breach of contract. The fact that a eontract governed the entire action of the court reporter 
did not tum the rest of the case into a case "upon a contract." 
An analogy might illustrate. If someone made a contraet to kill another person and then 
did so, the resulting homicide cou1d give rise to a crimina] prosecution and a wrongful death 
action-but not a suit upon a contract. The problem with the killing is not that the contract was 
breached, but that it was carried out. In the case at bar. Plaintiffs' contention that this is a case 
"upon a contract" is no 1ess absurd. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Motion accomplishes nothing but more stirring of an old pot. 
They have offered nothing new and nothing helpful to the Court. Their motion should be denied. 
DATED this 28 th day of February, 2011. 
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING A TIORNEY 
By. ~ .... ~ {l,.-
MattheWC:iiliafilS 
GrVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
BY.~'M.~.~ 
Christopher H. Meyer 
By. ~~£E>----
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individuates) by the means indicated: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor ViJlegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box. 959 
Boise.ID 83701-0959 
jmanwanng@evanskeane.com 
vviUegas@evanskeane.com 
o 
o 
o 
o [8J 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Ex.press Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mai1 
Christopher H. Meyer 
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Matthew C. Williams, ISB #()271 
Valley County Prosecutirlg Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 8361 1 
Telephone: (208) 382-7] 20 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
mwilliams@oo. valley.id.us 
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, [SB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise. Idaho 83701-2120 
Telephone: 208~388·1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 7. 20] J. the Court filed its Mem()rantium Decision Re: De/endant's Motion 
.for Summary Judgment ("Decision")~ which fully disposed of the each oftbe claims by Plaintiffs 
Buckskin Properties. Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (HPlaintiffs·'). Two days later. on 
January 10.20 J I, Plaintiffs filed their Motion/or Parlial Summary Judgment. On January 13t 
20 J J. Defendant Yaney County ("County") filed Valley County s Response to Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. On the same day. it filed Valley County '$ Motion/or Entry 0/ Judgment. 
The following day, January 14, 201 J. Plaintifm filed PlaintUfo J Objection to Valley County '$ 
Motion/or Entry a/Judgment Filed January 13, 1011 (""Objection"). This is the County's reply 
to that Objeclwn. 
ARGUMENT 
In their Objection, Plaintiffs contend that Count One ofthe.ir Compl4inl has survived the 
Court's Dec{si()n because Count One is forward-looking to yet uncompleted Phases 4-6 for 
which a l"OOd development agreement has not yet been negotiated. 'This is incorrect for the 
reasons discussed below. 
f. STATUTEOFLIMITADONS 
First, the statute of limitations applies to the entire project (which is governed by a single 
conditional -use pennit ("CUP"». It does not run separately on separate phases. Plaintiffs knew 
when they signed the Capital Contribution Agreement on July 14, 2004, when right-of-way was 
conveyed via final plat on October 2S, 2004, and again when they signed the Road Development 
Agreement on September 26, 2005, that their project-all of it-was subject to fees which they 
allege ace iD.cgaL Plaintiffs bad no reason to believe, at that tim~ that subsequent phoses would 
be treated any differendy. Hence, the statute ran on aU phases. and Plaintiffs' Complaint was 
filed too late. 
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II. M(X)'J'NESS AND RIPENESS 
On March 7. 20 J 1, the VaUey County Board of County Commissioners adopted 
Resolution 11--6: Resolution Regarding Road Improvement Fees and Development AgrcemenlS 
("Resolution"). A copy of the Ruolution is attached. to the Affidavit ofCynda Herrick Regarding 
Resolution J 1-6 filed today. By this action, the County has gone on record stating that 
developers who have outstanding payment obligations under existing road development 
agreements have three options. These are set out in Section 4 Oll page 3 of the Resolwll'on. First, 
they may make those remaining payments. Second. if development is stalled, they may ask: for a 
"time out" on those obligations. Third, they may notify the County that the permit holder wishes 
to renegotiate the road development agreement. 
In addition~ Section 2 on pages 2"3 ofthe Resolution provides that the County will not 
enter into any new road development agreements calling for the payment of fees or other 
contributions for off-site road improvements unless (1) tbe County has adopted an ordinance in 
compliance with the Idaho Development Impact Pee Act, Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 61-8216 
("IDIFA") or (2) the permit bolder volWltarily and expressly waives any objection to such fees. 
Accordingly. any claim that Plaintiffs may believe they have with r~ to Phases 4-6 
has been mooted by the Resolution. Given Plaintiffs' opportunity to negotiate a road 
development agTeem.ent subject to the tenns of Resolution 11·6, it is apparent that no one can say 
today what that new agreement might look like. Accordingly. lacking II crystal ball. Plaintiffs 
cannot possibly contend that the Court is in a position to rule on that new agreement. In other 
words, any old claim is moot and any potential new claim is nor yet ripe. 
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Dl. INTRRAcnON OF' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOOTNESSIRIPENESS. 
Given that the entire case is barred by the statute of limitations, there is no need for the 
Court to address ripeness and mootness. The Court need address ripeness and mootness only if it 
determines that Count One is not barred by the statute of Umitaticns. 
By the way, the fact that claims with respect to future road development agreements have 
become moot and unripe is not inconsistent with the Court's ruling that the entire case is tardy 
under the statute of limitations. In other words. it is possible for the statute oflintitations to run 
on a matter that subsequently becomes moot or unripe. This does not occur very often, but it is a 
principle recognized by the courts. Cabaccagn v. u.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
627 F.3d 1313 (9111 Cir. 2010) ("[A)lthoughjurisdiction is usually detennined from the filing of 
the reJevant complaint, after~arising events can defeat jurisdi'tion by negating the ripeness of a 
claim. "). In other words.. a claim may be ripe when filed, but become WI-ripe later. Thus, there 
i.9oo inconsistency in arguing (1) that the takings claim for the entire subdivision accrued and 
was ripe more than four years ago and was therefore barred by Ute statute of limitlltioll$ and (2) 
that the furward-looking challenge as to Phases 4-6 has been mooted and made no longer ripe by 
the action of the County this week. 
CONCLUSION 
The COlU1ty'S action in adopting Resolution 11-6 reflects the fact that it has acted in good 
faith throughout this process. It adopted the Capita11rnprovements Program in good faith, 
believing that it had the authority to do so. ]t issued CUPs and entered into road development 
agreements with these Plaintiffs and others in a spirit of cooperation to improve the roads and 
allow development. It relied in good faith on payments made, and it spent that money in 
accordance with those agreements for the direct benefit of Plaintiffs and other developers whose 
applications might otherwise have been denied for lack of public services. Without conceding 
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that its actions were in violation of law. the County's action in adopting this Resolution shows 
that it is. acting in recoW1ition of the fact. that rec~t litiga.ti~ co~g i'fflpact fees :p~t the 
situation in a new light. The County wants to do .the right thing and has done the right thing. 
Acting out of caution and concern for all citizens, businesses, and taxpayers, the County is 
steering a OOUl'Se aim~ at preventing further controversies over the Jawfil)ness of its approach to 
road improvement funding. At the same time. the Countyseck.s to protect its tax;payers from 
unfair claims from persons like Plaintiffs who see an opportunity 10 line their pockets based on 
agreements they previously made with the County thatluive served them weB. For these 
reasons, the Court should enter judgment in favor of the County on al1 counts. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011. 
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING AITORNEY 
BY.~~ 
Matthew C. Williams . 
GIVENS PURSLBY~. I.LP 
BY:~~ 
ChriS.~:. ~~.yer.  ~ .. ~ BY.~') 
n .. H c n 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h~y certify that on the 911\ day QfMa.rch, 2011, a true and. correct eppY Qfthe 
foregoing was served upon the following individua1(s) by the means indicated: 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, 1D 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vviUegas@evanskeane.com 
o 
8 [??J 
o 
U.S. Mail. postage prepaid 
Ex~Mnil . 
Hand DeJivQl)' 
Facsimile 
E,.Mail 
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MaUhew C. Williams, [SB #627t 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
CSSi:ade, JD 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-1124 
mwllliams@<:o.valley.id.1JS 
Christopher It Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson. ISa #5816 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock 81. 
P.O. Box 2120 
Boise. Jdaho 8370]·2720 
Telephone: 201-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspmsley.com 
mch@givensplU'sJey.com 
Att(jmeys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH lUDCCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
v ALLEY COUNTY. a political subdivision 
of tile State ofIdaho. 
Defendant. 
AFPl1)AVn OFCYNI)" HERRICK Ilt:GI\ltDING RUOLlJTlON 11-6 
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ST ATB OF IDAHO ) 
)$S. 
County ofVaJley ) 
[, CYNOA HERRICK, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
I. 1 am the Val1ey Cowlty Planning and Zooing Administrator and have been for the 
entire time the applications for The Meadows at West MOlllltmn ("The Meadows") have been 
processed through Valley County. 
2. The slaternent» in this affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge or upon 
infonnation contained in official records of Valley County that set forth Valley County's 
regularly c;onducted and n:guJarly recorded activities or both. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and coneCI copy of Resolution I J -6 entitJed 
"Resolution Reaarding Road Impro .... ement Pees and DeveJopment Agreements." 
4. The attached resolution was adopted by the Valley County Board of County 
Commiss.ioners on March 7.2011. 
I decJare under penalty of perjury tbat the foregoing is tnle and correct. 
DATED this 9\11 day of March. 20 II. 
Cynd enid<. 
AFflDAvrrOFCV!<iDA H£IUUCK K£CADING RESOUl1lON 11-6 
i09I S.l_AfrtdIW" ~c HCIridt Reaardilll RCIIOlwCII 
Pap 2 
549 
To: Page 5 of 9 2011-03-0923:16:45 GMT 1sea6071532 From: caralea Hopingardner 
CERTlnCATI: OF SERVlCE 
I hereby certify that on the 91h day ofMarcll.. 201 10, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following iooividual(s)by the means indicated: 
led Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane'LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Bois~JD 83701..()9S9 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vviUesas@evanskeane.com 
o 
~ 
o 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Expt:es.s Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-MWI 
Christopher . Meyer 
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RESOLUTION NO. U'"' 
RESOLUTION REGARDING 
ROAD~PROVEMENTFEESANDDEVELOPMENTAGREEMENTS 
WHEREAS, in order to provide a fair and equitable proce&s for en.,uring that adequale 
pubUc services are provided lo new developments, Valley County (the "County") prepured II 
Capital ImprovemenL Program ("CIP"). The CIP; as revised from time to lime. identifies and 
quantifies anticipated capital costs for road improvements within discrete geographic areas 
within the County. 
WHEREAS, the County has entered into agreements under which real estate developers 
agree to pay their proportionate share of road improvement costs based on tost estimates derived 
from the CIP. These agreements have gone by various names. including "development 
agreement," "road development ag:reemen~" and "capital contribution agreement:" They are 
referred .0 collectively berein as "Road Development Agreements:' 
WHEREAS. in collsidering applications for pennits and zone changes; the County is 
obligated by the Lo~1 Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA») to take into account its abiliiyto 
provide service, required for the new develOpment. For instance. LLUPA's provision on special 
use pennils staleS: "A special usc pennit mlty be granted t() an applicoot if the proposed use is 
condirionally permitted by dIe terms of the ordinance, ... subject to the ability of political 
subdivisions, including school districts~ to provide services for the proposea use, ... " Idaho 
Code § 67651l(a). Sinrilarly. the zoning provision ofLLUPAsta[es: "Particular consideration 
shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone change upon the delivery of services by any 
pol:itical subdivision providing public services, including school districts, within the planning 
jurisdiction." In addition. 1.Oning and conditional use pennits !.!lust be consistent with the 
comprehensive plan, which is mandated to address such things as school facilities and 
transportation. Idaho Code § 67~6508{c). Pinally. the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act 
rrOTl<"'A") provides: -'Nothing in this chapter shall obligate a governmental entity (0 approve 
any developo1ent request which may reasonably be expected to reduce levds of S<.."'IVice below 
minimum acceptable reve]s established in the developmen~ impact fee ordinance," 
WHERF..AS. foes and other contributions generated by these Road Development 
AgreemeJlts have enabled the County to approve new rcal es.ate project' on the basis of 
anticipated revenues provided under !he Road Development Agreements. In the absence ofthcse 
Road Development Agreements, the County might have been required to deny approval of some 
or all of these permil applications. or to impose sequence and timing col'lditions. on the basis that 
adequate public services were nOllhen available to serve the proposed development. 
RE50LIJTlON 11·6 EXHIBIT Page 1 of 4 
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WHEREAS. fees and other contributions generated by these Road Development 
Agreements have in fact been used to provide road improvcmenL<; rn accordance with the CXP, 
and these improvcm1ents have benefitted the holders of permits making the contributions. 
WHEREAS, the COUDty undertook the program and actions described above in the good 
faith belief that. it bad the authority to do so under its police power and under the following 
statutory provisions: (I) Idaho Code § 31870, which provides: "Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law. a board of county commissioners may impose and collect fees for those 
services povided by the county which would olherwisc be funded by lWi valorem tax revenues. 
The fees collected pursuant to tbis section shall be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the 
actual cost o.fthe service being rendered," (2) Idaho Code § 61-6SlJA, which authorizes 
development agreements in connection with rezones. (3) Idaho Code § 67.6512(d)(2). which 
authorizes the County to impose conditions via conditional use pennits controlling the "sequence 
end timing of development." (4) Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(6), which authorizes the County to 
require "the provision for on-site or off-site public facilities or services," and (5) 1dal10 Code 
§ 67 --6512( d}(8}, which authori:t..es the COWlty to require "mitigation of effects of the proposed 
development upon service delivery by any political subdivision, includinS school district, 
providing services within me pla.nningjurisdiction.'" 
WHEREAS, based on it .. 1 understanding that the fees contemplated under the C] P and the 
various Road Development Agreements fell within its authority based Oil the County's police 
power and the statutory provisions cited above, rhe Board of County Commissioners believed in 
good faith that it was not necessary to enact un impact fee ordinance in compliance with IDIFA. 
Accordina!y, the COlUlty did not enact an IDIFA-compliant impact fee ordinance. 
WHEREAS. the County acted ill good faith in entering into all plior Road Development 
Agreements and has spent money calJceted thereunder in accordance with and in reliance on 
those Road Development Agreements. 
WHEREAS, years after the Road Development Agreements were entered into, some of 
the parties to some of the Road Development Agreements have initiated litigation contending 
that the fees agreed to under the Road Deve!opmentAgreernenb are unlawful taxo, because the 
County has failed to enact an rOfFA-compliant impact fec ordinance. 
NOW. THEREfORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY 11m BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF VALLEY COUNTy' as follows: 
Section 1: The County will defend its right not to reimburse persons wbo previously 
have paid feos or made contributions in accordance with prior Road Development Agreements 
whjcb the County entered into in good faith and upon which the County reasonably bas relied. 
Section 2: In order to avoid litigatioll costs and ullcertainty, the Board of Cotmty 
Commissioners win no longer enter into Road Development Agreemen(s calling for the payment 
of fees or other contributions for off-site road improvements until such time as the Calmly adopts 
Ib'..soLUT(ON JI.,fj Page 2 of4 
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an IDIFA -complaint ord.inBncc, unless the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any 
objection thereto, In the ahsence of such waiver, the County will negotiate the tenus of fulure 
Road Development Agreement.') in good faith in a ma.JllICJ' that addresses the. County'S obligation 
to assure the availahility of adequate public scrvices in ways other than t.hc imposition of fees or 
other contributions for otf·site road improvements. The inability of the County to secure funding 
under the CIP on a going forward basis may be taken into account by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and by the Board of County Commissioners in cons.idering appUcatiollS fOI pennits 
for new developments. 
Section 3: The restricliorn; set OUf in Section 2 of this Resolution do not prohibit the 
County from imposing requirements or securing conunitments respecting on-5ite or on-boundary 
improvements or dedications that are authorized under LLlJPA and the County's police power) 
nor do they prohibit the County from requiring or entering jnto agreements respectjng water, 
sewer, trash collection. stormwater, and other services provided by the County or its authorized 
agents or oontmctors for the direct benetit of the pennit bolder, property owner, or tenant. 
Section 4: To the extent any Road DevelopmenlAgreemenl now in effect calls for 
payment of fees .or other contributions which have not been made as of this date, the permit 
holder may elect (1) to make those payments or contribution.1i in accordance with the Road 
Development Agreement, (2 ) to request the County to temporarily suspend the permit holder's 
obligations under the Road Development Agreement and/or other deadlines for a period of time 
during which no funhcr development is anticipated, or (3) to nOlify thc County that the permit 
holder wishes to negotiate a new Road Development AgretllTlent. Upon such A request to 
negotiate a new Road Development Agreement, the Board of County Commissioners will enter 
into good faith negotiations with the permit holder in that regard. Jf. at the time of sU(:h 
negotiation, IUlIDlFA~mp!ia.nt impact fee Qrdinance has been enacted, the revised Road 
Development Agreement wilt he in accordance with such ordinance. If no IDlrA-compliant 
impact fee ordinance has been enacted at the time of the negotiation, the County will seek other 
ways to meet its obligation to ensure that adequate public .services are availab1e to serve the new 
development. This could include conditions respecting the sequence and timing of development 
so as to enSLJre that development occur on a schedule con!;istenl with the availability of public 
services. Absent an JDlFA-compliantordinance. the new Road Development Ordinance. as in 
the past will contain no requirements for payments or contributions by the permit holder l,mJess 
such requirements are expressly and voluntarily agreed to by the permit bolder. 
ADOl"TED Oft this 7th day of Mnch, lOUt by majority vole o(the Boaol ofCounly 
Comlnissionen orValley Cellnty, Idabo pU..,1lant to and In cftmpltaoce with all appltc:able 
public notice, hUribg, and other procedunl requinments. 
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ORlolNAL 
Jed Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villeg .. ISBiI 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 West Main 
P. O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimlle: (208) 345-3514 
e-mail: jmanwariDg@evsDskeane.com 
Vvillegas@evanskene.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
B~~CLERK (j UA"""""::n ~-....;:::::::::;;~Deputy 
MAR lB 20U 
Case Nti_ rnst. No. 
Filed 1/: '/1 ---~L.L_ A.M. P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, aD Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a politieallubdivision 
of the State of Idabo. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-554-C 
NOTICE OF SuPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORITY 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, Plaintiffs submit the attached Order on 
Summary Judgment in the matter of Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Partners, 
L.P. v. Blaine County. Case No. CV-2008-22, and respectful1y ask the Court take judicial notice 
of the attached Order on Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment in this case. 
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DATED this 25th day of March. 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
By Ki41~~ 
Victor Villeg~the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, 10 836 J I 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Gil/ens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 .Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ) Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
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David R. Lombardi, Idaho State Bar No. l~l¥ens Pursley, ~~_IL;;E::;-;D;;:;::-{J.4:-:M~~-~-~-~-­
Christopher H. Meyer, Idaho State Bar No. 4461. ~- --...J..::J" 
Martin C, Hen<kickson, ]daho S'ate Bar No. SS76 L J~N 0 ~ 2008 1/. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LI-P .. jm-
601 West Bannock S1. ,........ 
,Jolynn Drago. Clerk Di$( 
P.O. Box. 2720 C~·t:!.!!!<line £.~ k1';;; 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: (208) 3 88~ 1200 
Fax: (208) 388-1300 
chrismeyel'@givenspmslcy.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
www.givenspursley.com 
Martin A. Flannes, Idaho State BarNo. 2874 
FLANNES LAW, PLLC 
P.O. Box. 1090 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Office: (208) 788-1315 
Fax: (208) 788-1316 
martin@flannes.net 
Attorneys for Pelilion.ersIPlain4/Ts 
Cove Springs Development, Inc. and 
Redstone Partners, L.P. 
IN THE DISTRICr COURT OF THE FIFTlI JUDICIAL mSTlUCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
COVE SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, and REDSTONE 
PARTNERS, LP., a Nevada limited 
partnership, 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BLAINE COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State ofIdahQ, and JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH 20, Whose True Names Are 
Unknown. 
ReblJondents/Defcndants, 
TOM O'GARA, .JOliN STEVENSON, and 
GERRY BASHAW, 
Intervenors. 
ORDlm ON SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3 
Case No. CV2008-22 
ORDER ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND J 
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111is matter came on for hearing before the Court on May 29, 2008. Appearing at that 
hearing 011 behalf of the Plaintiffs Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Paltners, L.P. 
were Chris Meyer, Boise, Idaho, Martin Hendrickson, Boise, Idaho, and Martin Flannes, Hailey, 
Idaho. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant Blaine County was Tim Graves, Hailey, Idaho. 
Also appearing at the hearing but not participating was Ned Williamson, Hailey, Idaho on behalf 
oflntervenors Tom O'Ga1"a, John Stevenson, and Geny Bashaw. The Court, having reviewed 
and considered the PetitionerslPlaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 2 and 3, the 
supporting pleadings, and the briefing with respect to the motion~ and having heard and 
considered the oral argument ofrespective counsel, finds and rules as follows: 
Count 2 - Tlereslteld, PUD, and CD Standards (or C01l.(orman.ce lvith Compreltensive 
Plan (2004 Ordinance) 
1. 111 its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 211, 212,213,214, and 215 of 
Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows: 
211. County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 10-5-2B 
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board 
determines that: "The proposed subdivision of land conforms to 
and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan text and map." 
212. County Subdivision Plmmed Unit Development 
Standard § 1 0-6-8A.l 0 states that a planned unit development is 
contingent upon the Board's determination: "That the PUD will 
conform to the comprehensive plan." 
213. County SubdiVIsion Cluster Development Standard 
§ 1 0-9-8E states d1at a cluster development is contingent upon the 
Board's determination: "That the A-20 CD conforms to the goals, 
recommel'ldations and conclusions in the Blaine County 
CO mprehensi ve plan." 
214. Under Idaho law, the purpose of a comprehensive 
plan is to serve as a general guide in instances involving zoning 
decisions such a[8] revising or adopting a zoni:1g ordinance 
215. Under Idaho law, the County may 110t elevate its 
comprehensive plan to the level of controlling zoning Jaw. 
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2. TIle County admitted Paragraphs 211, 212, 213, 214, and 215 of Cove Springs' 
Complaint 11lese are accurate statements of the law. U,..ru/.ia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 
358,2 P.3d 738, 743 (2000). 
3. SubdivisionOrdinance§§ IO-5 4 2.B, 10-6-8.A.lO,and 10-9-8.E,aswriuenin 
2004, apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout 
Blaine County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect ttle 
analysis or conclusions reached in this order. 
4. The Local Land Use Planning Act,ldaho Code §§ 67-6501 to 67-6537 
C'LLUPA") contemplates that the comprehensive plan shall serve as a planning docwnellt to 
guide the adoption of zoning and other ordinances. Comprehensive plans are forward-looking, 
visionary documents. Although LLUPA requires that land use ordinances adopted by the County 
should generally reflect the broad goals and aspirations ofthe comprehensive plan, not all ofthe 
specific provisions in a comprehensive plan are necessarily reflected in current zoning 
ordinances. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 2008 WL 803001 (Mar. 27,2008). Thus, the 
standards and conditions spelled out in its adopted land use ordinances constitute the County's 
articulation as to how the comprehensive plan is to be applied to subdivision applications, 
including the Cove Springs Applications. Cove Springs and aU citizens of Blaine County are 
entitled to rely on that articulation. Thus, individual zoning and subdivision permit applications 
are to be measured against the specific criteria set out in the applicable ordinances. 
S. The foHowing statement by the Idaho Supreme Court is controlling here: 
It is to be expected tllst the land to be subdivided may l"tot agree 
witll all provisions in the comprehensive pian, but a mOre specific 
analysis, resulting in denial of a subdivision application based 
solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan ele,'ates 
the phm to the level of legally controlling zoning law. Such a 
result affords the Board unbounded discretion in examining a 
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subdivision applioation and allows the Board to effectively re-zone 
land based on the general language in the comprehensive plan, As 
indicated above, the comprehensive plan is intended merely as a 
gUideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions. Those 
Zoning decisions have already been made in this instance .... 
Thus, the Board [may not rely] completely 011 the 
comprehensive plan in denying these applications, alld should 
instead have crafted its findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
demonstrate tlult the goals of the comprehensive plan were 
considered, but were simply used in conjunction with the zoning 
ordinances, the subdivision ordinance and any other applicable 
ordinances in evaluating the proposed developments 
Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 358-59, 2 P.3d 743-44. 
6. There is no issue before the Court on these present motions as to whether and 
what extent the County may consider its comprehensive plan in passing upon a subdivision 
application. More particularly, what weight Blaine County chooses to give to its comprehensive 
pJan in considering or passing upon a subdivision application, or the question of whether the 
County can give its comprehensive pI all lillY weight in passing upon a PUD or a Cluster 
Development or a Subdivision Application, (as opposed to adopting a new ordinance, Or 
considering a COllditional use permit, etc.) are not before the Court. 
7. County ordinances are law. By including in Its ordinance 10-5-2.B a requiremenl 
that "No application sha] I be approved" unless the Board "determines the proposed subdivision 
conforms to and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its 
comprehensive plan ''to the level of legally controlling zoning law," Therefore, this particular 
provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 358, 2 P.3rd 738, 
743 (2000), and is contrary to law on its face. 
8. By including in its ordinance 1 0-6-8.A.(l 0) a requirement that a planned unit 
development is "contingent upon the Boards de1errnjnatioll" that "the pun will conform to the 
comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status oflegally 
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controlling zoning law," Therefore, this particular provision of this ordinance violates Un'uNa, 
and is contrary to law on its face. 
9. By including in its ordinance 1 0-9-8,E a ,.equi,.emem that a Cluster Development 
js "contingent upon the Boards determination" that the "A-20 CD conforms to the goals, 
recommendations, and conclusions in the Blaine County comprehensive plan," Blaine County 
has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore, 
this particular provision of thlS ordinance violates U,.rutia and is contnuy to law on its face. 
The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code 
Sections 10-5-2.8, 1 0-6-S,A.! 0, and lO-9-S.E are contrary to law and are therefore nuH, void, 
and without fwthel' force and effect. 
Count 2 - Unauthorized Exactions in TfEreshold. PUD, and CD Standards (2004 
Ordinance) 
10. In its Answer, tile County admitted paragraphs 219,221,223,225,226,227,228, 
229.230,231,233,234,235,236,240,241,243,244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint, 
which state as follows: 
219, County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 10-5-2,C 
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board 
detennines that: "The proposed subdivision shall not adversely 
affect the quality of essential public services and facilities to 
current resldents. including but not limited to school facilities, 
school bus tral1sportation, police and fire protection, emergency 
services, and roads, and shall nor require substantial additional 
public funding in O1'der to meet the needs created by the proposed 
subdivision. The applicant shall be required by the Board to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed subdivision, which 
may include, without limitation, contrtbutioll.S for additional capital 
improvements, on-going maintenance, and labor costs. The plan 
for, timing of, and proposed phasing of the mitigation shall be in a 
fOl'm acceptable to the Board." 
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221. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development 
Standard § 1 0-6-8.A.9 states that a planned unit development is 
contingent upon the Board's determination: "TIlat the developer 
will finance the improvement of the road network outside of the 
PUD where traffic generated by the PUDs increased densities 
make such improvements necessary." 
223. County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard 
§ I 0-9-8.D makes apPl'oval of a Cluster Development contingent 
upon a determination: "That where off-site impacts are found to 
result from the proposed development of the A-20 CD, the 
developer has proposed improvements to mitigate said impacts. 
Such improvements nlay include but not be limited to the road 
network (road improvements not limited to surfacing, school bus 
turnarounds, widening, intersections, bridges, culverts, and 
drainage facilities), fire protection facilities, and trails/recreation." 
225. Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state. 
226. Under OilIon's Rule, counties have no inherent 
authority to regulate or to tax. 
227. Under Dillon's Rule, the authority ofIdaho counties 
to tax derives from grants found in or necessarily implied by the 
Idaho Constitution and stale statutes. 
228. The Idaho Constitution contains a grant of police 
power to [daho counties. 
229. The gran: of police power to counties contained in 
the Idaho Constitution does !lot include a general authority to tax. 
230. The police power lncJudes the authority to impose 
regulatory fees that are incidental to proper regulatory programs 
for the purpose of funding such programs. 
231. The police power includes the authority to chaIge 
USCI' fees for services provided by the County to a user Df those 
services. 
233. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in genera! are not incidental 
regulatory fees. 
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234. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in general are not user fees for 
services. 
235. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public ill general are not the sort of 
traditional exactions authorized under the police power in 
association with dedications within and primarily benefiting the 
development. 
236. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefitjng the public in general are taxes. 
240. Atticle VII, § 6 ofthe Idaho Constitution is not self-
executing. Any power of taxation authorized under this section 
must be implemented by legislation. 
241. The only statute authorizing counties to assess 
development impact fees is the Idaho Development Fee Act, Idaho 
Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216 ("IDlFA"). 
243. County Ordinances §§ I O-S-2.C, 1 0-6-8.A. 9 and 10-
9-8.D do not comply with the procedural and substantive 
requirements of IDrF A. 
244. The County did not enact County Ordinances §§ 10~ 
5-2.C, 1 0-6-8.A.9 and 1O-9-8.D pursuant to or in reliance on 
IDWA. 
249. The County has no authority to enforce a void 
ordinance or 10 apply a void ordinance to the Development 
A pplicatiolls. 
11. The County admitted Paragraphs 219; 221,223,225,226.227,228,229,230, 
231.233,234,235,236,240,241, 243, 244, and 249 ofeove Springs' Complaint. 'nlese are 
accurate statements of the low. Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. Cify of Coeur d'Alene 
("meA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P .2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. Cify 0/ Pocafello. 115 Idaho 502, 
768 P.2d 765 (1 ~88). 
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12. Subdivision Ordinance §§ IO-5-2.C, lO-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.D, as written in 2004, 
apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect througnout Blaine 
County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the analysis or 
conclusion.s reached in this order. 
13. Subdivision Ordinance §§ 10-5-2.C, lO-6-8.A.9, and 10-9·8.0 establish 
development impact fees that the County seeks 10 impose without compliance with lDIFA. 
14. The County bas no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The 
County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDIFA or not at all. 
15. The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover certain costro; 
associated with new developments pursuant to lDIF A, but apparently elected not to do so. 
16. The fees imposed under these ordinances are not incidental regulatory fees or user 
fees, but are intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. 
Accordingly. the fees imposed under these ordinances constitute illegal taxes in violation of the 
Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void. 
17. "Approval of a plat may not be conditioned upon payment by the 
subdivider of a specified pOltlon of the cost of improvements if no power to exact 
such a payment is delegated by the statutes. The county has a duty to keep all 
roads in reasonable repair and may not discharge that duty by imposing the costs 
011 local developers, absent statutory authority; thus, requiring a developer to pave 
a county road as a condition for approving a site plan is ultra vires." 
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 485, at 420 (2003) (emphasis added). 
18. In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), Subdivision Ordinance §§ lO-S-2.C, IO-6-&.A.9, and 10-9-8.0 are void because they 
have been preempted by rolF A. rDlFA is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively 
addresses development impact fees in Idaho and was intended "to occupy the entire field of 
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regulation." Envirosofe Services a/Idaho v. COZIn'Y Q{Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687. 689, 735 P.2d 
998, 1000 (1981). 
19. Specifically, with regard to designated paragl'aph 223, the County argues that 
compliance with Standard § 10-9-8.0 is voluntary. While part of that may be true, the County 
has made approval "contingent" 011 whether the proposed development has voluntarily agreed to 
contribute to mitigate off site impacts. When viewed in context, the County has conditJotled 
approval upon all agreement by the developer to contl'ibute to offsite improvements for clearly 
designated public purposes. In other words, the County has conditioned approval upon the 
developer's agreement to voluntarily pay a tax. In tha11'egard, the County seeks to do indirectly. 
(by coercing payment of a fee for mitigation of offsite public impacts) what it may not do 
directly (levy all "exaction" or tax for precisely the same purpose). 
Idaho Code 67-6513 requires that~ "Fees established for purposes of mitigating the 
financial impacts of development must comply with the provisions of chapter 82. title 67, Idaho 
Code," AdditionaIIy. the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IOlfA") provides, at section 67-
8204(17): "A development impact fee ordin.ance shall include a schedule of development impact 
fees for various land uses per unit of d\,:velopment." Blaine County's ordinance includes no such 
fee schedule, an omission the County seeks to get around by arguing their fees are "voluntary", 
that the County does not need to el1act or set a fee, (because they have placed the burden on the 
developer to set a feel), and thaI the County may ot may not actually set a fee requiring any 
payment in any particular instance. The issue is ~10t whether the County will or might set a fee; 
the statute demands that they set a fee. This attempt by the County (to avoid setting fees as 
I Blaine County Ordinance 1O-9-8.D provides that app!'()val is comingenl upon a determination tila( ",,,the 
developer has proposed improvements to mitigate such impacts" 
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called for by IDlF A) runs afoul of IDIF A. Another subsection of the same statute sets forth the 
result 67~8204(25) provides: 
"Any provision of a development impact fee ol'dinance that is inconsistent 
with the requirements of this chapter shall be null and \loid and thai provision 
shall have no legal ejJect. A partial invalidity of a development impact fee 
ordinance shall not affect the validity of the remaining pcrtiOl1s of the ordinance 
that are inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter." 
The COUl1 therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Sections IO-5-2.C, 
1O-6-8.A.9, and 10-9·8.0 are contrary to law and are therefore null, void, and v.rithout further 
force and effect. 
Count 3 -Road Mitigation Fee (2025 Ordinance) 
19. 1n its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226,227,228,229, 23(}, 231, 
233,234,235,236, 240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above. 
20. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 256, 257, and 258 of Cove 
Springs' Complaint, which state as follows: 
256. The Road Mitigation Fee [defined in paragraph 254 
of the Complaint as Public Ways and Property 01'dinance § 6-1-4 
as amended in 2007] does not fall within the scope oflDIFA 
257. The Road Mitigation Fee does not comply with the 
procedural and substantive requirements ofIDIFA. 
258. The County did not enact the Road Mitigation Fee 
pursuant to or ill reliance 011 IDIrA. 
21. TIle County admitted Paragraphs 225, 226, 227,228, 229, 230,23],233,234, 
235,236,240,241,256,257, and 258 of Cove Springs' Complaint. These are accurate 
statements of the law. 
OnDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3 Page 100f20 
566 
22. The Road Mitigation Fee required under Public Ways and Property Ordinance 
§ 6-]-6, (sometimes referred to as 6-!-4 in Cove Springs documents) as amended in 2007, 
establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with 
IDIFA. 
23. The County has 110 inherent authority to impose taxes tinder its police power. The 
County must impose development impact fees pmsuant to [DIFA Or not at all. 
24. The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover costs 
associated with roads pursuant to lDIF A, but elected not to do so. 
25, The Road Impact Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is 
intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly, 
the fees imp<lsed under this ordinance constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution and are, therefore, nulJ and void. TI\e County may not use an applicant's failure to 
pay an illegal fee as a basis for dellial of a pennit application. 
26. In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), the Road Impact Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a 
broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in Idaho and 
was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation." Envirosafe Services a/Idaho v. Counly 
q!,Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687,689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). 
The COl.u1 therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Section 6~1·6 of the 
Blaine County Code is contrary to law and is therefore null and void, and without further force 
and effect. 
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Count 3 -lnclusional'l!, Housing Fee (2015 Ordinance) 
27. In its Allswer, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226, 227,228,229,230,231, 
233,234,235,236,240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above. 
28. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 265,266,267,268, and 269 of 
Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows: 
265. Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4 adopted in 2006, 
provides, ill relevant part "INCLUSrONAR Y HOUSJNG: 
Twenty percent (20%) of the lots and houses in all subdivisions, 
including condominium subdivisions, approved and platted after 
the adoption date hereof shall be pennanently restricted as 
community housing ... ," 
266. Pursuantto Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4, an 
applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the Board may 
approve, any of four (4) options, or a combination thereof, for 
providing community housing that is required by the ordinance, as 
follows: (1) the applicant build community housing on the site of 
the subdivision; (2) the applicant build community housing off the 
site ofthe subdivision; (3) the applicant convey land, either within 
the subdivision or off the site of the subdivi!l.ion, for community 
housing; or (4) the applicant pay a fee in lieu for community 
housing. 
267. Subdivision Ordinance § t 0-5-4 does not fall within 
the scope of IDIF A. 
268. Subdivi!lion Ordinance § 10-5-4 does not cornply 
with the procedural and substantive requirements of IDIFA. 
269. The County did no1 enact Subdivision Ordinance 
~ to-54 pursuant to or in reliance on IDlrA. 
29. The County admitted Paragraphs 225,226,227,228,229,230,231,233,234, 
235,236,240, 24 I, 265, 266, 267,268, and 269 of Cove Springs' Complaint. These are accurate 
statements of the law. 
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30. The Inclusionary I-lousing Fee imposed under Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4 
establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with 
lDIFA. 
31. The County has no mherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The 
Cotmty must impose development impact fees pursuant. to lDIF A or not at all. 
32. lDIF A authorizes ce11ain categories of development impact fees, to wit: 
1. water supply, 
2. wastewater facilities, 
3. roads, 
4. storm water collection facilitics, 
5. parks and open space, and 
6. public safety facilities. 
Idaho Code § 67-8203(24). Affordable workforce housing is not among them. 
33. Accordingly, the County has no authority to impose a developmen1 impac1 fee for 
affordable workforce housing, even ifit complied with the procedural requirements ofIDlFA. If 
the County wishes to provide affordable workforce housing, it must do so through the 
expenditure of property tax revenues or other authorized means. The Legislature has not 
authorized the County to shift tlle cost of building affordable housing from the community as a. 
whole to individual developers and property owners. 
34. The County has no inherent authority to 1I11pOSe taxes. The Incll.1sionary HOUSing 
Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, butlS intellded to raise revenues for public 
purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accol'dingly, the fees imposed under this ordinance 
constitute mega! taxes in violation of the Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, nut! and void. 
35. 111 addition, even if the COWlty had inherent allthority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), the Inc1usionary I-lousing Fee is void because it has been preempted by ID[F A. IDIFA 
is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees iIlldaho 
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and was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation." Enviroscife Services oj Idaho v. 
CounlyofOwyhee. 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, iOOO (1987). 
The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Section 10-5-4 of the 
Blaine County Code is contrary to law, is therefore null and void, and without fUlther force and 
effect. 
Count 3 - WildJi& Overlap District (2025 Ordinancel 
36. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' 
Complaint, which state as foHows: 
262. The Wildlife Overlay District includes all 
"Classified Lands" as defined in Zoning Ordinance § 9~20-4. 
263. "Classified Lands" are defined in Zoning Ordinance 
§ 9-20-4 solely by reference to determinations made by the lDFG 
[Idaho Department ofFish and Game]. 
37. The County admitted Paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' Complaint. 
These are accurate statements of the law as enacted by Blaine County. 
38. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 defines "CLassified Lands" in terms of elk winter 
habitat, mule deer winter habitat, elk migl'ation con'idors, mule deer migration con'idors, and 
other areas identified by IDFG. The ordinance provides: 
• "Elk migration corridors in Blaine County are designated by IDF&G." 
• «Elk winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF &G." 
• "Mule deer migration corridors are des! gllated by IDF &G." 
• "Mule deer winter habitat in Blaine County IS designated by IDF&G." 
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39. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-5 provides; "Prior to the planning or designating of any 
subdivision, the applicant shall contact lDF&G Glnd any other applicable agency or professional 
as determined by the admin:istrator to identify any classified lands on the subject property:' 
40. LLUPA authorizes and mandates the establishment of zoning districts. Idaho 
Code § 67-65 I L 
41 , LLU PA does not require creation of a 7..oning map in so many words, but it does 
require the designation of zoning districts which, as a practical matter. may be displayed on a 
zoning map. 
42. A zoning map describes current zoning, It is not to be confused with the [and use 
map that is part of the comprehensive plan? 
43. LLUPA does not expressly authorize overlay districts, which are special zones 
imposed on top of an underlying zoning district. However, zoning districts and overlay districts 
are permissible fOlnlS of zoning. so tong as they comply with statutory, common law, and 
constitutional requirements for land use zoning, One of the requirements inherent in all zoning is 
that landowners and other affected parties be informed of the boundaries of the zones. This may 
be accomplished either by mapping or by the establishment of objective, textual standards that 
allow persons to determine with reasonable certainty which zones apply to a given property. 
44. Accordingly, the County's adoption of a Wildfife Overlay District without 
mapping its hound aries does not, in itself, violate LLUPA. 
45. However, the Wildlife Overlay District fails to provide any objective criteria (or 
any criteria at aU) to define its boundaries, other tban "references used by lDF&G." 
Accordingly, there is no way for a person to determine whethel' a property is within or outside of 
2 The operative provision simply refers to this as a "map." Idaho Code 9 67-65[J8(e}. It is referred to as a 
"land lise map" in Idaho Code ~ 67-6509(d}. 
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the Wildlife Overlay District other than to ask for a determination by a third party (an 1DFG 
employee) who answers to no one within the County and who can issue a conclusory 
deternlination on a case-by-case basis unbounded by any fixed, articulated standards or criteria. 
Furthennore. the ordinance allows IDFG to modify such «references" from time to time without 
any notice to and/or input from affected landowners. 
The COllnty argues that "wildlife move" which makes the adoption of a map difficult. 
Petitioners argue that the County bad a map that was used prior to the adoption of this ordinance. 
At different times, in different years, virtually everyone in Hailey, Bellevue, or Ketchum has 
seen moose in the streets, ell< in their yards or subdivisions, elk or deer wintering on surroWlding 
hillsides, bears along the river, etc. Yes, wildiife move, and they move in different quantities to 
different locations in different years; however, the county has sought in this instance to avoid 
responsibility for fixing or studying or ascertaining the general movement of various animals, 
and/or zoning in accordance with general movements of particular populations, by delegating 
this entire responsibility to the idaho Department ofFish and Gamc. 
Fish and Game wldoubtedly has more expertise than the County Commissioners in this 
area, but Fish and Game has no authority to set and/or designate zoning boundaries. The setting 
of zoning boundaries is a function that rests entirely WIth the designated agellts of Blaine County. 
In making this delegation, the County has unlawfully delegated all of its authority to 
officially designate the boundaries of a zoning district, the Wildlife Overlay District, to a non 
elected non county agent that needs to hold 110 hearings, accepts no public input, can change its 
designations of "classified lands" (and therefore the zoning boundary line) daily, weekly,. or 
monthly, without notice, be subject to differing opinions and criteriu within Fish and Game itself, 
and are not required to sct fOlih their designations in a published map or guide for the benefit of 
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landowners, buyers, sellers, developers, Or the general pUblic. The boundaries of the zoning 
dis.trict don't even shift with the wildlife; they shift Wlth the opinions of unknown persons ill an 
amorphous state agency. 
Blaine County has wholly abandoJ1ed its exclusive statutory obligation to establish a 
zoning boundary in this instance. 'n1e fact that the public can find out where these boundaries 
exist by contacting Idaho Fish and Game, or possibly obtain a waiver from the County 
administrator, or address grievances or complaints about the process or how Fish and Game 
exercises its discretion, before the Board of Commissioners do::s not save the ordinance. 
Contrary to the County's arguments, the Board of Commissioners, in this circumstance, is not 
able to control the ability of Fish and Game to exercise discretion. It is ioo late for there to be 
any discussion regarding an exercise of discretion once Fish and Game has made a designation. 
That comes about because Blaine County has delegated to Fish and Game the ability (0 set and 
establish law - the boundary of a zoning district, which may not be delegated. Any challenge 
after that is not a challenge to someone's exercise of discretion, it becomes a challenge to 
legislative authority, something quite different. 
46. The delegation ofland use planning and zoning authority cotltained in LLUPA is 
a complete, comprehensive, and exclusive deJegation to local clty and county governments. 
"The LLUPA provides both mandatory and exclusive procedures for the implementation of 
planning and zoning." Sprenger, Grubb & Associates v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320,321,986 P.2d 
343,344 (1999) ("Sprenger Grubb If'). "[LLUPA J directs cities and counties to plan and zone . 
. .. Exercise of the a.uthority to zone and plan, whether by governing board or by the established 
[planning and zoning] commissions, is made mandatory by I.C. § 67-6503." Gumprechf v. CUy 
a/Coeur d'Alene. 104 Idaho 615. 6 t 7, 661 P .2d 1214, 1216 (1983) > overruled on other ground.s, 
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Cilyo/Boise City v. Keep the Commandments Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 257,141 P.3d 1123, 
1(26 (2006). "The legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact comprehensive plans, 
establish ;toning districts and adopt amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and 
county legislative or goveming bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed procedures." 
Gumprecht, 104 ldaho at 618,661 P.2d at 1217 (1983). "We conclude that the power to approve 
a subdivision application in the impact area resides excfusively with the County." Blaha \I. Bd 
qf Ada OJunty Commr 's, 134 Idaho 770, 777. 9 P.3d t236, 1234 (2000) (only the county has the 
autbority to approve applications in the area of impact, even if the county wished to cede or 
delegate that authority to a city). 
47. IDFG is charged by the Legislature with the regulation of fishing and hunting ano 
with wildiif-e research. Idaho Code §§ 36-101 to 36~124, It has no regulatory authority over 
habitat on private lands. 
48. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 constitutes an unlawful delegation of regulatory 
authority by the County to another agency. Gumprechr, 104 Idaho at 617, 661 P .2d at 1216 
(holding that the City of Coeur d' Alene may not, in effect, delegate its planning and wning 
responsibilities under LLUPA to the people by holding an initiative election on zoning issues). 
49. LLUPA preempts Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4, because the ordinance violates 
LLUPA's assignment of decision-making authority to local officials and authorizes non-elected 
officials outside of county government to make binding deterrnh1ations that affect the land use 
entitlement process. 
50. lithe County desires to make use of the expertise ofIDFG, the U.S. fish and 
Wildlife Service, the University of Idaho, the USDA Extension Service, or any other expert, it 
should invite their views 10 the context of a hearing process that accommodates rebuttal of 
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evidence and which reserves the final decision to the County, as mandated by LLUPA. The 
result of that process should be the adoption ofa map or objective criteria that clearly define the 
boundaries of the zone. 
51. Accordingly, Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 is inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of zoning law. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 on its face violates both LLUPA and th.e 
due process clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions. The Court hereby declares, adjudges, 
and decrees it is void and of no further force and effect 
Therefore, the Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code 
section 9-20-4 is contrary to law and is therefore null and void. and without fU11her force and 
effect. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this lttR day of ~ ,2008. 
ROBE~t 
District Judge 
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Case N~:-rI7 1nsC. No 
FIled tWi...~ A.M,_=:::p-.... 
2 
3 . IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRaCT OF THE 
4 STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
5 
6 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES. INC., an Idaho 
7 corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
Case No, CV-2009-554C 
8 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(2) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
9 
I Plaintiffs, 10 . 
vs. 
11 
VALLEY COUNTY. a political subdivision, 
12 
(3) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION/AMENDMENT 
(4) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY 
FEES 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
16 
19 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES 
For Plaintiff: Jed Manwaring and Victor Villegas of Evans Keane LLP 
For Defendant: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens Pursley 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the Court on (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
20 Judgment: (2) Oefendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for 
21 ReconSideration/Amendment, and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
22 Fees. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties. Inc. ("Buckskin~) and Timberline 
Development, LLC ('Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in 
Valley County, Idaho, called The Meadows at West Mountain (the "Meadows"). Valley 
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, County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition to approve the Plaintiffs' 
1 
final plat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plajntiffs filed this lawsuit seeking 
2 
a declaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of 
: I Impact fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the 
5 Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 ' 
13 
14 
15 
16 
impact fees. On October 14. 2010, Valley County filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of 
limitations has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and 
paid the fees. On January 7, 2011. the Court entered its Memorand um Decision 
granting Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment 
Summary judgment will be granted only ~if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file. together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
I
' issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
17 
18 matter of law." I,R.C.P. 56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial 
19 I court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-mov~ng party and draw all 
I 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
26 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's 
Assoc. v. Bear Lake County. 118 Idaho 343,346.196 P.2d 1016. 1019 (1990). The 
motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokol, 117 Idaho 963, 
793 P.2d 195 (1990). 
The Plaintiffs are seeking summary judgment on Count One of their Complaint 
because they contend that it survived the Court's ruling on the Defendant's previous 
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Mot~on for Summary Judgment because Count One relates to uncompleted Phases 4-6 
for which a Road Development Agreement has not yet been negotiated. However. as 
3 the Court stated in its previous Memorandum Decision. U[t]he actual date of taking. 
4 although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be fixed at the point In time 
5 at which the impairment. of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial 
6 interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent~ Tibbs v. City of 
7 Sandpoint. 100 Idaho 667, 671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979). 
8 
Here. the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Penn it and at 
9 
the very latest, October 25, 2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to 
10 
run on all of the Plaintiffs' claims regarding each phase of the entire project because 
11 
12 
that was the date when the dedication of right of way was accepted and it was at that 
13 point in time at which an impairment of such a degree and kind as to constitute a 
14 substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent. Although 
15 there may be some dispute as to the exact date when the statute of limitations began to 
16 run, the dispute does not create a genuine issue of material fact because October 25, 
2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have began to run 
18 
as a matter of law. 
19 
~n addition. on March 7. 2011. the Valley County Board of County 
20 
Commissioners adopted Resolution 11·6: Resolution Regarding Road Improvement 
21 
22 i' Fees and Development Agreements ("Resolution"). The Resolution provides that the 
23 County will not enter into any new road development agreements calling for the 
24 payment of fees or other contributions for off-site road improvements unless (1) the 
25 : I County has adopted an ordinance in compliance with the Idaho Development Impact 
26 Fee Act or (2) the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any objection to such 
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fees. Based on the subsequent adoption of the Resolution, it appears the Plaintiffs' 
2 
claims with respect to Phases 4-6 have also been rendered moot because the Plaintiffs 
3 will now have an opportunity to negotiate a Road Development Agreement for Phases 
4 14-6. which will be subject to the terms of the Resolution. Therefore, the Court denies 
5 ,I the PlaintiHs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grants the Defendant's Motion 
6 for Entry of Judgment in favor of the County on all counts of the Complaint 
7 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment 
a 
A motion for reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment can be 
made prior to entry of final jUdgment. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(8); Puckett v. Verska. 144 Idaho 
10 
161.166.158 P.3d 937. 942 (2007). A party may submit new evidence with the motion 
11 
12 for reconsideration but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros. 143 Idaho 468, 
13 473. 147 P.3d 100. 105 (Cl. App. 2006). A deCision to grant or deny a motion for 
14 reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial coort. Van v. Por1neuf Med. 
15 Glr., 147 Idaho 552, 560. 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). 
16 ; I The Plaintiffs argue that the Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision 
17 \Ion the Defendant's previous Motion for Summary Judgment for two reasons. First, the 
18 
Plaintiffs argue that the Court is required to separately address the statute of limitations 
19 
for each phase of the project and that the statute of limitations has only run on Phase 1. 
20 
Second, the PlaintiHs argue that Count 1 of their Complaint arises from a contract. 
21 
which makes that claim subject to the five year statute of limitations for contract actions. 
22 i 
23 The Plaintiffs' first argument is w~thout merit because "[t]he actual date of taking, 
24 although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be fixed at the point in time 
25 at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substan1ial 
26 interference with plaintiHs' property interest, became apparent." T;bbs v. City of 
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II 
I 
Sandpoint. 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979). As stated previously. the 
1 
1 entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and at the very latest, 
: I October 25, 2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to run on all of the 
41 Plaintiffs' claims regarding each phase of the entire project because that was the date 
5 I when the dedication of right of way was accepted and an impairment of such a degree 
I 
6 and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest 
7 became apparent. It is irrelevant that the project was divided into separate phases 
a 
because the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and the 
9 
Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that the later phases of the project would not be 
10 
subject to the same impact fees as the earlier phases of the project. 
11 I 
I The Plaintiffs' second argument is also without merit because this is simply not 
1:1 
13 an action based on a contract. It is an action based on inverse condemnation. Under 
14 the Plaintiffs' interpretation of I.e. § 5-216, any cause of action where there was some 
15 type of contract between the parties would be subject to a five year statute of limitations 
15 I; regardless of whether the cause of action stemmed from the contract itself. This 
17 interpretation is incorrect. See Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. St. John Med. 
18 
Plans, (nc .. 674 So.2d 911. 912 (F~a. 3d DCA 1996) (noting that "[c]haracterizing the 
19 
claim as an inverse condemnation will not convert what appears to be a pure breach of 
20 
contract action into something more"); see also, Tex. S. Univ. v. State St. Bank & Trust 
21 
Co., 212 S. W. 3d 893, 916-17 (T ex.App.-Hooston 1 sf Dlst. 200 7) (discussing the 
23 differences between an inverse condemnation claim and a contract dispute). 
24 Idaho Code § 5-224 applies in this case and contains the statute of limitations for 
25 an inverse condemnation cla,m. "An aelion for [inverse condemnation1 must be 
26 commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." See C & 
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV-2009·554C • PAGE 5 
581 
G. Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003). 
2 
In this case, the Complaint was filed on December 1, 2009 and October 25. 2004 was 
the latest date when the statute of limitations could have started to run. As such, the 
4 : Plaintiffs were required to bring their inverse condemnation action by October 25. 2008 
5 in order to comply with the four year statute of limitations 1 Therefore. the Court denies 
6 ,the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment. 
7 
Ii 
9 
1(} 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
n 
22 
23 
24 I 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
The Defendant is seeking recovery of $666.00 in costs as a matter of right 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 Hc). $697.00 in discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(D), and $56,165.00 in attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§12-117 and/or 12-121. 
as provided under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5}. The Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney fees in this matter. 
i.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 HC) provides that: 
When costs are awarded to a party. such party shall be entitled to the 
following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in 
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the 
trial of an action. 
10. Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties 
to the action in preparation for trial of the action. 
I.R.C.P. (d)(l )(D) provides that: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of 
that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said 
costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverso party. 
25 I - . 
, I; , t:.llen assurring that tl".e Plaintiffs' cause of action for Inllerse indt/mnlfication could be classified as a 
?6 I breach of contract c.aim. the Plainti!is' claim would still be barred under a five year statute of limitations 
because they filed theIr Complaint more than five years after October 25. 2004. wPlch was the latest dale 
when the statute of limitations could halle started 10 run. 
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5 
6 
7 : 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
?O 
2\ 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The trial court, In ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs 
contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to 
why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be 
aliowed. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5} provides that: 
Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as 
costs in an action and processed in the same manner as costs and 
included in the memorandum of costs .... 
I.C. 12-117(1) provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or 
political subdivision and a person. the state agency or political subdivision 
or the court, as the case may be. shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nO'lprevailing party acted without a reasonable baSis in 
fact or law. 
LC. 12-121 provides that 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal 
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's 
fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, 
partnership, corporation. association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political Subdivision thereof. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the pursuit of their claims against the County was in 
good faith and was not without a reasonable basis in fact or law because the County 
was collecting illegal impact fees and there were genuine legal issues regarding the 
appropriate accrual date of the inverse condemnation claim. Both parties spent a 
sign4ficant amount of time briefing the statute of limitations issue and it was not clear 
from the outset of the litigation exactly when the statute of limitations began to run, 
Although the Court ultimately determined under the summary judgment standard that 
October 25. 2004 was the latest possible date when the statute of limitations could 
have started to run, there was a legitimate issue of law that was in dispute. Therefore. 
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the Court finds that the Plaintiffs were acting with a reasonable basis in fact or law and 
<' I deny the Defendant's request for attorney fees. The Court also denies the Defendant's 
3 '\ request for discretionary costs because the Defendant has not made a sufficient 
4 II showing of how those costs were necessary and exceptional. However, the Court will 
5 I award the Defendant $666.00 in costs as a matter of right pursuant to loR C.P. 
: IS4( d)(1 )(e), 
CONCLUSION 
B 
The Court (1) DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) 
9 I GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; (3) DENIES the Plaintiffs' 
10 I 
11 
Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment; and (4) GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion to 
• Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees by awarding the Defendant $666.00 in costs as a ~: I matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(C). The Defendant will prepare an appropriate 
14 judgment with an IRCP ~b) certification, 
1!) I DATED this -.lL day of April 2011 . 
I 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2::' 
I 
2fi I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2 . 
3 
I hereby certify that on the ..J..I- day of April 2011. , mailed (seIVed) a true and 
4 ,correct copy of the within instrument to: 
I 
\ VALLEY COUNTY COURT 
5 VIA EMAIL 
6 
Jed W. Manwaring 
7 EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W Main St 
B PO Box 959 
Boise, 1083701-0959 
9 I Fax: (208) 345-3514 
10 II Christopher H. Meyer 
11 i GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
[
1601 W Bannock St 
12 ; PO BOl{ 2720 
. Boise. 1083701-2720 
13 Fax: (208) 366-1300 
2() 
22 
23 
25 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
By (J~( tiD 
De y Clerk 
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ORIGI.~AL 
Jed Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villegas ISB# 5860 
EV ANS KEANE LLP 
]405 West Main 
P. O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
e-mail: jmaowaring@evanskeaoe.com 
VviUegas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IE N. BANBURY, CLERK 
·~~~~~~2~Depuly 
APR, 3 20tt 
Case No 
FiIedJ--:-(-r,r--- lost. No. ___ _ 
-A,M._ _P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN MD FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROP.ERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
P]aintitf, 
vs. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-554-C 
PLAI1\TJFFS' OBJECTION TO 
V ALLEY COUNTY'S PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT FILED APRIL 13, 201] 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attomeys of record, Evans Keane LLP, submit this 
Objection to Valley County's Proposed Judgment delivered under cover letter dated April 13, 
2011. 
Defendant's proposed Judgment at paragraph #2 states ''That all of PlaintifTs' claims 
against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice and;"," 
This Court's April 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision granted Defendant's Motion For 
Entry of Judgment because this Court found that Plaintiffs' claims for Phases 4-6 were rendered 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO VALLEY COUNTY'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 13,2011 -
1 
586 
moot by the enactment of Resolution 11-6. See. Memorandum Decision pp. 3-4. Such finding 
does not merit dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Phases 4-6. Plaintiffs 
have not yet met with Defendant to determine what requirements, if any, will be imposed as a 
condition to final plat approval. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that any entry of judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Phases 4-6 be done without prejudice. 
DATED this 13th day of April, 2011. 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
. 
By r{:41 ~~ 
Victor Vi1legas:the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, 10 836' J 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, 1D 83701-2720 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
[XJ u.s. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
( J Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[XI Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO VALLEY COU:-.ITY'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 13,2011 -
2 
587 
To . Page20fG 2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT 18665753182 From: LiA Hughes 
Matthew C. Williams~ ISB #6271 
VAlley COUllty Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
CS$Cade. (0 83611 
Telephone: (201) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-71.24 
mwillj,Bms@co.vaJlcy.;<f.WI 
Chris10pher H.Meyer"JSB #4461 
MartinC. Hendric~ont ISB#$875 
OWENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W . . BannockSt 
P,D.Box 2720 
Boise.. Idaho 83701-2720 
T ~)f;ph9De; 208~388-120Q 
Facsimile: 208-38.8-1300 
chri~eyer@sj\le~spur&l~y.COJl) 
mcb@givenspurs1ey ~com 
Attorneys for l),;fend~t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT O~ 
THE STATE OF JDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COI,JNTY Of Y ALLEY 
Case No. CV2009-554 BUClCSlON PROPERTIES,INC .• anlclQhQ 
Corpomtio~and TlMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT. LLC. an IdahQ Limited 
Liability Company, Ib;sPQl'CSETO rUINTlffS 'OBJ~CtION 
TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
v .. 
VALLEY COUNTY, BpoliticBl subdivision 
ofthc State IJfldahQ, . 
DckoolWt. 
COMES NOW. the Defendant. Valley County • by and through its at1nmey~ of recorrf, 
and hereby submilS its Response 10 Plilintlffs' Objection 1.0 Proposed Judgment. 
~-st:TOPLAINT]~F5'OJW:CllONroPROPOSEDJtJDCM£NT· Page 1 
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To: Page 3 at 9 2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT 18665753182 From: lisa Hu{tles 
On April 11, 2011, the Court entered its lvIef1Wrandum Decision r" Ap,.ilDeci#on') 
ccncerning lhe pending motions!R this action. The end result.ofthat decisjon was to cqnfinn 
thatth.e Court's Memorandum Decisiol1 Re : Deftndant. 'sMotion for Summary Judgment. 
entered on January 7, 2011, fuUy disposed of the each of the claimS by P1aintifls. ]n the A.pril 
Decisior,., the Court clarified thal aU ofPlaitllifTs' state lawcl~ms were barred by tht four year 
statute Df limitations, noting that th~y all arose· from the same Conditional Use Permit and that aU 
of the claiJlls accrued at the same time .• In accordance with the Court's instructions contained in 
. . 
the finalsenten.;:e of the April D.ecision. Valley County submitted its proposed judgment to the 
Cowt,~: copy of which. is .attached hereto a.s ExllibitA C""PropOsed Judgmenl}. 
Pla.intiffsobject:to the ProJ)!)sed Jud$1flent onthe gro~d that Plaintiffs' cl~ims regarding 
phases 4 thtough6 oft.beir development were. heldto be moot based upon Valley County's 
recent adoption ()fRc::~lutioJ;l t 1~6.~ ~Ia.intiffs· objection to ilieProposad Jlldgmulltis without 
merit because the Court, in th~ April De{;i.f ien •. cle-!3.dy statedtlult ~.n of Plaintiffs' ctait.ns vvere 
ban'edby the sl;at1,lte of JimifatiQIlS.. 
9 
11 
Here. lh~ e.,tire project was'governed by' asin~e CoooitlOnal Use Perrnitand.at 
the very latest, October 25.. .2004 was 1he tlat~ wh~n the s~tute of IimitatiQ.n.s DeQSn to 
run on a8 of Ibe Planiffs' claims regarding each -phase of the entire pl'{)jec1because 
that wa$lhe date when the dedication of right of W4Y was accepted and it was aOhat· 
·~2 
13 
14 
\5 
16 
p(lint in time at which an impainnent of such a degl'ge olln!i kind sst!) constitutes 
substantial interierenC(l w1tn th~ Ptaintiffs' Pnlperty intereSllJecame apparent Although 
there may .besome dispute as to -the exact date when the sJalute:of limitaf~ns began to 
run, tbe displ.Jte does not create 8. genuine issue of material fact because. Octol.')er 25, 
11 2004 was the latest pDlnlin time that the stalute of limitations could .have begc;ln to. run 
U! 
as a matter of laW. 
·R£S1'OI''Sf: TO PUINnFfSt OBJECTION Tn PROrostD JUDGMENT Page 2 
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To: Page 4 of9 2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT 18665753182 From: Lisa Hughes 
(April ])eeisien. p. 3; see also pp. 4-5.) Thus; t~ Proposed Judgment accurately reflects the 
, ' 
Comi's nllings and dismissal or all ofPlaintifCs'claims with prejudice is appropriate. 
Valley County recognizes tPat tile Co\lI't discussed ileSQJution 11,.0 in the April Decision 
and c~nch}(l~dtbat Plaintiffs' claims regarding phases 4,6 oftheh ~'(elopmenthave been 
.-e.ndered moot. However. that pOf(i()n of the 4pr.i/ Decisionis plainly articulated .by the Cou,rt to 
bean additional ba$is for dismissal of those c1aims. (Id.~ pp. 3-4.) If the ,Court had detennined 
that the claims related to phases 4-6 were not Ilarred by the statute of liuritations and, instead. 
hadIUled that such claims were subject to dismissal only based onm.ootness, then Plaintiffs. 
would have a point. But ajudgrneru or dis.rnissal with prej'iJdice of ~lJ claims l.sproper here 
because the Court ruled thal ·'at the very latest, October 25, 2004 was the:,datc when the statute of 
<limitations began to run on aU of the Plaintiffs', claims reaardint;t eaehphase of the entire l'rojec1 . 
. . ." (ld, p. 5, emphasis added.) 
For these reasons, ValleyCounty respectfully submits that the CourtshQUld enter 
judgment in favorofthc: County on all c~unt~ c()Osistent with the Propo.<:ed.ludgmlJnJ. 
DATED this 131h day of April, 2011. 
GIVENSPUllSLEY"LLP 
RF.SPON~ETO.PLAJN11U'S' 08Jl:CTlON TO PROPOSE]) JlJDCMI:NT Page 3 
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To: Page 50fE! 2011-04-13 15:05:45 MOT 18665753162 From: Lisa Hughes 
I hereby certify that 0t? the 13111 day of April. 20 11 ~ a true and con-eel copy of the 
foregoing wasserve(f upon the fnUowil1gindividual (s)by the means. indicated: 
JedM<lJIwaring 
Vidor Villegas 
Evans Keane:LLP 
1405 WcstMain 
P.O. Box: 959 
Boise .. ID 83701 ~0959 
j manwarin11@evanskeanc.com 
vviUegas@evanskeane.com 
D 
o 
o 
~ 
u..s, Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand J)e.livery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
Page 4 
591 
To: Page 6 Df 9 2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT 18665753182 From; Lisa Hughes 
EXHIBIT A 
592 
To: Page 7 of ~ 2011-04-13 15:05'45 MDT 186e5753182 From: Usa Hughes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA,LDISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES~ INC., an Idaho 
Corpora:tion. and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT~ LLC. an (dabo Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiffs. 
v. 
VALLEY COUNTY,apolitlcal subdivision 
of the Slate of Idabo, 
Defendant. 
Case No.CV 2009-554 
JUOOMI.NT 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Valley County's Molionfor 
Enuy of Judgmenl, and this Court having previously granted Vulley CQu1IIy '05 Moiionjor 
Summary Judgment in. its Memonutdwn Pe,dsiQoentered on.J~unry7,2011.,1mdthis Court 
having also c,onsidered Pl,#nNjJs' Motion jorPQrtiqlSum.mary Judgment. Pff.linliffs' Morion/or 
ReCDI1Jiderat;on, ValieyCounJy's Me11f(Jram:ium a/Cost ... andAllor~y Fee,,~ 8I1.dPlaintifft' 
),.forion fa Disallow; 
NOW. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED. AND DECREED: 
1. That judgment ;$ entered jn favor nftbe(>efendadt:WlQ against th~ Plaintiff$- on all 
counts of P/Qlnti/ft ' Complaint; 
2. That all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Oefendantare dismissed with prejudice, 
'and; 
JIJUbM~J 
109t5-2_1111.o2_' 
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To: Page8of9 2011-04-13 15:05:45 MDT 18665753182 From: Li$a Hughes 
3. That Plaintifis slWl pay to Valle) Cowlty $666.00 foc il$ custs pursuallt to IRCP 
Rule 54(d)( l)(C), pJus interest acawngat the statutory rate from .and after the 
date of entry ofjudgmenl. 
DATED.tbi!l __ day of April. 2011. 
MICHAEL R MCLAUGHLIN 
Districl Court Juclge 
.RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issuesdetermioed by the aooyejud.gmentit is hereby C~RTIFIED, in 
Ifl;cmW:utce;: wi~h Rule 54(0). I.R.c'.P ... that, the Cowl has. detennined (hat there is no JUSt reason 
for delay of the entry ofa final judgmcnt.andthat the Court has and,do~s h~by direct that the 
abovejuda:ment shall be a finaljud-'Pllent upon which execution ma.y'issue !md an appeal may be 
ta.k.en I:t.S provitlt:d by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this __ day of April, .2011. 
JUDGMENT 
1081~2_1111402_1 
MICHAEL R. .MCLAUGHLIN 
District Court .Judge 
Pl.tge 2. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that.on the __ day of April. 2011;.&. true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upo n the following individual(s) by the mean$ indicated: 
Jed Man'W8ring 
Victor V iIleg~ 
Evan~ .Keane. LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 9.59 
Boise, ID 83 701 ~09S9· 
jm.anwaring@ev~keane.com. 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
Matthew C. Wi1liams 
Va11eyCounty Prosecud!\g Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID83611 
mwilliam$@co.valley.id,us 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hc.mdricbon 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W.B~St. 
P.O. Box 2120 
Doise. ID 83701-2720 
chrismeyer@APven:n>ursJey.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
JuDOMf.N1' 
1091~2_1111.02_1 
B 
8 
o 
B 
o 
o 
o 
o 
n 
B 
o 
U.8. Mail. postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
US. Mail. pOstage prepaid 
E"press: Mail 
HllIld D~livery 
Facsimile 
E-MaiJ 
U.S, MaiJ,poSIa~e prepaid 
E~press Mail 
Hand DeJiv~ry 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
CIeri. of the Distdct Court 
By; ~~ __ ~~ __________ ~ ____ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
Page 3 
595 
Case No 
F~'~~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICTOF--A'~PJf~ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2009-554 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MA'ITER having come before the Court pursuant to Valley County's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment, and this Court having previously granted Valley County's Motion/or 
Summary Judgment in its Memorandum Decision entered on January 7, 2011, and this Court 
having also considered Plaintiffs' MOlion/or Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion/or 
Reconsideration, Valley County's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, and PlaintiffS ' 
Molion to Disallow; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on aJ I 
counts of PlaintiffS' Complaint; 
2. That all ofPJaintifis' claims against the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice, 
JUDGMENT 
10915-2_1111402_1 
and; 
Page 1 
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3. That Plaintiffs shaH pay to Valley County $666.00 for its costs pursuant to IRCP 
Rule 54(dXI)(C), plus interest accruing at the statutory rate from and after the 
date of entry of judgment. 
DATED this rt day of April, 2011. 
~~~ 
MICHAEL R. MCL GH IN 
District Court Judge 
RULE 54{b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in 
accordance with Rule 54(b}, LR.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this I q day of April, 2011. 
JUDGMENT 
1091~2_1111402_1 
I).;£h~/£ 
MICHAEL R. MCG IN 
District Court Judge 
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CLERK.S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -d day of April. 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
/ 
Jed Manwaring 
Victor Villegas 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jrnanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
mWiJIiams@co.valley.id.us 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
JUDGMENT 
10915-2_1111402_1 
vEf· 
o 
o 
o 
o 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
~ U.S. Mail. postage prepaid 
o Express Mail 
o Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile 
DE-Mail 
/ 
~ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Del ivery 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
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J~d Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villegas JSB# 5860 
EVANS KEA.'JE LLP 
1405 West Main ~aseNo. __ -,\nstNo, __ _ 
P. O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701..0959 
Telephone: (108) 384-1800 
Facsimile! (208) 345·3514 
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
V villegas@evanskeane.eom 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Filed A.M. ;3: &~ P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURY O:F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintitlsl Appellants, 
VS. 
VALLEY COUNTY, a politicaJ subdivision 
of the State of Idaho. 
DefendantlRespondent. 
Case No. CV-1009-554-C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: TIlE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, AND TO 
THE CLERK OF TIlE ABOVE-E~'TTTLED COURT 
1. The above-named Appellants, Buckskin Properties, Inc., and Timberline 
Development, LLC, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the District Court's Memorandum Decision Re: DefendanCs Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered on January 7, 2011, Memorandum Decision entered on April I!, 2011 and Judgment 
entered April 19. 2011 by the Honorable Judge Michael R. McLaughlin, presiding. 
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2. That the pany has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supremc Court, and the 
Memorandum Decisions and Judgment described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1) ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Appellants intend to assert a number of issues on appeal I including, but not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) When does a cause of action for inverse condemnation begin to accrue on a multi-
phase residential subdivision? 
(b) Did the District Court eiT in IIXing the accrual date of Appellant's inverse 
condemnation claim upon its payment of road development fecs under Phase l despHe 
the fact that AppeUant paid separate road development fees for later phases? 
(c) Did the District Court err in dismissing Appellant's declaratory action on the final 
phases of its development as being moot? 
This appeal is taken upon both matters of law and issues of ract. Appellants reserve the 
right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the issues set torth above. 
4. There have been no orders entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Appellants request pursuant to I.A.R. 25(c) the reporter's transcripts of the 
December 6, 2010 hearing on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 8lld the Marth 
11, 2011 hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 8l1d Motion fOT 
Reconsideration. 
6. Appellants request the folIowing documents to be induded in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R: 
No. Filed Description 
t 12/01109 Complaint 
I 2 12/01109 Summons 
3 12/01/09 Affidavit of Service 
4 12121109 Answer 
5 04/15/10 Affidavit of Cynda Herrick 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· 2 
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I No. I Filed Description 
6 JO/l4/10 Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
I 
7 10/14/10 Valley County's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion 
. for Summary Judgment 
I 
8 10114/10 Valley County' s Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
I 9 10114/10 Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (as Exhibit to Clerk's Recordj 
10 
I 
11102/10 Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
SUUUUCU'l Judgment 
11 11102/10 Affidavit of Dan R. Brumwell 
12 11/02110 Affidavit of DeMar Burnett 
13 11/02/10 Affidavit of Robert W. Fodrea 
14 i 11/02/10 Affidavit of Rodney A. Higgins 
15 11/02/10 Affidavit of Steve Loomis 
16 11/02110 Affidavit of Michael Mailhot 
17 11102/10 Affidavit of Larry Mangum 
18 11/02/10 Affidavit of John MiHington 
19 11102/10 Affidavit of Joseph Pachner 
20 11102/10 Affidavit of H~ Rudolph 
21 11/02110 Affidavit of Anne Seastrom 
22 11/02110 Affidavit of Matt Wolff i 
23 11109110 A ffidavit of Victor Villegas in Opposition to Summary Judgment I[ 
(as Exhibit to Clerk's Recordl 
24 1.1/10/10 Valley COWlty'S Reply Brief in Support of Motion fOT Summary 
Judgment 
25 11111110 Stipulation to Move Summary Judgment Hearing from Valley 
County to Ada County 
26 01111111 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
27 01/11/11 . Motion to Vacate Trial Date & Request for Status Conference 
28 01113/11 i Motion for Entry of Judgment 
29 0llt3/11 Response to Motion for Partial S - .)' Judgment 
30 01/14/11 ' Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion for Entry of 
Judlmlent Filed January 13, 2011 
31 01121111 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment 
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No. FUed I Description 
32 01/21111 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsiderationl Amendment 
33 
I 
01128111 Stipulation to Move February 17, 2011 Motions Hearing f-rom 
Valley County to Ada COlmty 
34 02/28/11 VaHey County's Response to Motion for Reconsideration 
l 35 03/09/11 Valley County's Reply in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment 
\ 36 03/09/11 I Affidavit ofCynda Herrick Regarding Resolution 11-6 
37 03/28/11 Notice of Supplemental Authority 
38 i 04113111 I Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Proposed Judgment Filed 
April 13, 2011 
39 04113111 i Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to YalJey County's Proposed 
Ju~ t 
I 40 All Orders 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of ~ppeaJ has been served on the reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address .set out 
below: 
Frances Garrison 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Valley County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, lD 83611 
Vanessa Gosney 
clo Hon. Timothy Hansen 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, 10 83702-7300 
Penny Tardiff 
c/o Hon. Darla S. Williamson 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702·7300 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
NOTTCE OJ; A PPP A 1 _.4 
\ 
I j 
I , 
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(d) That the appellate fillng fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties Tequired to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DA TED this J.. ( day of May, 2011 
EV ANS KEANE LLP 
By Y&4l~~ Vict~r Vi11ega;,or 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERYICE 
I HEREBY eER TIFY that on this day of May, 2011, a Ulle and COrrect copy 
of the foregoing document was served by flrst-class rrulil, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by 
fax transmission to; by ovel1light delivery to; or by personaIly delivering to or leaving with a 
person in charge of the office as indicated be]ow: 
Matthew C. Williams 
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, 1D 83611 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LlP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, II) 83701-2720 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
ValJey County Clerk 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade. ID 83611 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7184 
Vanessa Gosney 
clo Hon. Timothy Hansen 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, II) 83702·7300 
NOTICe OF APPEAL - 5 
[Xl u.s. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ 1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[XJ U.S. Mail 
( ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax [ J Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
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Penny Tardiff 
c/o Hon. Darla S. Williamson 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, 10 83702-7300 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
[Xl u.s. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
( ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas 
III 007 
604 
06/15/2011 WED 17103 FAX 208 8 130D Givens Pursley 
Matthew C. WiUiams~ ISB #6271 
Valley COWlty Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade. ID 83611 
Telephone: (208) 382-7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
mwilJiarnS@Co.valley.id.us 
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson. ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock St 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 8370l-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-) 200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com 
mch@givenspursley.com 
Attorneys for DefendantIRespondentlCross-AppeIlal1t 
1210021006 
ARCHIE: 1\1. BANBURY, t;Lth. 
BY~,ce..../ Deputl JUN15 2011 . 
Case NO. __ --..JCJnst.No __ _ 
Filed A,M,-£.~..P.M 
IN THE DfSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idallo 
. Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
v. 
Plaintiffsl Appe) lant/Cross-
Respondents, 
V ALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant/Respondent! 
Cross-Appellant. 
None.: or·' CRoss-APr&t\L 
11828911JOOC 110915.2 
Case No. CV 2009-554 
NOTICE OF CRoss-ApPEAL 
Page 1 
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06/15/2011 WED 17:03 FAX 208 3B8 1300 Givens pursley 
TO; THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, BUCKSKIN PROPERTlBS. INC., 
TIMBERLINE DEVELOPMENT LLC, AND THE PARTIES' A rrORNEYS, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTInED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
l. The above-named RespondentfCmss-Appellant, Valley County, appeals against 
the above named Appellants/Cross-Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's MOIion for Summary Judgment entered on January 7, 
2011. the Memorandum Decision (1) Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
(2) De/endant's Motion/lJr Entty of Judgment (3) Plaintiffs' MOlion/or ReconsideraJiol1/ 
Amendment (4) Plaintiffi' Motion to Disallow CostJ and Altorney Fees entered on April I I, 
20 I 1 , and the Judgment entered on April 19, 2011, the Honorable Judge Michael R. McLaughlin 
presiding.. 
2. The Respondent/Cross-Appellant has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court pursuant to Rules 15(a) and 11 (g), LA.R., and the two memorandum decisions and 
Judgment described in paragmph I above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1). 
J.A.R. 
3. The following is a preliminary statement of the issues that the RespoooentlCross-
AppeHant presently intends to assert in the appeal: 
a. The thrust of the issues presented by Respondent/Cross-Appellant wHl be 
a defense of the District Court's decisions on the merits, both on the legal and factual 
bases identified in the District Court's two memorandum decisions and on other legal and 
factuaJ bases presented to the District Court. In addition. Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
Williaise the issue listed below. 
NO"flet: OF CNOSS-ArPEAL 
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b. In its two memorandum decisions and Judgment, the District Court erred 
in failing to award attorney fees to Respondent/Cross-Appellant. More specifically. the 
District Court should have found that Appellants/Cross-Respondents acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact thus entitling Respondent/Cross-Appellant to an award of 
attomey fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988. Respondent/Cross-Appellant intends to seek costs and attorney fees for both the 
District Court proceedings and on this appeaL 
c. Respondent/Cross-Appellant reserves the right to raise other issues on 
appeal only to the extent pennitted by law. Respondent/Cross-Appellant will object to 
any issue, argument, or facl raised on appeal by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents that 
was not timely raised below. 
4. RespondentlCross-AppelJant does not request allY additional reporter's transcript. 
5. Respondent/Cross-Appellant l'eqUests the following documents to be included in 
the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, tA.R. and those 
designated by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents in the initiaJ Notice of Appe.al: 
a. Affidavit of Mike Mailhot in Support of Application for Preliminary 
Injunclion filed on 4/612010; 
b. Affidavit of Matthew C. Williams filed on 1128/2011; 
c. Valley County's Memorandum of Cos Is and Stawment in Support £Hed 011 
113112011; 
d Affidtll1it of Christopher H. Meyer filed on 1131/2011; 
e. Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson filed on 1/3112011; 
f. Affidavil qf Murray D. Feldman filed on 1131/2011; 
NO'l'lC(O:Of CRQS!\ .. APPEAL 
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g. Molion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees filed on 2/15111; 
h. Plaintiff's MemoranduM in Opposition JO Valley County's Me!1UJranaum 
o/Costs and Statemenl in Support filed on 2/15/11; and 
i. Valley County's Response /0 Motion to Di.mllow Costs and Auorney Fees 
filed on 3/t /20 11. 
6. Respondent/Cross-Appellant does not request any documents, charts, 01' pictures 
offe.t'ed or admitted !IS exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
7. I certify: 
a. That service of the norice of cross-appeal and any request for additional 
transcript has been made upon the repotter; 
b. That the estimated reporter's fees for the requested transcript, if any. have 
been paid; 
c. That the estimated fees, if any, for including any additional documents in 
the clerk's or agency's record have been paid~ 
d. That all appellate filing fees, if any, have been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2011. 
NOTICt~ OF CROSS-A I'rE.U 
!l82B99JD()C 110915-2. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LU' 
BY:~'i~ 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Attorneys ./Or RespondentiCross-Appeliam 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June. 2011, the foregoing was filed. served, 
and copied as foUows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial Disu'ict Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
SERV[CE COPIES TO: 
Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main Stl'eet 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise.ID 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
COURTESY COPlES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. Mclaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jason Gray 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Coul1house 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, 1D 83702 
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net 
[81 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
f2l 
U. S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
U. S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
U. S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
u. S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Christopher H. eyer 
NOTICE OF CltOSS-AI'I'EAt 
1I1!2899_3.DOC/I09IS-1 
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Jed Manwaring ISB #3040 
Victor Villegas lS8# 5860 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 West :\'lain 
P. O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone~ (208) 384-]800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
Vvil1egas@evanskeane.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
~~= 
APR 06 2010 
. ca._ w.No-----
Filed / /,' UJ ...A.M P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOllRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUSTY O.F VALLEY 
BUCKSKI.~ PROPERTlES. INC. an 
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE 
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
PlainUff, 
VALLEY COUI'iTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of ldaho. 
Defendant. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
) ss. 
County of EI Dorado } 
Case No. CV-20(l9-5S4-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE MAILHOT 
IN SVPPORT OF APPLICATION 
FOR PRELI:\1II'\ARY INJUNCTJO~ 
Mike Mailhot, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
I. Thm ! have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
2. prainlitT Buckskin Properties. lnc. (HBuckskin") is an [daho corporation and was 
the initial applicant for a residential subdivision named The Meadows at West Mountain rThe 
Meadows"), which is located in Valley County. Idaho. 
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3. Plaintiff Timberline Development LLC ('Timberline") is an Idaho limited 
liability company of \vhich Buckskin is one of two members. Timberline Development, LLC is 
the assigneeisuccessor in interest of the final phases for The Meadows. 
4. I am the managing member of Timberline. 
5. On or about July 12,2004, Buckskin was granted approval for a conditional use 
permit titled Conditional Usc Permit For Planned Unit Development No. 04-01 ("PUD"). The 
conditional llSC permit was for the project named The Meadows at West Mountain. A true and 
correct copy of said Conditional Use Permit is attached hereto as Exhibit "A ". 
6. As a condition of approval of its PUD, Buckskin was required by Defcndant to 
enter into a written agreement with the Valley County Board of COllnty Commissioners to 
mitigate tramc impacts on roadways attributable to The Meadows. 
7. On or about July 12. 2004, Buckskin entered. under protest, into a Capital 
Contribution Agreement with thc Valley County Board of Commissioners, which required 
Buckskin Properties to pay money for its proportionate share of the road improvement costs 
attributable to traffic generated by The Meadows. According to the terms of the Capital 
Contribution Agreement, Buckskin was required to contribute money to road impact mitigation 
as established by Valley County at the time the tinal plat for each phase of The Meado\'/s was 
recorded. A true and correct copy of the Capital Contribution Agreement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "8". 
8. For Phase 1. the Capital Contribution Agreement required Buckskin to convey 
reaJ property in licu of paying a monetary fee. In addition, any monetary amount;; in excess of 
the property conveyed to VaHey County would be credited toward future tec payments that 
Buckskin would have to pay upon recording the final plat for later pl1ases. 
AfFIDAVIT OF MIKE MAILHOT IN SL:PPORT Of APf>LlCATION fOR PRELIMINAR Y INJUNCTION - 2 
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9. For Phase 2, Buckskin \"'as again required by Defendant to elllcr into a written 
agrcement for the mitigation of tramc attributable to its project. 
10. On or about September 26, 2005, Buckskin entered, under protest, into a written 
agreement titled Road Development Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the Road Development 
Agreement, Buckskin was required to pay $232.160.00 to pay for mitigation of the project's road 
impact, which was due prior to recordation of tIle final plat for Phase 2. A true and COITcct copy 
of said Road Development Agrcemcnt is attached hereto as Exhibit "C', 
II. On or about December 15,2005, Timberline issued a check to Valley County for 
$232,160.00 for payment under the Road Development Agreement. 
l2. Timberline is currently in the process of completing the final plat for the 
remaining phases of The Yleadows. Valley County has oncc again sought the payment of 
monics for the prop0l1ionate share of road improvement costs attributable to trame generated by 
the remaining phases of The Meadows as a condition to it signing and recording the final plat for 
the remaining phase~. 
J 3, Timberline has sought and obtained approval for an extension to its deadlinc for 
filing a tinal plat for the remaining phases of The Meadows. 
l4. Valley County approved and issued said one-year extension to record the final 
plat for the remaining pllases of the Subdivision 011 July 9,2009. Said extension will expIre on 
July 12,2010. A true and COITCCt copy of said approval is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
15. Plaintiffs obligation to pay such monies to Valley County as a condition to the 
tinal plat approval and recording is an issued to be tried jn the above-referenced matter, 
16. Without a temporary stay of the extension period during the pender:cy of the 
above-referenced matter, Timberline will be ilTeparably hamled because said extension period 
AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE :V1AILHOT IN SUPPORT OF APPLIC A T10!' FOR PRELI:VIlNARY I"IJCT\CTION - J 
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I 
win exPireldUring the pendency of the above-referenced matter and Plaintiff will be unable to 
obtain final/approval and recordjng of the nnal plat for the remaining phases of the Subdivision. 
17. I Sincc the granting of extensions is a discretionary matter, and based on my 
experiencej with Valley CoUnty, I fcar Valley Cou.,): will not gnmt Timberline anolb ... 
extension as retaliation for filing this lawsoit 
I 
I ~:::; 
i ~1ike Mailhot 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before l1)e tillS :l. day of April, 2010. 
I 
JOS=PH M. H£NOErtSON 
., Comrn. !~54514 . l\; 
'-,.t>:qt.;<y Pvoi.c.. Caliio((lIi1 ,.., 
1'1 Dor.ldo Coumy 
Com:n. Expire:s .bl '5.2013 
ota lie for Califomj~ 
Residingin£1 :PY~"';) H:,')ls Crt-
My Commission Expires; ~ 151 iJS> L$ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r H~REBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of April, 2010; a true and correct copy of the 
foregolDg cument was served by first..eEass mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
rransmissio, to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in chnrge oithe office as indicated below: 
MJttbew C. Williams 
I 
Valley County Prosecutor 
I 
P.O. Box l350 
Cai;cade,ID 8%11 
Telephone: (208) 381·7120 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
! 
! 
I 
I 
! ) 
[.x] U.S. Ma.u 
[ 1 Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery [ 1 Hand Delivery 
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Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission 
P.O.~1350 
CourthOU$8 Buifdlng AnllEl.lC 
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
For .Planned Unit Development No. 04~Ol 
(PUD04-0t) 
Tbe Meadows at West Mountain 
Issued to: ]8I;:k Charters 
Buckskin Properties, Inc. 
POBox 145 
Donnelly. ID 83615 
Ca8CG0'9. Idaho 83611 
Phone (208) 382--7114 
Property Location: The property is located in the NE4 of Section 17, T. 16N, R. 3E. Boise 
Meridian. VaHey County. Idaho. The site contains 122 acres. 
There have been no appeals of the Valley County Board of County Commissioner's decision of 
July 12~ 2004. The Board's decision stands and you are hereby issued a conditional use permit 
with coDditioos of approval for establishing PUP 04-01 The Meadows at West Mountain as 
described in the application as. updated,. staff reports.. and minutes. The approved U$e is for 
temporary contractor housing. 221 single-family rl!Sidential lots. 17 common Jots, 2 commercial 
lots totaling 11.2 acres, and ] 60 multi-family units. 
The effective date of this permit is July 13. 2004. All provisions of the eonditional use permit 
must be established according to the phasing plan or a permit extension in comp1.i.ance with the 
Valley COUllty Land Use and Development Ordinance will be required. 
Conditional Use Permit 
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Conditions of Approval: 
1. The application. tbe staff report, and the provisions of the Dmd Use and Development 
Ordinance are all made a pan of this permit as if written in full herein. 
2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shalt require an additional 
Cvnditional Use Permit. 
3. The proposed occupancies described in the application and in this report shalJ be 
established. and in use according to the phasing plan or this pennit shall be null and void. A 
phase wilt be developed at least every two years. 
4. TIle issuance of this pennit and these conditions will not relieve the applicant from 
complying with applicable County, State, or Federal laws or regulations or be construed as 
pennission to operate in violation of any St3WTe or regulations. Violation of these laws, 
regulations or rules may be grounds fur revocation of the Conditional Use Pennit or grounds 
for suspension of the Conditional Use Permit. 
j. A site-gradlD8 pJan approved by the Valley County Engineer is required. 
6. The irrigation district must approve the relocation of the irrigation ditch. 
7. A tetter of approval from the Donnelly Fire Dimet is required. 
8. A lerrer from the Anny Corps of Engineers addressing wetlands is required. 
9. A letter from North Lake Rec.reationaJ Sewer &. Water District verifying use of the sewer 
is required. 
10. A lener verifying Water rights is required from Idaho Dept. of Water Resources and a 
letter from tile Idab<l Department of Environmental Quality addressing the approved water 
system is te4plircrl. 
11. Prior to issuance of buildin8 permits, water, sewer and fire proteCtion will be available. 
12. The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive approval 
from the Board of County Commissioners. 
13. Development of apomon of me multi-family units will be moved to Phase It . 
14. The Homeowner's Association will take care of snow removal 
15. There will be no fencing between single-family structures. 
Conditional Use Permit 
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16. They will not discharge more water into the drainage then pre-development nows. 
17. The final plat will either dedicate or deed to the public the right-of-way along West Roseberry 
Road on the northern portion oftbe develOpn'lent. 
END CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
Conditional Use Pennit 
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. ~#...,. SlATBOPIDAHQ,County of Valley) S$ 
VAUEY COUNTY, CAItM1I, IIMHO. J hereby certify thtir the foregoirJg is . =tIDr:VAU.ET~"-c::r~ true copy of tIte originl!rOn,fi~ and c: 
La\.AIID Go. HIW1IlCH h1.. uo~ record in this offitc. . ~~DIIptQ .l_r~ U-OAh<n Dated: g-.)t,"!Uy. 
.-- - -.. _. I-Y&W'ULUW8ATWESTMOUNTAIN nr._t. • .-. ,r 
. . UU~Aoo:g:t~&~ omufit~~ 
c.uwITAL CON'nU:B1JTrON AGJlEI:MI'.NT BY4 . . . 
Deputy 
THIS AGREEMBNT is made this 12th day of July- 2004. by aDd between . 
P'ROPERlBS lNC. wboac addnsa is P.O. Box 145. Do1melIy ID. 83615 the lJew.Iuper of that 
certain Project in v.tlcIy Couaty. ldaIJD, JaJowa as 1be Ml.AJJ()WS AT WEST MOUNTAIN. and 
V ALt.EY C011NTY, B. poJiticIllUbdMsion of the S,* of ldabo, 0-....... ~ I'B&m:d to 
as "Valley Coum:y"). . 
RBaTALS 
Develop« has submitted aldd subdiviaioo. application tor Valley County appnwaL 
Through the deveIojaueGt I'8!Iicw of 1his app1icatim,. Valley County idcnitied ea1aio. 1IIIIIJjtjptcd 
impeds OD public services aud ~ N8SOJ'J8bJy atttiba1ablc to dIe.PJqect. 
Developei' bas asr-d to participate .in the CO¥t of mitigatina these impacts by COJrtributing its 
proportioo.ttc 18ir share of tb8 c:ott of tbe needed improwmams idlIIti&d irl tbis Agrecmem, aDd 
IistocI OIl the auacbed &bJ"bit A. 
VaBey COllDIy aDd the DeWiIopcI' desire to nlCIIlIOriaIifI the terms of1bDir aareemalt regardiug tfJe 
De¥eIopc:a". participetloo in me fimdiag of c:erCrrin of the ahesaid impnMme.nts. 
AGB.EI':.MI!NT 
2. &_PiPJ Centnblltiou: Developer &gMes to a ptOpOI1iou.ate share of the toad 
imp:ovemeot costs att:ribu1abIe to the sitc-geuerated t:r:a:ffic as established by Valley 
Couaty, Cm'nmtly this amoUDt has been calculated by tbe VB&y OnIDty &pw.er to be 
S461.00 per &weaIF daiJy "'Chicle ttip geb&':raIed by the Project. Road impact 1TIitigarion 
may be provided by Developer coDlIibution of JDI)IIIIf or other capital oJJSets suc.h as 
right.-ot:.way. ~ or iD-liDd ~ Such otmets are iDcluded in this 
AgTeemetIt. 
3. Propordoaate S •• n,,: .DIM:Ioper agrees to J'AlY a 8UI'Jl cqtJal to 119000 of the total costs 
of the road hnprowmeot program identified on tbD attacl:I:d Exhibit A fbI each lIP 
vebicJo trip geuerated by the Project. ReR:r: to the attacNxf ExI:Iiblt B 1br details of the 
caJcuJatio.n. 
4. M ..... od od nadIR of PaymeaUi for Road lm(tlP!!!leats: J:le'w:Ioper shaJl ~e 
capiIal to lVIId Jmpact mi1igalion as esrablishecl by Valley CoUDty at the time the 1inal plat 
of eech phae of' the P.rojed is recorded. Said pIIYIIBIt .may be ~ & ofDets 
descn"becl bmein above. T'ht ~'s a1brcsaid couttibutiooB ahaIl be paid as :anJlows:: 
EXHIBITB 
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A. Metbodffimillg ofPaymcots: The:J.Jeveloper's CODtribution st.n be paid as 
fullows: 
1) Upon the fiaal approval ofdJe preliminary plat 1br the first phase oftbe 
Project,. p&1lDf:U of Sew:oty l1ioc Tho1lSaDd two huDdn:d Jboety t'M) and 
No/lOO DoDIIrs ($79,292.00) sbaII be IllIde by the eo~ oftbe road 
tight4way described on tlac attached ExlMbits C-l 8Dd C-2. The wtaI 
value of'WhidJ is $91,14200 A credit in tbc 8QJOunt ofSll,8S0.00 sbaJ1 
be avaiJable to tfJc lJe'Vdopc:t :fOr future c:apial contI:ibubobs.. 
2) Modifieation. ofDc'vcloper's P8.)'lDBDt ScbtAJu1e: It is admowledged by 
Valley County and the Devdoper 1hal the consttucticm. oftbe road. 
improvaDf3Jfa and t1Je acquisiDon QfpubJic right-of-way XllutuaIfy 
beDeDclal to Valley Coodly and the Developer to complete at tbe earliest 
possible dat& In the C'WIIJt that VaHey County demoDStra1'es that a 
modification or ~ of the tiDq ofDevoJoper's afbresaid 
oontribtd.ions would :taciJiIate au. earlier completion of this project. the 
Developer sbaII DCgOtiate in JOOd 1irith Rlprdins: II» .J:lO&'l'ble 
moc:li6cation of fJ1JIJIor ~ of the a6.uesaid payment scbedoIe.. 
B. Upon the recording of the final plat ofany ibture pIJase of tile ~ Developer 
sbaIl JIIIY a sum pel' avaage daily ~ trip. which is roughly proportional to 
119000 of the lbOSt JeCeDt _Bland construction cost oftbc cur:n:ut road 
improVClJ:lCDt program tor 1bc service 8IC8. That pto8I'8IlltDly iDcIude (1) 
improvemems, which haw been compIded by VEIDey Co1mty prior 10 the dPte of 
cotlt.dbutioa,. .... (2) improw:meds. which are budgeted :fOr cor.op)etion 9ritbin the 
next teo years fiJDowiog the daCe of comribntion. 
C. The COIJtributi.ons made by DevelopCr to Valley County pursuant to the terms of 
this.Agreeme:ut shaD be segregated by VaHey CoUDty aDd eaa.uarhd aDd applied 
ooly to the projoct costs of the road impro'\lClDl!:Dt projects which are specified in 
Exhibit A, or to sueh other projects as are llJIIhWiy agrc:cahle ~ tbe parties. 
D. The sale by Developer ofpart 01' all of the Project prior to the platting tIJereof 
sbaU nat trigger any paymtat or COOIribution~. Howeve:r. in such 
case, the purchuer of sudl propaty, and the saccesso.rs and assips tIJereot shall 
be bouod by the tams of this .AgIeem.I:IJt it cite same respect as DeYebpcr. 
reprdioa the propcrtypm:cbased. 
5. ~UQP; 
Page 2 
A. It is iDtClJded, t2Jar VaDr:y Couat,y w.il1 n:conJ this AJreement The il1teot of the 
:ncordation will be to doc:umc:ot the ofticial aped of the eortractual obfiaation 
set Jbrth. in 1bis ~ Tbia Aareement wiD not in any way esmhlLtb a Iieal 
or other iDta.rcat in &.vor of VaJey County as to any :real property owned by the 
DcwOOper at ~ time of reconIiog, or any real property, vdIidJ, may be acquired 
bytbc ~ CD 8tW date a:Iler the recording of this Agreement 
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VALLEY COUNTY BOARD Oli' COMMISSIONERS: 
Date: f zt-/J Y 
A'IT.I'ST: 
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EXHI8ITA 
DONNELl. Y TO TAMARACK ROAD lMPROVEMafIS PHASE 1 
PIl.OGUIII SUMMARY 
JAN. 7,2004 
lTEM NO. PRmECr 
1 DONHaLYTO TNWW.J<.: C1VfRJ.Ay 
2 W. ROSl:BERRY ROAD EXTENSION 
3 ~A"t~~,~.) , 
.. W. R~ RD. BRIDGE (95'*1 COMPlETE) 
5 ~ ftf'f. ROAD OJLVERlS ~ CXM'lETE) 
'6 IUGlff-oF-WAY ACQUtSmOH 
J ROsz:B.fRRY/NORWOOO lNTERSECTION 
8 CORR1DOR STWY 
9 RCXK a&K BRIDGE 
10 POISON CREEk BIUDG'E 
$1.150.000 
$1,600,000 
$590,000 
$55AOO 
$300,000 
$200..000 
$SOAOO 
$60,000 
tfiO,oao 
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EXHIBIT 8 
DONNELLY TO TAIURA~ ROAD IMPROVEMENlS PHASI! 1 
PROGRAM SUMMARY . 
JAIiI.1,2004 
TAMARACK RESORT 0 3'"" 
CAPITAL CXJNiRl8U1lON 
CAPACITY All.OCAnON 
PLA1TED DEVELOPMENT. 40~ 
CAPITAL CllNTRI8UT1ON 
OPN::1.TY AU.OCAUON 
PlATTED LOTS 
DlNELOPMENT COST PER WItIClE TRIP 
675 
1,245.000 
2700 VPD 
$1.245,000 
2700VPO 
$1.Mt /lDf 
.aBl /vpD 
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EXHIBIT "C-l" 
A PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED IN THE NE 1/4 OF SECTlON 17, 
TOWNSHIP 16 NORTH. RANGE 3 EAST, BOISE MER!DIAN, VAlLEY COUNty, IDAHO 
2004 
UN£' TABlE 
UN[ BEARING LENGTH 
l1 N89'22· ... 7'"W 35.00' 
'-..L2 SlY09'4S"!. 70.00' 
CURVE! RADIUS 
C1 1 165.00' 
C2 1236.00' 
........ .... 
1.38 ACRES 
LEC.ENJ) 
o ClLCULAlEO FIOINf 
• FOUND 5/S" REBAR 
• FOUND BRASS CN' MONUMENT 
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EXHIBIT "C-2" 
A PARCEL or LAND SITUATED IN THE NE , /4 Of SECTION 17, 
TOWNSHIP 16 NORTH, RANGE 3 EAST, 80lSE MERIDIAN, VALLEY COUNTY, IDAHO 
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EXISTING WETlANDS 
THE ~ AT WEST .. OUNTAIN 404 PERIofrT APPUCATIOH 
PROPERTY l..OCAlED NEAR CASCADE LN<E. DONNEl.LY IDAHO 
lOCAll0N: NW t/4 CORHER, SE'CtTON 17. T.l6N. R. 3E. VN..LEY COUHTY. 10»10 
APPl.ICANT: BUCKSKlN PRClf'ERTES 
DETAIL SHEET .3 
PRt:PARED BY: TOO'THIIWt-oRTOH ENGINEERING COMPANY 
DATE: AUGUST t 1, 2004 
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P.D. 60K 072 • C&3CadC. Idaho 63011 
Gordon Cruickshank 
~ntendent 
gcruloonankOco.vallc!Y.ld.us 
om~· (108) ;,oz·n9~ 
fAX· ()06) ~61-7196 
Mr. Jack Charters 
Buckskin Properties lnc. 
P.O. Box 145 
Donnell y Jd, 83615 
Re: Meadows at West Mountain Phasel 
Dear Jack. 
1be Construction Plans for the Phase 1 road, drainage and grading work is approved 
subject to the following conditions: 
1) Prior approval of submittals for the base. su~base and asphall to demonstrate 
compliance with ISPWC Specifications. Compliance with minimum strength 
standards (L.A. Abrasion> 35) is required unless a geotechnical fabric is installed 
below the su~base course. 
2) A quality control plan is required. Outlining the responsibility and frequency of 
Compaction Tests. 
3) Compliance with Valley County fugitive dust standards is required. 
4} Compliance with standard Valley County Road permit condition is required (copy 
attached) 
5) Final inspection and acceptance of lhe work, by the Road Superintendent will be 
required prior to County maintenance of the public roads in Phase I 
6) 1be temporary gI'BveJ site access at Roseberry Road should be paved between 
ChattelS Circle and Cameron Dr. If the Pbase II work is not completed by 2005. 
Sincerely, 
Patrick 
Valley 
- - - - -- --------
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Itigllt-of-Way Use Permit - General Conditions 
I) All wurk shall be completed in accordance with the plans and speci ficalion 
submiUed by the Applicant, (he Idaho S1andal'ds for Public Works Constructions 
{1SPWC), and the conditions oflne permit 
2) The Applicant will monitor the quality or lhte work pterfonlloo by the,Contraclor 
for confomlance with the plans. specifications and conditions ofthis permit. The 
required inspection and testing results will be suhmilted to Valley County .in a 
timely manner for review, I[(he required fcsting is not provided then Valley 
Count}' wiU hire ./lSojJ Engineer 10 perfonn .lbe w1)rk and direct expenses 
incurred will be biUed to Ihe applicanl Failure to perf ann according to 
~!Jir~m~nts 10 this. penni.l will r~\t in 1~ f!!vP!:'-.ation oflh~ J>«:rmit 
3) Trench backfill shaH be 6" minus granular fi II material compacted in J 8" lifts 10 a 
density of95% as measured by ASTM 0 698, Compaction tests shall be 
perfonned at least every 500' oftrencll. 
4) Road base shall be tYJle 1 crushed gravel confonning 10 lSPWC Section 802 
placed with a minimum thickness of 6" and compacled to a density of 100% as 
measur-ed by AASHTO T 99. Tests shall be performed at each crossing or at least 
every 500' oftrencll. A gradation and abrasion test are required for the gravel. 
5) Asphalt resurfacing shall be Class I plant mix asphalt. conforming to JSPWC 
Section 8\0. Asphalt shan be placed witb a minimum 1hickness of2 W' and a 
minimwn tolerance of y,. .. measur~ with a 10' straight edge standard, Asphalt 
shaH be compacted to a denslty of 97% maximum weight as measured by 
AASHTO T 166 (method A). Test shall be performed at all road crossing. 
6) Asphalt joints shall be saw cut immediately prior to resurfacing. Cuts shall be 
made along smooth straight lines with a minimum IXltch width of 4', An 
emulsified asphalt tack coat shall be applied on all roge joints. 
7J Road sooulders shall be reco/lslmclClJ wilh 6" of type I gravel wilh a mil1imum 
width of2 feet and 2: I·emba.nkment side sIOfJe. ShouJder and embankment shaU 
be compacted 10 a density of95% (AS1M D 698) <lnd revegetated with an 
approved seed mix followingconslructiol1. 
8) Roadway borrow ditched disturbed during conslructl0n shall be cleaned and 
r~gra~ tp .the :ilandard Valley County dilch 5~tion f;:H19wingf!()l1Slmction. 
9) Asphalt road surfaces removed or damaged shall be repaved witllin 7 calendar 
days of the initial excavation. Temporary palchi'1B materials shall be approved by 
Valley County prior to instaltatiol1. 
10) Signs. marker or delinealors posts removed or damaged during construction shaH 
he replaced with new posts and compacted bnckfilL Sign installation shall 
confonn to ISPWC~ SD-J 131. 
II) Construction traffic eontrol devices and activities shall conform to the MUTeD 
recommendations. 
12)AII public and private loads will remain open to at least one traffic lane at all 
times and both traffic lanes wiJI bq open during the night. Construction activities 
shall'be schedliled to m'jnimiz.e 'inleITuplion of traffic, Through traffic Sluiu norbe 
stopped for more than 5 minutes at any time without prior written authorization, 
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ROAD DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREDQ;NT is modo Ibis O?G 77z. day of~ .2005. 
by and between Buckskin PJoperties lnc.., whose address is P _ _ Box 145. DonnellY. 
Idaho 83615, the »noelo.,.. oftbat certain Project in Valley couoty. Idaho. known as the 
MeIICiowIat West MeuaWa - Phase 2. and VaUq Ceuty, a political subdivision of 
the Smte ofldabo. (hereinafter referred to as "Valley County"). 
RECITALS 
Developer bas submitted a subdivision application to Valley CouDty for approval of 8 
J 58 lot remdeGrial development .known as the Meadows at West:Moumain - Phase 2. 
Through the development review oftbis application. Valley County identified certain 
unmitigated b0l*" on public SCl'Vic:u and ia1i:ast:ruc«u reasonably atCributable to the 
Project. 
DeveJoper has agreed to participde in the cost of mitisatin81bese impacts by 
contributing its proportionate &ir share oftbe cost oftbe needed improvements identified 
in the Agreeme:ut and listed OlD. the attacbed Exhibit A. 
Valley Comly and the Developer desire to memorialize the terms of their agreement 
regarding the Developer's participation in the fuudiog of certain of the aforesaid 
imprt>vemeots. 
AGREEMENT 
Therefore. it is agreed as foUo\1lS: 
L Capital I"'p1'OlIeInent Program: A lis:ti.qg and cost estimate oftbe West Roseberry 
Area 200S Roadway Capitallmprovemeul Program, incorporating construction 
and right-of-way needs for Ibc project area is attached as Exhibit A. 
2. Proportionate shore: Developer agrees to a proportionate share of the road 
UDprovemen.t costs: attr:ibuqbfe to U8ffi.c generated by the Meadows at West 
Mountain - Phase 2 as established by Valley County. Curreatly Ibis amount bas 
been calculated by the Valley County Engineer to be $461 per average daily 
vehicle trip geru:mted by the Project. ReiUlO Ex.hibit A aud Exh.ibit B for details 
of the West Roseberry Area 2005 Capitallmpro-vemem Prognun Cost Estimate. 
Road impac:t mitigation may be pro"rided by Developer OODIribution of money or 
other capital offsets wch as right-of-way, engiDeeri.ng or in-kind coostruction.. 
Such an offset to the road improvements is addressed in paragraph 3 of this 
Agreement. 
3. Capital contrilndion: Developer agrees to pay a sum equal 10 $1,844 (an average 
of 8 trips per lot x ~ (50% split) x $461 per trip) per each ofdIe 62 single fiuniLy 
Meadows - Phase 2 Road Development Agreement Page 1 of4 
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residential lots. Developer agrees to plY a sum equal to SI,.383 (an average of6 
alps per unit X ~ (5()o,4 split) X $461 per trip) per each of the 96 apartment 
dwelling units. The Developer's proportionate share of the road improvements 
identified in Exhibit A for the 158 residential units shown on the subdivision 
application is S247.0961ess the followiogoffsets: 
Existing Credit of S II ,850 for roadway right-of-way dediaIled 
UDder Phase I of this deveJopmeDt aod dooumented UDder the 
subsequent Road Development Agreerneot approved by Valley 
County OIl July 26; 2005. 
Dedicated roadway right-of-way as shown on the Final Plat and 
more specifically described as; Ten (10) feet adjacem to 
Roseberry Road for a dismnce of960'. and totaliDg 0.2204 acres. 
The value oftbe dedicated ROW is $3,086. 
The total value oflhe dec:Iieated ROW is S14,936. 
The developer a;rees to PlY Valley Coontythedifference between their 
proportiomde share of roadway costs (1247,096) less the otDecs for dedicated 
right-of-way ($14,936) for a total cash paymeot 0($232,160 due prior to 
recordation of the Final Plat 
4. The CObtributions made by Developer to Valley County pursuant to the tams of 
this Agreerneot sball be segregated by Valley County and earmarked aud applied 
0DIy to tile project costs ofb road improvement projects specified in Exhibit A 
or to such otbe:t projects as are mutually agreeable to the parties. 
S. The sale by Dewloper of part or aU oftbe Project prior' to the pIattins thereof 
sball not trigger any pay:ment or contn"bution respousibility. However. in such 
case, the purchaser of sucb property. and the successors and assigns thereof: sball 
be bound by die tams of this Agreement in the .same respect as Developer. 
regarding the property purcbased. 
6. Recordation: It is iotended that Valley County will record this A.gl'eement. The 
intent of the ~ will be to document the official asped of the contractual 
obligation set furth in this A.gl'eement This Agreement will not in any way 
establish a lien or otfJcr interests in favor ofVaUey County as to any real property 
owned by the Developer at the time af reconiing. or any real property that may be 
acquited by the Developer OD any date after 1bc recording of this Agreement. 
Madaws- Phase 2 Road Development Agreement Page2of4 
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By:!JJ=a~ 
Jack A. Charters. uu:mber ofBuclcskiJl Properties.lnc:., Developer 
VALLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: 
By: ____ £"--"X'-'C ...... "::..--J. _(].,.::J"'"-________ Date: ___ _ 
Commissioner/Chairman F. Pbillip Davis 
By: z;d~ 
Commissioner F. W. BId 
A1TEST: 
V ALLEY COUNTY CLERK: 
4~~~y;JJ_··· __ Date: 4hJ/~ yeJt{;l((G~- ~
It .'/ 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
) IS. 
COUNTY OF VALLEY ) 
On this ;;:?,.[ptJ.. dayOf~lk»k., 2005. beforetne. CJc..rJ Nt\. K. ¥ou'1' 
the undersigned, a Notary bJie in and for said State, personally appeared 
-:s o.c. i:. A c.bu.r-k-; and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
In witness whereo( I have unto set my hand and affixed roy official seal the day aod year 
~r~ /~ ~ 
Reaidins at~~ 
,idaA 206// 
My CommissiooExpires: <4 3~, :l.O){ 7 . 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) as. 
COUNTY OF VALLEY ) 
OntIUs ;).~ dayof ~ 2005.befureme. ~-J~~ 
the undersi!ed. a N~ P\iiiCiIlBDd fOr'said State. personally appeared ~,~ ~ 
1 J-.~ W. K",,JA .. l '* r. w 0.( .... and actnowIedged to me that they executed the same. 
In witDess whereof: I have unto set my band and affhr.ed my official seal the day and year 
first written. 
My Commission Expires: _---<Jc..LJ_--'C'J-=---.....,v ~!r'-y--
Meadows - Phase 2 Page 4 of4 
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EXHIBIT A 
DONNElLY TO TAMARAC( ROAD IMPROVEMENtS PHASE' 1 
PROGRAM SUMMARY 
.MJL7,2OM 
ITEM NO. PROJECT 
1 OONNB.LY TO TN4ARICK CM:Rl.AY 
2 W. ROSEBERIlY ROAD EXTENSION 
3 CAJ.S;:WAY ENGINEBUNG (PRElIM.) 
.. W. ROSEBERRY RD. BIUI:JQ: (951f, (])MPLEJ'E) 
5 WEST Mr. ROAD OJlVERTS (95'MI (])MPLEJ'E) 
6 RJGHT ...()F-WAY ACQJJSlTION 
7 ROSt:Bt.RRY/NORWOOO INTERSECnON 
8 CCIRRlIXIt Sl1JUt 
9 ROCX CREE)( BR1DGE 
10 POlSON CREaC BRlDGf 
ESllMAlED 0)S1' 
$1,150,000 
$1,600,,000 
$85,000 
$S90,ooo 
$55,000 
$300,000 
$200,000 
$50,000 
$60,000 
$CiOJIID 
$41150,000 
-"---------
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EXHIBnB 
DONNEUY TO TAMARACK ROAD IMPROVEMENTS PHASE 1 
PROGRAM SUMMARY 
JAN.7,2D04 
TAMAIlACK RESORT • :JOIM. 
CAPITAL CONTRlBUTlON 
CAPICITY AIJ..OOnlON 
PLAna DWELOPMBrI' ...... 
CAPITAl. CDHTRJIlJ1lCIN 
t::»fJCtTY AI.J.OCAnON 
PlATfED LOTS 
DEVEUJPMDIT COST PER fUTURE lOT 
900 
$4,150,000 
9,000 VPD 
1,245,000 
2100VPD 
$1,660,000 
3600 VPD 
$1,245,000 
2700 VPD 
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PO Box 1350 
219 Nortl1 Main Street 
Cascade, 10 83611-1350 
Todd Hatfield, Chairman 
Harry Stathis, Vice-Chairman 
Phone: 208.382.7115 
Fax: 208.382.7119 
Email: cberrick@co.vallev.id.yS 
Website: WHIW.CO. YaIJey.id. us 
Ed Allen, Commissioner 
Rob Garrison, Commissioner 
Tom Olson, Jr., Commissioner 
VALLEY COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING MEETING MINUTES 
DATE: July 9, 2009 
TIME: 6:00 p.m. - 7:30 p.m. 
LOCATION: Valley County Courthouse 
AITENDANCE: Commissioners present: Chairman Todd Hatfield, Rob Garrison, Tom Olson, 
Jr., Harry Stathis, and Ed AJlen were present. Staff member present: Cynda Herrick, AICP, 
Planning and Zoning Administrator. 
MINUTES: 
Commissioner Garrison moved to approve the June 1 1,2009, minutes. Commissioner Allen 
seconded the motion. Molion carried with changes indicated on page 5, second paragraph 
changing "law to have a tank". 
Commissioner Allen moved to table minutes from June 25, 2009 to July 28,2009. 
Commissioner Stathis seconded the motion. Motion carried. 
OLD BUSINESS: 
1. CUP 05-17 Wbite Cloud Pbase 2 - ExteD~ion Request: Elkhom LLC is requesting 
approval of a one-year extension of the final plat approval that currently expires on August I, 
2009. White Cloud Phase 1 was recorded July 2006. Phase 2 is a replat of Block 4 and Block 5 
of Phase L The site is located in the SE Section 24 & NE Sec 25, T.18N, R.2E. and SW Sec 19 
& NW Sec. 30, T.IBN, R3E, B.M., VaHey County, Idaho. [Not a public hearing.1 
Staff explained that the applicant was continuing to monitor for septic pennits as described in the 
request for extension from James Fronk, P.E., Secesh Engineering. dated June 11.2009. Staff 
also explained that the first phase had already been recorded and all improvements of 
infrastructure were complete. 
Commissioner Stathis moved to extend final plat approval for CUP 05-17 White Cloud Phase 2 
to August 1,2010. Commissioner Allen seconded the motion. Motion carried. 
Planning and Zoning Minutes 
July 9, 2009 
Page 10f4 
EXHIBITD 
633 
2. pun 04-01 The Meadows at West Mountain, Phases 4-6 - Extension Request: 
Timberline Developments, LLC, are requesting approval of an one-year extension of the 
Conditional Use Permit which states that a phase will be developed at least every two years. 
Phase 4 expires on July 12,2009. The site is located in Section l7, T.16N, R.3E, B.M., Valley 
County. Idaho. [Not a public hearing.] 
Staff explained that the applicant was requesting an extension in order to finalize the road 
development agreement; seek approval from North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District; 
gain approval from Valley County for engineering of phases 4-6; and approval from the county 
surveyor. Staff also explained that the first three phases had already been recorded. 
Commissioner Stathis moved to extend final plat approval for PUD 04-01 Meadows at West 
Mountain Phase 4-6 to July 12,2010. Commissioner Olson seconded the motion. Motion 
carried. 
3. Impact Fees: Continuation of discussion on Impact Fees - (Moved on agenda to the end of 
New Business.) 
A. NEW BUSINESS: 
1. C.U.P. 09-09 Elo Estates - Preliminary & Final Plat: Youde - Three Forks, LLC, and 
Steve & Ingri MilIemann are requesting approval of a 2-lot single-family residential subdivision 
on approximately 24 acres. Subdividing this property would rectify an iIIegaJ Jot split. The 
subdivision would be served by jndividual well and septic systems. Conservation easements are 
]ocated on the property. The property is currently addressed as ) J 71 & 1291 Elo Road and is 
located in the E Y2 SE ~ Section 22, T.ISN, R3E. BM, Valley County, Idaho. 
Chairman Hatfield asked if there was any exparte contact or conflict of interest. Chainnan 
Hatfield excused himself from discussions due to conflict of interest. 
Commissioner Stathis, Vice-Chairman, acted as the Chairman and asked for the Stafi' Repor1:. 
Staff presented the Staff Report and read an e-mail from Janet Lord (exhibit [). 
Bob Youde, 1210 Samson Trail, managing panner, to represent the applicant: 
• 12.5 acre parceJ was approved in 1997, but final plat was never recorded. 
• Parcel has been so 1d and resold since 1997. 
• Discussed septic issue. 
• Discussed road right-of-way. 
• Intention is to keep this intact as a single family residential site. 
• MiIlemann's are co-applicants. 
• Purpose is to make this a legal lot. 
Commissioner Garrison asked if other half has a house, well, and septic. Youde confirmed. 
Planning and Zoning Minutes 
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Commissioner Stathis asked if there were any proponents, undecided, or opponents. There were 
none. 
Commissioner Stathis closed the public hearing. Discussion ensued: correcting error, septic is 
taken care of, can find no issues. 
Commissioner Garrision moved to approve C.U.P. 09·09 Elo Estates, preliminary and final plat. 
and authorize the Chairman to sign. Commissioner Allen seconded the motion. Motion carried. 
OLD BUSINESS: 
1. Impact Fees: Continuation of discussion 011 Impact Fees. 
Chainnan Hatfield announced the item and invited Assessor Campbell and Clerk Banbury to 
address the Commission. 
Assessor Campbell stated she is here to give accurate infonnation concerning Mr. Moore's 
presentation as presented on June 11,2009. She presented exhibit 1 - Crane Shores and exhibit 2 
• Hawks Bay Subd Tax Comparison. She then explained the worksheets. 
Archie Banbury, Clerk, stated this is the first time he has ever talked to a Commission about 
funds. He commended the Commission. He questioned where to go with the discussion. He 
said he will try to impart some background - we do fund accounting. aU of which have their own 
income and expense. There are 22 funds. At the beginning of this year, there was 8.S million; 
but, you need to take out for operating cash, trust funds that cannot be spent, court facilities fund, 
etc. 
Working capitaJ gets you from the low point to the high point. A financial statement is a snap 
shot. Need to take a look at whether we need Impact Fees. Over last three - four years, building 
and P&Z have contributed large revenues, which are now down. 
Commissioner Olson asked how you budget when impact fees are small. Archie said we 
anticipated a slow down. Commissioner Olson asked, how would you budget impact fees? 
Archie - you would have to budget it fow. Funds can be put into a contingency fund to save the 
money and cannot be spent without unanimous vote of County Commissioners. 
Commissioner Garrison questioned black side of the budget. In boom years, where does the 
money go? Archie responded, into general fund and can be diverted into capital improvements. 
Discussion ensued concerning the court facilities fund. 
Commissioner Olson asked ifnew funds could be established for capital improvements. Archie 
stated can only have 5% reserve. Talked about decrease in building fees, Tamarack's capital 
improvements, etc. but had increase in PIL T funds. Grants were discussed. County grants to 
seniors, WICAP, etc. 
Commission Allen made a motion to set a public hearing on August 25 at 6:00 for Impact Fees. 
Amendments to the comprehensive plan and the adoption of CIP and implementation of impact 
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fees. Commissioner Stathis s~onded. Motion carried. Chairman Hatfield voted no. 
B. OTHER ITEMS: 
I. Facts & Conclusions! 
• C.U.P. 09~02 SLRWSD Treatment Plant 
• C.U.P. 09-07 Shilo Bible Camp - Managers Residence 
Commissioner Allen moved to approve the Facts and Conclusions as listed. Commissioner 
Garrison seconded the motion. Motion carried. 
2. Discussion of Proposed Subdivision Regulations & LUDO Amendments: The 
Commission agreed to have a work session at the regularty scheduled meeting in August. 
3. Appeal of Administrative Decision - C.U.P. required for Kelly's Whitewater Park 
There needs to be public input. This park will be there for a long time. Need to know where 
rock will be, parking, facilities, etc. 
Jim Fodrea responded. The packages are ready to go to the Corps and state agencies. Focus is to 
place rock in river this fall. 
Commissioner Allen moved to require a conditional use permit for Kelly's Whitewater Park. 
Commissioner Garrison seconded the motion. Motion carried. 
Meeting adjourned 7;35 p.m. 
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